

Poland

130. Airgram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

A-47

Warsaw, January 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

United States Policy Assessment—Poland.

REF

II FAM 212.3-5²

The past year was not a good one for U.S.-Polish relations. Poland's image in the U.S., already damaged by the regime's retreat in previous years from the atmosphere of liberalism and progress which characterized the period immediately following October 1956,³ was further blackened in 1968 by the harsh suppression of the student demonstrations in March, the increasing shrillness—at least for the first half of the year—of the “anti-Zionist” campaign, and, finally, by Poland's participation in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. These developments were sharply criticized in the United States, both on the official level as well as by the public at large, and the action against Czechoslovakia caused the U.S. to cancel several “high-visibility” cultural exchanges with Poland. Internally, the regime concentrated on such essentially negative concepts as anti-revisionism and hostility to the FRG, while asserting its unswerving allegiance to the U.S.S.R. “for better or worse.” The political climate became more oppressive and the Embassy found it more difficult to maintain productive contacts.

In the face of such a gloomy picture, questions naturally arise as to the desirability of attempting to seek better political and economic relations with Poland. More broadly, Poland's conduct, like those of her partners in the action against Czechoslovakia, raises questions

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 POL-US. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, USNATO, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, Paris, Poznan, Sofia, Vienna, and Prague.

² This regulation in the *Foreign Affairs Manual* required ambassadors to provide annual reports on relations with the country to which they were assigned.

³ In October 1956 Gomulka returned to power as Poland's Communist leader in the wake of a wave of strikes and popular protest. Gomulka implemented several major reforms that conflicted with the Soviet model of communism, including relative toleration of the Catholic Church, an end to collectivized agriculture, and limited freedom of expression.

about the validity of the concept of "building bridges" to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.⁴

With regard to the over-all policy of "bridge-building" (a label which incidentally has probably outlived its usefulness), it is perhaps pertinent to stress the obvious—that it should correctly be seen as a policy for the very long term. Also, at least in my view, it should not have been our expectation that, through expanding Western ties with the East European countries, a process of "osmosis" would occur in which liberalization in these countries (as apart from the U.S.S.R.) would make it possible to work out a resolution of the German problem and of European security.⁵ Surely, such fundamental alterations in the status quo can only be brought about through a change in the Soviet Union's perception of its security interests. And to say this only underlines the long term nature of the process envisaged: While progress has been made in the period since World War II, the time frame is still measurable in terms of generations, not decades.

Of course, to achieve progress on general problems of European security, there must be change in the East European countries as well as in the Soviet Union. While the attitude of the latter is determinant, the process goes hand-in-hand and cannot be separated. We should work for constructive change and broader areas of agreement both in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe, seeking to build positive attitudes wherever and whenever this may be possible and always keeping in mind that the evolutionary process we wish to encourage is certain to be slow, difficult, and erratic. We must be patient—but also ready to exploit favorable opportunities as they appear in order to further the process.

It is helpful to see our own relations with Poland in the light of these considerations. While the negative phenomena mentioned in the first paragraph are real and discouraging, there are other aspects of the Polish scene which are more promising. The elements which have always distinguished the "Polish way," and which were highlighted in October 1956, are still very much in evidence, i.e., a strong sense of nationalism, a powerful Catholic Church, and an agricultural system in which 85 per cent of the land is privately owned. Popular attitudes in Poland traditionally have been anti-Russian, and this sentiment has

⁴ On July 8, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson approved NSAM 352, entitled "Bridge Building," which instructed U.S. Government agencies to "actively develop areas of peaceful cooperation with the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union." For the full text of the NSAM, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XVII, Eastern Europe, Document 15.

⁵ This seems to have been suggested in some recent NATO discussions. [Footnote in the original.]

probably been reinforced by the Czech events and the widespread feeling that the Soviet Union is tightening its controls. Gomulka may say that Poland is with the U.S.S.R. "for better or worse," and the people must acquiesce, but they are not happy about it. Rather, their hopes and desires identify with the West, most immediately with the countries of Western Europe, but ultimately, and even more strongly, with the U.S., which is seen as a country where the individual can prosper in freedom and where technological progress has reached its zenith. The millions of Poles who have emigrated to the U.S. and done well there of course contribute to this image.

On the internal front, despite the efforts of the regime to tighten the ideological screws and bottle up the effervescence of youth and the intellectuals, there is a sense of repressed dynamism and a desire for change. The regime gives the impression of being on the defensive, and the tone of its recriminations against liberal policies and against the West is indicative of its weakness. Under the blanket of imposed orthodoxy, intense political maneuvering is taking place as Gomulka tries to keep on top of those forces demanding new political and economic policies which will be less dogmatic than the old and more keyed to Poland's national interests.

In this situation, the U.S. should follow policies aimed at enhancing its influence in Poland and broadening the range of its contacts with those individuals in Poland who seem most likely to play significant roles in the changes which are certain to come in the future. Poland's size (the largest of the Eastern European countries), the energy of her people, the possibilities of U.S.-Polish trade (already more than with any other East European country except Yugoslavia), the geographic position of Poland and the importance of her attitudes regarding the security of Central Europe, the family ties between millions of U.S. citizens and their relations in Poland—all of these factors argue for a positive U.S. policy. The unattractive features of the present regime are obvious and difficult. Some must simply be tolerated, such as the regime's determination to stay closely aligned with the U.S.S.R.; others, such as anti-Semitism, cannot be passed over and should be the object of our concern, expressed at high levels as may be appropriate. This should not prevent us, however, from making the most of the many opportunities which remain open to us in Poland to promote in a discreet manner the evolution which is already in train.

The Embassy has outlined its specific proposals for action programs recently (Embtel 5366 of December 11, 1968)⁶ and will submit more detailed suggestions in a separate report. Briefly, we recommend

⁶ For the text of the telegram, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XVII, Eastern Europe, Document 138.

continued and expanded student, professor, and technical exchanges; expanded use of PL-480⁷ funds for English language teaching and scientific research projects (including increased contacts with the U.S.-sponsored Children's Hospital in Krakow); the revamping of VOA broadcasts to appeal more to youth, and the re-introduction of some form of a media guarantee program. As opportunities present themselves, we should also promote exchanges of the "highly-visible" variety, such as symphony orchestras, theatre groups, and jazz ensembles. In the trade field, we favor maintenance of Most Favored Nation tariff treatment for Poland, participation in the Poznan Fair, competitive commercial credits, a reinstitution of Export-Import Bank credit guarantees, resumption of normal commercial promotion activities and discreet encouragement of meaningful Polish participation in international bodies such as GATT and the ECE, as well as increased contacts wherever feasible between Poland and other East European countries and the OECD.

Other areas of bilateral interest in which progress might be possible are (1) resumption of negotiations for conclusion of a Consular Agreement, in which the Poles recently have expressed a strong interest, and (2) reduction on a reciprocal basis of the travel restrictions for official personnel which grew out of our unilateral imposition of such controls in 1963.⁸

Lastly, I believe it would be helpful if the U.S., in consultation with the FRG, could take a public position recognizing de facto the permanency of the present western boundaries of Poland.⁹ While this would

⁷ P.L.-480, signed into law on July 10, 1954, was formally known as the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. P.L.-480 became synonymous with the Food for Peace program during the Kennedy administration. The enactment of the Food for Peace Act of 1966 (P.L.-89-808) instituted sweeping changes, including the establishment of self-help criteria as a means of evaluating possible recipients. For the text of the Act of 1966, see Stat. 1526. For text as amended, see 7 U.S.C. 1721 *et seq.*

⁸ For further information on the restrictions placed upon Polish and other Soviet-bloc diplomats traveling in the United States in 1963, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Documents 83, 85, 86, and 87. For the text of the U.S. statement announcing the restrictions, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 2, 1963, pp. 860-63.

⁹ At the Potsdam Conference, the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed on August 1, 1945, that "pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including the portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany." (*Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, p. 63) Based on the decisions at Potsdam, Poland declared that its border with Germany, the Oder-Neisse line, was permanent. In contrast, the United States, concurring with the FRG, argued that the final delimitation of the Polish-German border would have to await a German peace treaty.

admittedly be a far-reaching and complicated political move, requiring in particular some straightforward talk with Bonn as to our view of the European scene, it would be a step reflecting the realities of the situation and one which would not only be influential in lessening the impact of one major element of the communist propaganda line in Poland but which also could prepare the way for more rational Polish-FRG relations.

In sum, despite a difficult year in 1968, I believe it is in the best interests of the U.S. to follow a policy aimed at expanding our influence over the long term in Poland and encouraging those elements which are ready and even anxious to work with us. Regardless of adverse developments, we should never feel that the “game is up” in Poland. This is a lively country, inhabited by energetic and imaginative people who look to the West, not the East. The light cast by the U.S. is bright in Poland, and we should do everything we can to ensure that it is not permitted to dim. On the contrary, we should work so that its rays will become ever more penetrating.

WJS

131. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 9, 1969, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation with the President Concerning Poland and other matters

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Henry Kissinger
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

1. At the President's suggestion, I discussed the situation in Poland briefly, noting the relatively good opportunities the Embassy had for contacts and the wide-spread sympathy towards the U.S. on the part of the people. These factors, plus a strong feeling of nationalism in Poland, provided the U.S. with the possibility of exerting constructive influence in Poland. I said I had the impression that the Polish Gov-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL POL-US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting took place at the White House.

ernment in recent months had indicated interest in improving its relations with Western Europe and with the U.S., in part because of economic pressures; the Poles realized that they could not get everything they needed from the Soviet Union and they were interested in trade and Western technology. In conclusion, I noted that, of course, the regime in Poland was thoroughly Communist and closely attached to the Soviet Union.

2. The President expressed himself in very friendly terms toward Poland and her people. He recalled with pleasure the warmth of the reception he had received in Warsaw when he visited there as Vice President.² On the other hand, he knew that Gomulka was extremely tough; the President had found him cold as steel and harder in his attitudes than Khrushchev.

3. The President said he was very anxious for the U.S. to keep in contact and communication with the Polish people. He remarked that it was not within our capability, certainly in the short term, to pull Poland away from the Soviet Union. Also, there could be no thought on our part of stimulating revolutions in Poland or any of the other countries in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the President felt that we could be active in promoting contacts with Poland in cultural and other fields. In this context, he wondered if it would be appropriate to send a member of the Cabinet to Poland soon. I said I felt it probably would be too early for such a step, although it certainly should be kept in mind, if, as I hoped, relations between the U.S. and Poland improved. The President mentioned that, if it would not be appropriate to send a Cabinet member, we might keep in mind the possibility of other high-level officials from his staff. For example, Mr. Moynihan might visit Poland with a view to discussing urban problems with Polish experts.

4. The President favored trade with Poland and with the other East European countries. After Viet Nam is settled, the Administration will be prepared to take far ranging actions in this field. For the present, however, attitudes in Congress prevent any major moves in this direction since some of the East European countries are helping North Viet Nam. The President knew that Eastern Europe could not satisfy its requirements in the technological field by depending on the Soviet Union. In particular, he believed this was true in the computer field, and he thought that, in the future, we should give consideration to selling computers in Eastern Europe since such a step could be in our interest.

² For documentation on Nixon's August 2-4, 1959 visit to Poland as Vice President, see *Foreign Relations*, 1958-1960, volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe Region; Poland; Greece; Turkey; Yugoslavia, pp. 190-225.

5. I mentioned my concern at the prospect that, because of budgetary problems, the U.S. would not be able to exhibit at the Poznan international fair in June 1970. The President said he believed it was of great importance that we exhibit at Poznan and the money to do so could be found somehow. He asked Mr. Kissinger to be in touch with Mr. Shakespeare of USIA on this subject. In speaking of Poznan, the President mentioned the possibility that a Cabinet officer might be sent to open our exhibit at the fair next year. On the general question of trade fairs, the President commented that we should emphasize our participation in fairs in Eastern Europe, where our presence is needed. We should not be so concerned about other areas, such as Western Europe, where trade and contacts are good in any event.

6. After I had described, at the President's request, the enthusiastic reception given in Poland to the Apollo 11 moon landing, the President suggested that, if Hungary declined to receive the astronauts on their forthcoming tour, we should request Poland to accept their visit.³ The President remarked that Poland had been his first choice as a country in Eastern Europe for the astronauts to visit, but he had anticipated that Gomulka would not be willing to accept them. However, in view of the great public response in Poland to the moon shot, he now thought that it might be difficult for Gomulka to turn down the prospect of such a visit. The President noted that he did not feel it was appropriate for the astronauts to tour all of the countries of Eastern Europe and that it clearly would not be appropriate for them to go to Romania so soon after his own enthusiastic welcome there.

7. The President then spoke about U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. If the Soviets now appear to be seeking détente and to want agreement with us on certain problems, this is because they see it as in their interest to do so. They approach these matters with their heads, not with their hearts, which is quite understandable. We must aim at convincing the Soviets that they need our cooperation in various areas in order to have peace and stability. One area is in Eastern Europe; others are in the Middle East and Viet Nam. The Soviets have some soft spots in Eastern Europe. We can work on these to some extent with the view to stimulating constructive change, but we must always bear in mind that we cannot go too far. The examples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia (although we had nothing to do with the latter) are very fresh in our minds. All in all, it is a delicate game which must be played with skill. The President encouraged me to recommend ways in which we could expand our contacts in

³ The Hungarian Government turned down a visit by the Apollo 11 astronauts during their September 29–November 5 worldwide tour; see Document 110. The astronauts did not visit Poland.

Poland. He felt that for too long we have not been sufficiently active in our Polish policy.

8. The President referred to the problem of the Oder-Neisse frontier.⁴ He wondered how serious this question really was for the Poles, since there was no chance of changing this boundary in any case. Mr. Kissinger commented that recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier by the FRG was strictly an internal political problem in West Germany. The acuteness of this problem was lessening with time as the influence of the expellees declined. The President repeated again that changing the border was unthinkable.

9. The President questioned me concerning the problem of anti-Semitism in Poland, recalling that it seemed fairly bad when he had been there in the late '50's. I said the situation had worsened following the Arab-Israeli war.⁵ Special procedures had been instituted by the regime under which Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel could do so by giving up their Polish citizenship. Around 6000 had taken advantage of this, leaving roughly 22,000 Jews in the country. It appeared that Gomułka himself had not favored the anti-Semitic campaign and in the last six months the situation seemed calmer. The President remarked that by their policy the Poles had lost some of their brightest people through emigration and he thought the anti-Semitic actions in Poland had been highly unfortunate. Mr. Kissinger noted that this problem was also related to internal domestic politics in Poland, since a number of Jews had occupied high posts in the Communist Party and the Government and had been targets of Moczar. Mr. Kissinger understood Jewish emigration would end as of September 1. I said the situation was not entirely clear on this point. We had received assurances from Polish officials that emigration of Jews in the future would be permitted under normal procedures, although probably on a more selective basis than in the past.

⁴ See footnote 9, Document 130.

⁵ Reference to the "Six Day War" of June 1967. Documentation on the U.S. concern regarding official anti-Semitism is in *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, volume XVII, Eastern Europe; Austria; Finland, Documents 132, 134, and 135.

132. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, September 24, 1969, 1735Z.

Secto 41/3189. Subject: Secretary's Meeting with Polish FonMin, Sept. 23.²

Following summary based on uncleared memcon,³ Noforn and FYI only subject to revision upon review.

Jedrychowski started by saying Polish policy was to improve relations with all nations. US-Polish relations were improving and were especially favorable in economic and cultural fields. He believed major difficulties had been eliminated in our talks on consular convention and said he hoped signature could take place soon. Jedrychowski termed certain financial problems which two countries had settled "too insignificant to mention here." Poland intended to make more use of US technology, he said. In next two years Poland would not be able to afford purchases of industrial capital goods because of outstanding debts. Starting in 1971 Poland could increase purchases from US, particularly of complete industrial plants, as part of five-year plan now being formulated. Jedrychowski said total investment in period 1971–75 would be equivalent to investment of previous 19 years and total 1,250,000,000,000 zlotys or 30 to 35 billion dollars. Jedrychowski cited two obstacles to increased purchases from US: (a) US embargo—Poles never know which items will be turned down and (b) credit offered in US not comparable with that offered in Western Europe. He pointed to amendment to ExIm Bank charter⁴ which prevented Poles from making use of ExIm guarantees for purchases in US. Jedrychowski requested Secretary to look into possibility of modifying ExIm Bank policy so Poland could come into US market in bigger way in future.

2. Secretary assured Jedrychowski we also wished to improve relations. President still remembered warm reception he had received

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 POL. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Warsaw, London, Paris, Moscow, and Prague.

² In telegram 2648 from Warsaw, August 20, Stoessel reported that Winiewicz had requested the scheduling of a meeting between Rogers and Jedrychowski, who would be attending the UN General Assembly in September. (Ibid.)

³ Memoranda of conversation are *ibid.*, Conference Files, 1966–1972, Entry 30S1B, CF 397—24th UNGA, Sept 1969, Memcons II.

⁴ Reference is to the Findley Amendment, adopted October 18, 1966, as a rider to the 1967 Export-Import Bank appropriations bill. It forbade the Bank to make loans to any Communist Bloc state without a Presidential determination that such action was in the national interest. For the text of the relevant portion of P.L. 89–691, approved October 15, 1966, see 80 Stat. 1024.

from Polish people when he was Vice President. He asked for reaction in Poland to Apollo 11 flight. M Jedrychowski said reaction was one of great appreciation and respect for US achievement. Polish people were well informed of all details of Apollo mission. Secretary commented: "Not as in some other Communist countries." Jedrychowski said he didn't know. He thought some Communist states were late in presenting TV transmission because of technical or financial reasons but that situation had been corrected later and coverage provided.

3. Secretary asked for report on Polish-Chinese relations. Jedrychowski pointed to one profitable joint enterprise: Polish-Chinese company of shipping brokers. Trade between two countries was down, however. Jedrychowski said China was one of those big powers which considered trade to be just a function of foreign policy. This was case with USG or at least with some US Congressmen. Poland tried to separate ideology from formal relations with other states. For example, Poland had correct trade relations with Albania.

4. Jedrychowski said ideological questions would be no problem between US and Poland but for shadow cast on our relations by war in Vietnam. Poland was interested in seeing Vietnam war come to peaceful settlement. Jedrychowski wanted to assure US both North Vietnam and "Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam" have necessary good will to bring war to end. Their own national interests and their geographic location declare this. NLF 10-point proposal⁵ has many elements which offer basis for negotiations. Many of points are formulated in general terms and are flexible. There are just two postulates on which US must agree: withdrawal of US troops and agreement that new Government South Vietnam be based on coalition of national "patriotic elements."

5. Secretary welcomed FonMin's comments on Poland but said he did not in least agree with his commentary on Vietnam. There was no sign from other side that they desire settlement or even to discuss settlement. We have made clear fact that we are prepared to discuss. Other side has made no proposal except that we get out and that they be able to provide government officials to run Government of South Vietnam. These proposals are clearly unacceptable. We are prepared to negotiate and would welcome opportunity to talk. We would be pleased to have officials from Communist governments take part in supervisory force during time of free elections in South Vietnam. Jedrychowski said

⁵ For the text of the peace plan, May 8, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1968–1969, p. 23653. For documentation on the North Vietnamese proposal and U.S. reaction, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Documents 67 ff.

other side would agree to national elections but not under international supervision and not under “unilateral South Vietnamese Government.” There must be new coalition government with broad base of support, he maintained.

6. Secretary said this kind of talk tends to sour relations between our two countries. If North Vietnam wanted to discuss this question, that would be one thing. However, he did not welcome Polish presentation on behalf of North Vietnamese. Jedrychowski said that this was Poles’ own initiative; President Nixon in GA speech has asked for help in ending war.⁶ Secretary said he did not find Polish remarks helpful. Jedrychowski asked what was way out. Secretary said President had made answer quite clear. Polish FonMin said question of prestige on both sides made solution difficult. In case of small nation such as North Vietnam there was even more sensitivity than in case of great nation. North Vietnam was trying to find face-saving solution.

7. Jedrychowski turned to subject of Europe. Poland advocated policy of collective security which could assure Poland and other European nations opportunity for peaceful development. This policy was in tune with Budapest appeal for ESC.⁷ Secretary said we were curious to know how Poles envisaged ESC would work. Jedrychowski replied that ESC should draw up all-European agreement on security and cooperation. This would guarantee to all European nations respect for (a) their national independence, (b) their territorial integrity, (c) their national borders, and (d) their internal affairs. Secretary asked if that included Czechoslovakia; if it did, we might be interested.

Jedrychowski said it did. Czech “affair”⁸ arose from insecurity and instability in Europe. We should understand throughout Polish history Czechoslovakia had always been place from which attacks were launched on Poles. In 1939 Nazis had launched three-pronged attack on them. South prong came from Czechoslovakia. Secretary asked if Poland was expecting attack from Czechoslovakia in 1968. Polish FonMin said no, but Poles had serious apprehensions that Czechoslovakia could serve again as base for attacks. Secretary asked if this apprehension justified their first attacking Czechoslovakia. Jedrychowski said Poland and Czechoslovakia had been bound by close alliance. Perhaps if all countries in Europe had recognized existing boundaries and if revisionist tendencies inside Czechoslovakia had not been present,

⁶ For text of the September 18 address, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 724–731.

⁷ Reference is to a communiqué issued by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee at the conclusion of its March 17 meeting. For relevant portions, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 1035–1037.

⁸ Reference is to Polish participation in the Warsaw Pact military invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

situation might have been different. Despite 25 years since Potsdam Conference, Western boundaries of Poland were still questioned by some states. FRG maintains it has legal right to take up at any time question of Polish borders. Unfortunately, US and UK encourage this policy on part of Germans. Of major Western powers only France has clearly recognized Poland's western boundaries as final.

8. Secretary said he would be glad to discuss any sensible plan for reduction of East-West tensions. We were still considering matter of ESC. Jedrychowski said that in course of preparations for ESC questions to be discussed will be clarified and agenda developed. ESC would reduce tensions and improve situation in Europe. As Polish contribution to European security considerations they had proposed to FRG an agreement which would recognize Polish western borders and in itself lead to normalization of relations with FRG. Jedrychowski said Poles were ready to discuss. He asked US use influence with FRG to obtain recognition of final character of western borders and to obtain German signature of NPT.

Rogers

133. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 9, 1970.

SUBJECT

Polish Ambassador's Conversation with Mr. Kissinger February 3

The Ambassador came in for a talk that had had to be rescheduled several times.

After some opening discussion of Polish attitudes toward Germany in which the Ambassador noted that it was hard to convince the older generation of the feasibility of good relations with Bonn, Mr. Kissinger asked why the Poles then placed so much faith in German renunciation of territorial claims. He² said this was a political necessity and was

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. The original was sent to Kissinger. A typed notation indicates that Hillenbrand received a copy directly from Sonnenfeldt.

² Michalowski. [Footnote in the original.]

required to make establishment of relations possible. He said that the US could contribute by telling the FRG that we wanted an agreement settling the border. Mr. Kissinger said that we had made clear that we want reconciliation between Poland and the FRG. Michalowski said this was not enough. Mr. Kissinger said that we would present no obstacle to Polish-German understanding. He went on to comment that most border disputes these days seemed to be inside the Communist world.³ Michalowski agreed but said with a smile that these problems were not geographically close to Poland. As the saying went in Warsaw, there was a big buffer state between Poland and China.

Michalowski said that Mr. Kissinger's remark about not presenting obstacles was important. German-Polish relations were very important for Europe generally and their improvement was a stepping stone to a European conference. Kissinger asked how the Soviets felt about the Polish-German talks. Michalowski said they were encouraging the Poles; but they were worried the US was not doing enough for Europe as a whole and for a conference. Mr. Kissinger responded that no one had really told us what a conference would accomplish. Why have a conference to restate the obvious? We were not hostile toward it, but what was it for? Michalowski said it was the best means to improve the situation. The Poles were working on additional agenda items. A system was needed to replace the division of Europe. Mr. Kissinger asked how.

Michalowski responded that cooperation was needed in every field. Both the US and the USSR belonged to Europe. What was needed was a regional security system with a range of measures on all aspects—non-use of force, assistance for victims of aggression, recognition of borders, etc. Two-power agreements were not enough. Czechoslovakia would never have happened if there was no division. (Mr. Kissinger had interjected how a problem like Czechoslovakia would be dealt with in the system Michalowski was describing.) A new Europe was needed and the process had to be started. There could either be one or several conferences. Mr. Kissinger concluded that we would watch developments and would not oppose a meaningful eventual conference. Michalowski rejoined that the US used to work actively against a conference.

Before ending the meeting because of another commitment, Mr. Kissinger noted that Michalowski presumably wanted to talk mostly

³ Reference is to the Ussuri River boundary dispute between China and the Soviet Union. Armed clashes between the two states began in February. After further clashes and a military build-up, negotiations opened in Beijing in October.

about bilateral relations. Michalowski said these were favorable; there were no conflicts. The only problems were economic. It was agreed that at a future meeting, bilateral relations would be reviewed.

In leaving, Michalowski asked about the status of our review of Port Security regulations.⁴ He said he had heard the papers were on Mr. Kissinger's desk. Mr. Kissinger said he would look into the status. Mr. Sonnenfeldt said the matter was moving along; while he could make no promises, he was hopeful that there would be a resolution that the Poles would find helpful. They would of course be informed as soon as the matter had been decided.

HS

⁴ Reference is to a Polish request for clearance to permit its ships to port in the Great Lakes. See Documents 8, 13, 15, and 16.

134. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

Conversation with German Minister

Minister Oncken of the German Embassy came in to see me today at his request to show me an instruction from Bonn to the effect that the Poles had told the German negotiators² in Bonn that a White House "personality," though not the President himself, had told the Polish

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files—Europe, Germany, Vol. IV 12/69–9 Apr 70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. The original was sent to Kissinger. A typed notation indicates that Hillenbrand received a copy directly from Sonnenfeldt. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it on March 27.

² Negotiators from the West German and Polish Foreign Ministries met in Warsaw February 4–7 for a first round of talks on the normalization of relations between their two countries. The main topic of discussion was potential FRG recognition (de facto or de jure) of the Oder-Neisse Line. For an account of the talks, see *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1970, Bd. I, pp. 163–164, 166–169, and 175–179.

Ambassador that the US would have no objection if the FRG recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent Western frontier of Poland.³

I told Oncken that this seemed to refer to a talk between Mr. Kissinger and the Polish Ambassador on February 3,⁴ in which Michalowski had said that the US should tell the Germans that we wanted them to make an agreement settling the border. Mr. Kissinger had responded that we had made clear that we wanted German-Polish reconciliation. Michalowski had then said that this was not enough, to which Mr. Kissinger had responded that we would present no obstacles to German-Polish understanding. I added that Mr. Kissinger had made no comments more specific than that and had not addressed the legal points involved at all. I also told Oncken that in talking with me before going in to see Mr. Kissinger, Michalowski had said that since the Germans settled their Western frontiers they should be able to do the same in the East. I had responded that these situations were legally and politically different.

Oncken said he appreciated the information and would report it home.

HS

³ Ambassador Rush reported from Bonn on February 13 that Finke-Ossiander "told EmbOff in strictest confidence, and without authorization to do so, that, in course Winiewicz-Duckwitz discussion on Oder-Neisse line, . . . , Winiewicz countered FRG point on four-power responsibility for final border settlement provisions, with accounts of 'reports' recently received from Polish Ambassadors in Paris and Washington. . . . Winiewicz said, according to his info, FRG 'concern' over four-power issue greatly overdrawn. . . . [P]olish Ambassador in Washington reported that he recently spoke, 'not with the President personally,' but with 'somebody quite high up in the White House.' He also said that Oder-Neisse issue would present 'no problems to U.S.'" (Telegram 1577 from Bonn, February 12; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files—Europe, Germany, Vol. IV 12/69–9 Apr 70) Sonnenfeldt summarized the issue for Kissinger: "As was to be expected, the Germans, despite Oncken's very confidential call on me, put the story the Poles told them about White House support for an Oder-Neisse settlement into regular State channels. Before the attached telegram . . . arrived from Bonn, I had already sent Hillenbrand the memoranda of your conversation with the Polish Ambassador and of mine with Oncken. Hillenbrand will write to Fessenden to make sure he will tell the Germans the same thing at his end as I told Oncken here. This should take care of this matter at least for now." (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, February 13; *ibid.*)

⁴ See Document 133.

135. Letter From the Ambassador to Poland (Stoessel) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand)¹

Warsaw, February 25, 1970.

Dear Marty:

I am writing you in connection with the Oder-Neisse issue. I do so with some hesitation, since it is a subject deeply involved with our German policy, on which you are the expert; also, I realize that I probably am not fully aware of Washington's current thinking on the problem and what may already have been passed to Bonn confidentially on this score. Nevertheless, I hope you will bear with me if I convey some of my own thoughts about the Oder-Neisse question, which is the key point in the Polish-FRG political talks.

In brief, I am concerned that in our attitude (expressed in some detail in State 017691 of February 5²) we may be giving too much emphasis to the legal aspects of the frontier question—particularly the reservation of our own legal prerogatives—to the possible detriment of achieving a solution of this long-standing and important issue.

I appreciate, of course, that it is essential that we retain our rights in respect to Berlin, which stem from victory in World War II and the various post-war accords, notably the Potsdam Agreement.³ However, the status of the Oder-Neisse line does not appear to be of such vital importance to the U.S. interest, except as it may derive from Potsdam and its solution may affect Potsdam. I therefore feel we should approach the idea of an agreement settling the Oder-Neisse question with as positive an attitude as possible and demonstrate as much flexibility in handling it as we can.

From what I know of the current FRG attitude on the Oder-Neisse issue, it appears to coincide with ours, i.e., a "final solution" of the problem must await a peace treaty and the Four Powers must consent to any boundary settlement. However, my fear is that this may not—and probably will not—be sufficient to obtain an agreement with Poland, since I anticipate that the Poles will insist on a definitive agreement which does not mention any peace treaty to be held in the future.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 32-3 GER-POL. Secret; Limdis. A copy was sent to Fessenden at the Embassy in Bonn.

² Telegram 017691 to Warsaw, February 5, is *ibid.*, DEF 4 EUR.

³ See footnote 9, Document 130.

This situation could well lead to a deadlock and to the ultimate failure of the Polish-FRG talks. Such an outcome, I would imagine, would have an adverse impact on Brandt's *ostpolitik* and conceivably could be a serious blow to his political fortunes in the FRG, although I am in no position to pass judgment on that. So far as Poland is concerned, a failure of the Polish-FRG talks would clearly be a setback for Gomulka, and might be an important factor in causing him to lose his present position. While this at first glance might seem no great loss for the U.S., I think it is at least questionable whether a new Polish leadership, succeeding to power in the aftermath of a breakdown of the efforts aimed at normalizing Polish-FRG relations, would be better for our interests than a continuation of Gomulka's reign.

A number of other aspects could also be cited, of course, in favor of an agreement on this issue, including its contribution to stability in this part of the world and the likelihood that over the long term an agreement would lessen Soviet influence over Poland. We have gone into these aspects in previous reporting, and I will not repeat the details here. In sum, however, I feel strongly that we have a stake in seeing a successful outcome of the Polish-FRG talks on the Oder-Neisse.

What I would like to suggest is that, if it comes to a point of impasse between Poland and the FRG over the form of an accord on the Oder-Neisse, we should be prepared in advance to use our influence with the FRG to help find a way out of the impasse.

For example, why couldn't we in fact go along with a Polish-FRG treaty which—along the lines of the Belgian-FRG border agreement—would state that the Oder-Neisse border is considered as final between the two contracting parties? Such an agreement in itself would not make reference to an eventual peace treaty. However, as in the case of the Belgian treaty, the Allies would then come forward with notes of consent as required by the Bonn Conventions. (L in its Memorandum of December 10, 1969, page 10 and following pages, has described this procedure clearly.)⁴ This should establish for the record our continued view that the final determination of the boundaries of Germany as a whole must await a peace settlement. Brandt, of course, could make use of these Allied notes in securing Bundestag approval for a treaty, but he would not have to stress them to the Poles.

I am aware, of course, that the Oder-Neisse problem differs from the Belgian-FRG border question in many ways, not least in the political importance of the territory involved and the fact that the temporary nature of the Oder-Neisse line is specifically mentioned in the Potsdam Treaty. However, I wonder if, in the interests of obtaining

⁴ Not found.

Polish-FRG agreement, which could bring so many benefits in its train, we should not try to overlook these differences and treat it in fact like the Belgian case.

I would imagine that we would find support from the British and French for this line of action. Indeed, I fear that if we are not prepared to move in a direction along these lines, we may find ourselves isolated in the future from our Allies. This could include, I believe, the FRG itself, for the time may come when Bonn may wish to give up strict adherence to legalities in an effort to reach a solution with Poland. I suggest that it would be well to prepare for such an eventuality and to take the lead in finding a solution which, while perhaps falling short of our ideal position, would still preserve the *essentials* of what we want.

In addition to the "Belgian route," which would preserve for the legal record our Potsdam prerogatives, and after bilateral FRG-Polish agreement, another helpful move in promoting an Oder-Neisse solution would be to have the three Western powers declare (as they did at Potsdam with regard to the Soviet border in East Prussia) that they would support at a future peace conference the agreement reached between Poland and the FRG. This, I can imagine, would be even trickier from the legal standpoint than the Belgian formula, and would also require careful formulation and coordination with Britain and France; but it could be of real help as a specific step to relieve regional tensions, and I do not see that it would damage our interests.

In all aspects of the Polish-FRG negotiations, the influence of the Soviet position is undeniable, and at the same time difficult to define precisely with regard to the various areas of negotiation. I do feel, however, that a good possibility exists that, almost regardless of the outcome of the Soviet-FRG talks, the Poles probably have a relatively free hand to work out an agreement on the Oder-Neisse, so long as it can be described as "definitive." The actual timing of signature of such an accord might well be subject to some delay in the event of a breakdown of the Soviet-FRG talks, but I believe it would eventually take place.

Forgive me for running on so long on this question, and also if I am belaboring a dead horse or am all wrong—perhaps because of a "parochial view"—on the policy involved. I do feel it is important to move *soon*, while the political conjuncture in Poland and the FRG appears propitious, to an Oder-Neisse accord. And I would hope that we would neglect no opportunity to make such an accord possible, sacrificing, if necessary, some of our legal desiderata in the process if they are not absolutely essential.

While the FRG seems to be moving along well at present, and I know we do not wish to press unnecessarily, it may be that the FRG will need some encouragement before long as to ways of finding an

Oder-Neisse accord, and I trust that Brandt, when he comes to Washington if not before, will receive such encouragement from us.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Russ Fessenden in Bonn for his information and possible comment. Elliot Richardson may also be interested in our views, but I will leave that to your discretion.⁵

With very best personal regards,
As ever,

Walt

⁵ On March 16 Fessenden responded in a letter to Stoessel: "The present phase [in the talks between the FRG and Poland] is one of exactly fine work in developing formulas and exchanging language on the Oder-Neisse. I am almost more confident of the ability of both sides to come to an agreed formulation on this point than I am about the possibility of inclusion of wider points in the agreement like benefits for ethnic Germans in Poland. These are the issues in which the CDU [the opposition party] is now placing great stress. This, not the U.S. position, is the big problem for Brandt. . . . I don't think . . . that there is any practical necessity for us to try to bring influence to bear on Brandt in this matter [i.e., the Oder-Neisse line]. Nor do I believe we should be in a position of appearing to force his hand. . . . For us to intervene could even run the risk of getting us involved in the middle of a hot German internal political issue." (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, Box 9, Chrons (1969)—Letters (Outgoing))

136. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Ambassador to Poland (Stoessel)¹

Washington, March 9, 1970.

Dear Walt:

I have read with much interest your thought-provoking letter of February 25 concerning the Oder-Neisse line.² I am glad you did not hesitate to send in your views. They have been a stimulus to our thinking on this sensitive issue.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Correspondence, 1968–72. Secret; Limdis; Official–Informal. This letter is attached to a March 21 letter from Stoessel to Hillenbrand. Copies were sent to Richardson and to Fessenden in Bonn. A handwritten notation in an unknown hand on the first page reads: "A useful response—ret: AMB."

² Document 135.

As I read it, your letter makes two basic proposals. First, the U.S. should be prepared to encourage the FRG, including Brandt himself, to be forthcoming in negotiating on this issue. We should use our influence with the Germans if an impasse were to develop in FRG-Polish talks. Second, the U.S. ought not overemphasize the legal aspects of the frontier question to the detriment of achieving a satisfactory political solution and should be prepared to sacrifice unessential legal desiderata to this end.

On the first point, the Department has made it clear that we hope the FRG-Polish talks will succeed in eliminating the Oder-Neisse issue as an impediment to improved relations. I assume that by encouraging the FRG, however, you mean something more than this. You will already have received [Emory] Coby Swank's letter of February 26³ (which crossed yours in the mail), in which he pointed out the importance of our not conveying any impression of undercutting the FRG in its bilateral negotiations. The Germans will have to make up their own minds on how to handle this issue and, except where our treaty rights and obligations are directly involved, I do not believe that we should try either to spur them or to restrain them. As you point out, the FRG seems to be moving along well at present. Should an impasse in FRG-Polish negotiations develop over this subject, we could review our thinking, but even in those circumstances I do not believe we should volunteer unsolicited advice. The effect of such advice on German domestic political considerations, once it became publicly known, could do serious harm to U.S.-German relations.

The considerations you set forth on the U.S. attitude towards any FRG-Polish agreement are well taken. I fully agree that we should not overemphasize legal aspects per se to the detriment of a satisfactory political solution. We hope that a way can be found which will satisfy the political requirements of both negotiating parties without doing violence to our own substantial interest in the continuing validity of wartime and postwar agreements on Germany. In general, I concur that we should show as much flexibility as is consonant with our own vital interests in dealing with any solution that may develop from the German-Polish negotiations.

You recommend specifically that we take the "Belgian route" in dealing with the problem, whereby the contracting parties would state that the border is final between themselves without referring to the eventual peace settlement as foreseen by the Potsdam Agreement. In this case you recommend that the Allies come forward with notes of consent, establishing for the record our view that the final determination of the

³ Not printed. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Correspondence, 1968-72)

boundaries of Germany must await a peace settlement. I would tend to agree with you that if we were to treat a hypothetical FRG-Polish agreement in the same manner as we did the FRG agreements with the Benelux countries, we would not have sacrificed essential legal points. From the political standpoint, however, I wonder if such an approach would satisfy the Polish demand for a definitive agreement. Since our reservations would become public, it seems quite plausible that the Poles in such an event would be unhappy with us, though perhaps not with the FRG. It is just for this reason that I agree with Coby's point that we should not now mislead the Poles into thinking we would automatically and unconditionally accept and support whatever agreement the Germans and Poles might make.

Another variant, as suggested in L/EUR's memorandum of December 10, 1969, might be to seek some Four Power agreement recommending that the eventual German peace settlement adopt the Oder-Neisse Line as the final boundary between Germany and Poland. While I do not believe we would wish to take any sort of initiative to promote this point, we could respond favorably to some FRG-Polish proposal to this effect,⁴ assuming of course that the Soviet Union would be willing to endorse such a recommendation.

I hope that this letter will lead you to the conclusion that even though unwilling to put pressure on the FRG, we are open-minded about how we could support any solution the Germans and Poles might reach, while at the same time safeguarding essential Allied legal rights stemming from valid international agreements which have important implications beyond the Polish border question.

Elliot Richardson is, as you surmised, very interested in this subject and I have sent him copies of your letter and this reply. You will have noted State's 24567⁵ reporting his conversation with the German Ambassador on the Polish-FRG talks.⁶

Sincerely,

Marty

⁴ A handwritten notation in the margin reads: "interesting."

⁵ A comment in margin reads: "attached." Telegram 24567 to Bonn, February 17, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL GER W-US.

⁶ In a March 21 letter to Hillenbrand, Stoessel responded: "I appreciated your letter of March 9, responding to mine of February 25 on the Oder-Neisse question. Your comments are well-taken and do indeed lead me to the conclusion that our official position is open-minded and flexible." (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Correspondence, 1968-72)

137. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Lunch with Mr. Ryszard Frackiewicz, Counselor at the Polish Embassy

At lunch yesterday, Frackiewicz spent the first 20 minutes summarizing the President's foreign policy report,² as he understood it (highlighting the references to normalization of relations with Eastern Europe), and wondering whether our economic policy toward Eastern Europe was not in contradiction with the basic thrust. He said he could not understand why we seemed to treat Eastern Europe the same way as the USSR (in contrast to the Johnson Administration's different treatment of different Communists) and why we were not granting Romania MFN. I said the President's view of East-West trade was outlined in the Report and that as a practical matter economic policies were in fact tailored to different situations. Basically, however, we doubted that economic contacts would lead to great political breakthroughs; more likely, political progress would lay a more solid foundation for greater commercial contact.

Frackiewicz then turned to Polish-German negotiations and stressed how important it was for the US and other allies to encourage the Germans to settle the Oder-Neisse, including necessary amendments to the Paris Agreements.³ I took occasion to tell him that the Poles would make a bad mistake if they tried to play the Western allies off against each other on this question. I had been very disturbed to learn that Mr. Kissinger's general comments to the Polish Ambassador about our support for German-Polish reconciliation had been passed on to the Germans by Polish officials in a version that had us supporting the Polish interpretation of Potsdam.⁴ I also noted that an American journalist in Washington had told me that Mr. Kissinger's alleged comments had also been passed to newspapermen by the Poles.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 834, Name Files, Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. The original was sent to Kissinger and a copy was sent to Ash. Copies were also sent to Haig and Lord.

² For the relevant excerpts from the President's annual report on U.S. foreign policy, presented to Congress on February 18, 1970, see Document 7.

³ The Paris Agreements, signed on October 23, 1954, among other things, ended the postwar occupation of Germany. For text, see *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pp. 424-436.

⁴ See Documents 133 and 134.

I said that this sort of thing made private conversations very difficult and could not help the cause of Polish-German agreement. Frackiewicz professed to be shocked by what I told him and said he could not imagine that any Polish official could have been guilty of an indiscretion. I said I hoped that no further attempts would be made to use us in order to undercut the German position in the Warsaw talks.

On the substance of the matter, I reiterated that we welcomed German-Polish reconciliation and, indeed, would consider it of historic significance. I personally hoped that the complex juridical questions involved could be settled although it seemed doubtful to me that the maximum Polish demands provided a suitable basis.

Frackiewicz then wondered whether we had cooled on the idea of normalization of German relations with the East. I said our position was as stated in the President's Report. He returned to the theme that we should press the Germans to move on the Oder-Neisse. I said a matter of this kind cannot be resolved by pressure but only in a natural way involving substantial acceptance by the parties concerned of what was being done. I added that if at some point the Germans and the allies considered it desirable to examine the juridical issues among themselves then this would presumably take place in the normal course of events. But pressure would not be likely to bring about such an examination.

I then briefly raised the question why the Poles, after all that had happened to them at the hands of the Germans and the Russians over the centuries placed so much faith in formal agreements about borders. Frackiewicz said that if the Poles let themselves become the prisoners of their history they might as well go out of existence. But he agreed that even without an agreement with the FRG, Poland had ample relations with that country in the economic, technical and cultural fields.

Toward the end of the lunch, Frackiewicz asked about the status of our decision on Polish shipping into the Great Lakes. I said it did not appear, contrary to earlier indications, that a favorable decision would be forthcoming soon.⁵

HS

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 133.

138. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 27, 1970.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Polish Ambassador, Michalowski, May 26

The Ambassador came in at his initiative prior to returning home for consultations. His main purpose was to complain about the poor state of bilateral relations. He cited our failure to grant the Poles access to Great Lakes ports for their shipping line² and our delay in granting a license for a fluid catalytic cracking plant.³ He said that he had always been a strong advocate of better US-Polish economic relations but that these developments undermined his credibility in Warsaw.

I said that after careful consideration it had not proved possible to change our regulations with respect to the ports; this was of course not applicable just to Poland but to other East European countries as well. I told him that I was not informed about the cracking plant license but would try to find out where it stood. (Michalowski said he had heard it was being reviewed in the White House.) In general, I said that prospects for major changes in our legislation or in economic relations did not appear to me to be promising as long as the Vietnam war continued. I added that in any case Poland was pretty well off since it had MFN and other aspects of our relations (e.g. scientific and cultural exchanges) seemed to be progressing well.

Michalowski said that MFN was of course helpful but the Poles found that they could not spend the money they earned by their exports because of our refusal to license US exports of the type of industrial equipment the Poles wanted. He, Michalowski, had urged Polish economic planners to provide for cooperation with the US in the new five-year plan but that now it seemed this was an illusion. Michalowski went on to say that Vietnam had already lasted five years

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. The original was sent to Kissinger and a copy was sent to Ash. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² See footnote 4, Document 133.

³ In telegram 1825 from Warsaw, July 2, Stoessel reported: "Recent high-level Polish representations have convinced me that a broad spectrum of US-Polish relations could be adversely affected by a negative decision on the pending export license application for the fluid catalytic cracking process. . . . [T]he Poles have repeatedly stated that the decision on the catalytic cracker will be regarded as a test case of the US Government's trade policy vis-à-vis Poland and of the seriousness of its professed interest to develop and expand trade relations." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971)

and would probably last five years more; that was a long time to wait for better relations, especially since the Poles could do nothing to bring about peace in Vietnam. Michalowski professed to be especially pessimistic because recent US actions in Indochina would only serve to harden DRV and VC positions and probably rule out a negotiated settlement. Michalowski went on at some length about the importance of decoupling economic relations from political ones. Reverting to the cracking plant, Michalowski said that this was really *the* test case from which Poland would determine whether it could expect any significant economic assistance from the US. It wanted such assistance (at least many in Warsaw did) not as a gift or favor but on a purely commercial basis. He personally felt it important that the US be among Poland's significant economic partners.

I said we felt on the whole that improved economic relations with the East would have the most solid basis if they flowed from better political relations. Soviet practice, certainly, had shown repeatedly how deteriorating political relations serve to disrupt economic ones (viz. what they did to Yugoslavia, Albania, China, Romania and Poland itself). This did not mean that we opposed a certain level of activity; on the contrary. But I did not see any prospect for major changes under present circumstances. Michalowski said that his return to Warsaw in these circumstances would be a rather sad one.

We briefly talked about the Rome NATO meeting at which I said there probably would be a statement on MBFR.⁴ Michalowski asked whether there would be anything on a conference, which the Poles still believed was a desirable goal. He also asked whether there would be specific proposal on MBFR. I said that MBFR was a complex subject on which a good deal of preparatory work still needed to be done; but NATO was probably ready to express more vigorously its interest in talks with the East on it. As regards a conference, I said there were different approaches among the NATO allies on this and I could not say at this point precisely how the NATO communiqué would deal with it. My own personal view continued to be that we should concentrate on issues rather than procedure. Michalowski said there ought to be active preparatory work for a conference.

As regards the Polish-German talks, Michalowski felt that a good deal of progress had been made and he felt there was now some prospect of success especially if at the right time the Germans received some encouragement from the US. He said the Poles were still not quite

⁴ The North Atlantic Council approved a special "Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions" at its meeting in Rome May 26–27. The text of the declaration is in *NATO: Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1971), p. 380.

satisfied with the FRG formula on the Oder-Neisse since it still fell short of "final recognition." There also was a hitch in Polish-German economic negotiations. All told, he felt that it would probably not be until the autumn that both these negotiations would be crowned with success. In his view, Brandt was unlikely to give more ground before the Land elections in June, although a Polish delegation would be going to Bonn for more talks before then.

I said we continued to be in favor of German-Polish reconciliation. I foresaw no serious problem for us if the Poles and Germans agreed on a frontier formula. We were not going to inject ourselves into the talks, however. I asked if diplomatic relations would be established once the agreement had been settled. Michalowski said not right away; there still were psychological inhibitions in Poland. Eventually, however, this would occur.

Michalowski asked if I was optimistic on SALT. I said I had tried to avoid using words like optimistic and pessimistic, but that in my 20-year experience with disarmament negotiations, I felt that SALT had gotten off to the best start. The problems were complex ones and much hard work was ahead. Michalowski said he was encouraged by the fact that SALT was progressing despite the bad international situation. I said disarmament talks over the years had occasionally made progress while the political climate was bad (e.g. the NPT and the test ban treaty shortly after the Cuban missile crisis); the pattern of interrelationships was not clear-cut. We had of course never put forward specific political preconditions for holding SALT but clearly on this crucial set of security issues there was bound to be a connection with the over-all US-Soviet relationship. Michalowski said we should treat economic relations the way we seemed to treat SALT—carry on regardless of political difficulties.

The conversation ended with Michalowski again bemoaning the unfortunate state of our relations and his "sadness" in returning to Warsaw with empty hands.

Note: The license application for the Polish cracking plant is being considered in the normal fashion. State, Commerce and DuBridge are evidently in favor; Interior and Defense have reservations. Mr. Downey of this office has informed the Polish Ambassador (May 27) that the application was under active consideration but that we are not in a position to indicate what the outcome will be. The Ambassador noted he had neglected to mention two points during his conversation with me: The Poles are ready to offer assurances that (a) the cracking plant would not be used to produce fuel for jets, but only for automobiles, and that (b) the technology of the plant will not be transferred to third countries. He expressed the hope that a favorable answer would await him on his return to Washington on June 9.

139. Editorial Note

In a meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard Davies on September 11, 1970, Polish Ambassador Jerzy Michalowski referred to the “‘unpleasant news’ he had heard an hour earlier from Commerce Secretary Stans on the recent U.S. Government action further postponing a decision on the catalytic cracker licensing case. He said that, while not unexpected, this would cause unfavorable consequences in U.S.-Polish relations.” Davies replied that “the decision might be reviewed in the future when further improvement in the atmosphere of U.S.-Polish relations had occurred.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL POL-US) On the decision to postpone a decision on the Polish request, see Document 14.

On September 19 Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff presented President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger with a memorandum in preparation for the latter’s upcoming meeting with Ambassador to Poland Walter J. Stoessel. Sonnenfeldt wrote: “Stoessel will probably be interested to hear from you a rationale for Polish-American relations, in view of the negative decision on the sale of petroleum technology to Poland. (We have told the Poles that it is deferred because of the ‘general political situation.’) You may wish to say that the President does not feel the time is ripe for any special moves toward Poland. Our main interest at present is demonstrating that the countries most friendly to us, Romania and Yugoslavia, benefit from their positions of independence, and that we, in fact, differentiate between the countries of Eastern Europe. Of course, Poland is not on a par with East Germany, Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria. We regard Poland and Hungary as a kind of middle ground, which means that various exchanges and so forth should proceed. Later we might reconsider the cracking plant.”

Sonnenfeldt continued: “He may mention that the Poles are taking this cracking plant decision as a touchstone of our relations, and reading a great deal into it. This, of course, makes life for Stoessel more difficult. You might point out that as long as the Poles play the North Vietnamese and Soviet game as members of the ICC we have to take this into account. On the other hand, we are not so unrealistic as to expect Poland, in light of its geographic position, to condemn the Brezhnev doctrine.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971) There is no record of Kissinger meeting with Stoessel in Kissinger’s Record of Schedule. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 428, Miscellany, 1968–1976) No other record of the meeting has been found.

140. Editorial Note

On November 18, 1970, after nearly 10 months of negotiations, West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Jedrychowski concluded a treaty on normalizing relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany, popularly called the "Treaty of Warsaw." Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the treaty reads: "The Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland state in mutual agreement that the existing boundary line, the course of which is laid down in Chapter IX of the Decisions of the Potsdam Conference of August 2, 1945, as running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, constitutes the western state frontier of the People's Republic of Poland." For the full text of the treaty, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1969–1970, page 24346.

In an unsigned memorandum to President Richard Nixon that morning, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger assessed the agreement as follows:

"The Polish-West German treaty, to be initialed in Warsaw this morning, will contain an agreement that the Oder-Neisse (as defined in the Potsdam agreement), 'constitutes' the Western border of Poland, and that neither side will raise territorial claims against the other 'in the future.' While the treaty disclaims any infringements on existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, it goes a long way to being the definitive settlement of the border issue. There is no mention in the exchange of notes between Bonn and the Three Western Powers, or between the Germans and Poles, of the German peace treaty. Attempts to make reference to the peace treaty in a note from Bonn to the Three Western Powers collapsed under strong Polish pressures. We plan to note the fact of the treaty with approval, and say little more in our note to the Germans. Brandt will probably go to Warsaw for the formal signing, but ratification procedures are still open to further talks. Presumably, the Poles will try to break the linkage of their treaty to the Moscow treaty, a linkage the Germans agreed to in Moscow." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 23, President's Daily Briefs, November 17–30, 1970)

During a senior NSC staff meeting on November 18, Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt discussed the negotiations in Warsaw. According to a record of the meeting, the following exchange occurred:

"Mr. Kissinger: What did the Germans get from the Poles?

"Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Nothing. Incidentally, people are beginning to get very queasy about the Germans making treaties in Eastern Europe, especially with the Russians. As you know, Brandt decided that

[former West German Foreign Minister Gerhard] Schroeder had made a mistake in trying to circumvent Moscow and he has changed their priorities. Some Poles are now beginning to talk about the Germans getting together with the Soviets on frontier questions. They're beginning to talk about a fifth partition of Poland.

"Mr. Kissinger: I have yet to meet a non-German who is happy about German approaches to Eastern Europe.

"Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Many people are schizophrenic about this. They wanted a détente, but are getting very queasy over a German-Soviet treaty, particularly when it is referred to as a non-aggression pact." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, National Security Council, 1969–77, Meetings, Staff, 1969–71)

In a press release issued the same day, the Department of State announced: "The United States has noted with satisfaction the initialling of a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People's Republic in Warsaw today. These negotiations have been the subject of consultation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Western powers who, with the Soviet Union, share continuing responsibilities for Germany.

"The United States is confident that this development will promote improved relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany and help to eliminate sources of tension in Europe." (*Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, page 1112)

In an affirmative response to a diplomatic note from the Federal Republic of Germany on November 19, the United States noted that "it shares the position that the [Polish-West German] Treaty does not and cannot affect the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers as reflected in . . . known treaties and agreements." (*Ibid.*, pages 1112–1113)

On December 7 West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Polish Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz signed the treaty in Warsaw. It was ratified by the West German Bundestag on May 19, 1972, along with the Moscow Treaty, and entered into force the same year.

141. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 11, 1970.

SUBJECT

US Attitude towards Polish-FRG Treaty

PARTICIPANTS

Jerzy Michalowski, Ambassador, Embassy of the Polish People's Republic
Richard T. Davies, Assistant Secretary, EUR
John A. Baker, Jr., Director, EUR/CHP

Polish Ambassador Michalowski came in at the invitation of Mr. Davies who wished to clarify further for him the US attitude toward the signature of the FRG-Polish Treaty.² Mr. Davies observed that for the time being the Department of State would, if asked at press briefings, stick by its position of November 18, 1970, stated after the initialing of the Treaty (i.e., "The United States notes with satisfaction the initialling of a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People's Republic in Warsaw today. These negotiations have been the subject of consultations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Western powers who, with the Soviet Union, share continuing responsibilities for Germany. The United States is confident that this development will promote improved relations between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany and help to eliminate sources of tension in Europe").

If pressed to clarify this position, the spokesman would have to point out that the US maintained its rights for Germany as a whole up until a peace settlement and that such a settlement would involve the final establishment of the borders. We were not especially anxious to stress this, Mr. Davies said, and we knew it would not be welcomed by the Poles. We were being more forthcoming about the Treaty in our replies to specific written queries from the US public and Congressmen and would include the sentence: "The United States welcomes the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 32-3 GER-POL. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Baker.

² Michalowski met previously with Davies on December 5 to inquire about the U.S. attitude toward the treaty. Davies stated "that we plan in the near future to say in response to inquiries from our public that we welcome the treaty including the border provisions as a contribution to the lessening of tension in Europe." In a subsequent conversation with Michalowski, Baker "said that, at the December 7 press briefing, the spokesman would stick to the substance of the statement made when the Treaty was initialled November 18. . . . The more forthcoming language will, however, emerge in due course as a result of its use in reply to public inquiries." (Memorandum of conversation, December 5; *ibid.*) For the Department's statement of November 18, see Document 140.

treaty, including its border provisions, as a contribution to the improvement of German-Polish relations and to the elimination of sources of tension in Europe.”

Michalowski asked what we would do if such letters were published and Mr. Baker observed that normally the Department's clearance for publication would be sought. We would not exclude, however, that this might occur. We did not feel this would be particularly helpful as it could stimulate questioning of the spokesman and perhaps the type of clarification mentioned above.

Michalowski observed that there was disappointment in Poland that the US appeared not to welcome the Treaty and genuine puzzlement as to our reluctance not to accept (*sic*) the Treaty, border provisions included, as the British had (Michalowski later referred more accurately to the British use of “welcome” rather than accept). Michalowski further remarked that the US position appeared to lend encouragement to expellees and others in Germany who were resisting the Treaty. Mr. Davies asked whether the US stance was really causing that much concern in Poland, expressing doubt that this was the case. Michalowski referred to Polish concern for “forces in the US administration” who, he alleged, appeared interested in braking the FRG's Ostpolitik and were allegedly maintaining an unyielding position in the Berlin talks. He said he could not be sure that it would be possible to avoid criticism of the US in Poland unless a more forthcoming US public statement were made.

Mr. Baker observed that US media had given ample and favorable coverage to the signature of the Treaty and Chancellor Brandt's reception in Poland. There had been little pressure for an official US statement on the Treaty and the favorable atmosphere would be impaired if any controversy were to be raised about it.

Mr. Davies observed that we had considered the matter carefully and, for a number of reasons, felt it advisable to avoid if possible stirring up either proponents or opponents of a more forthcoming posture. Perhaps at a future time a clearer welcome would be possible. Until then, we expected our friends in Poland to avoid criticism in the knowledge that we were not concealing anything by our reserve.

While departing, Ambassador Michalowski remarked to Mr. Baker that there was a certain lack of clarity in the US handling of the matter. Mr. Baker admitted that this observation had validity, but added that a certain lack of clarity was at certain times preferable to too much clarity.

142. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, December 16, 1970, 1430Z.

3501. Subject: Gdansk Riots. Ref: Warsaw 3477 (notal).²

1. Bitterness and anger came over wide segments of Polish population in wake of December 13 public announcement of price changes (both up and down) which Polish man in street generally regards as signifying 10 to 15 percent cut in purchasing power. Demonstrations and riots in Gdansk area as well as disturbances in other cities appear to issue directly from this untimely government action. With Christmas national holiday in offing, this action seems like slap in face to Poles.

2. Gdansk or Szczecin radio reports, on which Western European accounts apparently based, have not been heard here. Telephone, air and rail communications have been interrupted during past 48 hours. The information we have, however, tends to confirm those reports. Following is summary of info available to us.

A. Swedish Consul in Gdansk reports that 800 to 1000 workers demonstrated in Gdansk afternoon December 14 shouting "Down with Gomulka" and "Down with Karkoszka" (First Party Secretary, Gdansk Province).

B. Same source states Chairman Gdansk Province National Council Bejm went on local television that evening to urge demonstrators to go home, telling them not to endanger what they had already achieved, and not to let themselves be carried away by small handful of agitators.

C. Same source morning December 15 saw some 300 housewives demonstrating with placards and shouting slogans.

D. Unverified reports say demonstration grew to point where local party headquarters allegedly attacked. Several buildings apparently set on fire. Police curfew put into effect. Police and army said to patrol streets and guard party headquarters. Some 300 people including militia reported injured, but we cannot confirm reports of deaths from independent sources.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Munich, and Poznan, and passed to USIA for IAS.

² Telegram 3477 from Warsaw, December 14, detailed the price increases that sparked the riots. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO 14 POL)

E. Telephone and air communications with Gdansk still cut out December 16.

F. Lesser disturbances reportedly have take place in Katowice area, where police or Army in force said to have discouraged incipient demonstrations, and in Lodz and Bydgoszcz.

G. Factory stoppages reported in Warsaw area.

3. Another source indicates police and militia received substantial wage boost several weeks ago to insure loyalty to regime. While we cannot confirm this specifically yet, we note that Sejm Commission for Internal Affairs, in reviewing Interior Ministry budget, "paid tribute . . . for self-sacrificial and even more effective activity."

4. Source who claims to have read PAP News Bulletin for internal government use tells us it reports party headquarters for [and] police building and radio station in Gdansk as having been set on fire.

5. Prevailing mood of Poles is uglier than any encountered in last two years. While riots and demonstrations may not bring people any significant material benefits, they give regime another black eye and tend to reveal extent of lack of confidence between regime and people.

Stoessel

143. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Polish Situation—Wider Implications

Reference Intelligence Memorandum from CIA dated 18 December 1970²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

² Attached but not printed. Also attached but not printed are Kissinger's talking points for the December 18 meeting; telegram 4733 from USNATO, December 18; an East German message from December 18; and two CIA intelligence memoranda on the situation in Poland.

The CIA evaluation, coordinated with State/INR and DIA, is sound as far as it goes.

There are more serious questions that lurk in the background. The basic one is that it is once again proving extremely difficult to reform or even tinker with a Communist economy. *Any* rational economic measures if undertaken with any degree of speed, are bound to involve price increases for the consumer since Communist prices bear no resemblance to costs.

—In Poland there are the special additional points (1) huge amounts of zlotys have been piled up in large segments of the population, (2) wages were being lowered for some in the drive for greater productivity for profitability, (3) the regime was obviously concerned that the Christmas season would surface the zlotys hidden in stockings and bank accounts and quickly exhaust the limited supply of food etc., and (4) Gomulka was apparently persuaded that having just gotten the FRG to cede 40 thousand square miles of territory to Poland he had the political green light to clobber the workers with a price-wage squeeze. (In fact, the Polish population has long since thought this territory was theirs and in the end, even if it didn't think so, is more interested in a full Christmas table.)

All Communist economies have built in inflation which weighs most heavily on the population at large. Thus, once the spark of popular dissatisfaction is really lit it can, as it now is in Poland, catch fire and explode.

Beyond that, of course, the issue is not merely one of prices and supply and demand. It is one of structure. Ironically enough, again, the explosion is occurring in a country which is already a maverick in that it never went along with the irrationality of agricultural collectivization. Nevertheless it is a Communist country, run by a clique of bureaucrats interested most of all in their own survival. *Real* reform, introducing elements of genuine spontaneity into the system, threatens their monopoly on power. It is quite true that through what can only be called a virtuoso performance, Kadar in Hungary has over a period of some ten years let some of this happen and seems reasonably well in the saddle nonetheless. But even that story is far from told to the end.

All of this is by way of suggesting that the rigidity of the Soviet leaders is bound to be reinforced by what is happening in Poland.

—Recent Soviet economic decisions make very clear that the yen for experimentation does not exist within the political leadership. It *does* exist among the economic managers and you thus have a basic contradiction between those who have the political power and those who make the country function in practice. Moreover, these latter, although despised for their bourgeois attitudes and manners by many Soviet intellectuals, artists and writers, have their tacit support because they are allied against the stifling regime of the political bureaucrats.

The foreign policy implications for the Soviets from all this are complex. As I have previously suggested, Soviet political leaders of the most orthodox stripe can be quite open to trading with the West (and to providing a political-formalistic base for that by a treaty with the Germans) because in this way they hope to avoid genuine economic reform. Such leaders could even be prepared to make some kind of a SALT agreement with us although they are extremely beholden for their hold on power to those who bear arms in the USSR and who are not noted to their devotion to SALT. But they will always be on guard against the domestic political spill-over effects of economic and technical relations with the West and of any accommodations that may be reached here or there on this or that critical issue with us. This is what limits the prospects of real détente.

There is a theory that in the tradition of Pilsudski, and not unlike de Gaulle, Gomulka is given to moods of resignation and would be quite capable of walking off the job.

The CIA paper notes the possibility of Gomulka's stepping down and of Gierek taking his place. It is noteworthy that in the current crisis Gomulka has been nowhere seen or heard. I think it is worth noting on this score that Gierek has sometimes been identified as a representative of that wing of the Polish Party which combines an interest in greater managerial efficiency with a highly cultivated sense of Polish nationalism. In addition, he is one Pole near the top reaches who has genuine charisma. He has long run his Silesian fiefdom as a semi-autonomous province and has done so very effectively. His accession to power, if a coalition forms in Warsaw to elevate him, may or may not be acquiesced in by the Soviets. If they object, they may have to use major pressure to prevent his rise to the top and either save or persuade Gomulka to hang on or come up with an alternative. As regards the latter, no one can think of one.

But if Gierek does succeed, there may sooner or later be a blow-up with the Soviets because he simply does not share Gomulka's passionate (and tragic) view that Poland can only be safe as a totally loyal ally of the USSR. (de Gaulle found out about Gomulka's feelings when he tried to persuade him to "broaden Poland's horizons.") This aspect of Gierek should be qualified to some extent. Gierek was born in France of Polish parents and spent the war in Belgium. His attitudes are heavily influenced by the Thorez-Duclos wing of the French CP; he is thus conservative on Communist ideological issues and would therefore not consciously drive things to a clash with the Soviets. But sooner or later the dynamics of differing interests would produce in Poland what already happened there once before in 1956 and has since happened in every other East European country (except perhaps the GDR)—a conflict situation. Gierek, unlike Gomulka, might not exert himself to prevent this from occurring, especially since Poland's Western frontier will

have been settled and a major source of Polish dependence on the USSR removed.

Thus, what the Polish events seem to demonstrate anew is the profound abnormality of the Soviet-imposed system in Eastern Europe and the fact that sooner or later, in one country after another though, of course, in quite different forms, there will be rebellion against this abnormality. This is the essence of the division of Europe; this is the essence of why the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe is ultimately untenable except by force (no matter how successful the Soviets may be in the short and medium term to disorient the West Europeans) and this is the basic reason why Western professors (and SPD politicians) who talk of “peaceful engagement” and glorious schemes for the “re-unification” of Europe on the basis of technological convergence or whatever other vehicle they happen to make a fetish of, are romantics and adventurers who, if listened to, will produce massive frustration in the West and a defensive reaction in Moscow that could under some circumstances produce catastrophe.

144. Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, December 18, 1970, 4:14–5:02 p.m.

SUBJECT

Poland

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Under Secretary John Irwin

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand

Mr. John A. Baker, Jr.

Defense

Mr. G. Warren Nutter

Mr. John Morse

CIA

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman

Mr. Thomas Karamessines

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt

NSC Staff

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Mr. William Hyland

Mr. D. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. An inter-agency study will be prepared discussing political implications and possible US actions in the event of the following contingencies:

- a. Abatement of the riots in Poland.
- b. Suppression of the riots by the Polish armed forces.
- c. Soviet military intervention in Poland.
- d. Spread of disorders to East Germany and other East European countries.

The analysis of political implications should discuss how the above contingencies may affect Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the United States. With regard to possible US actions, the study should particularly consider the nature and timing of steps which the US might take to manifest its disapproval of Soviet intervention or repressive measures by East European governments.

The study will be prepared by a Working Group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand and including representatives of Defense, JCS, and CIA. The WSAG will meet on December 21 to discuss an initial report from the Working Group.²

2. CIA will continue to provide at least daily reports to the WSAG on the situation in Poland and related developments.

3. The WSAG noted the importance of continuing intensive efforts to obtain intelligence on Soviet troop movements.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we should get together in order to get ourselves up to speed on what the situation is in Poland. We need to see what implications might develop for us and what we should prepare for. (to Cushman) Can you give us a briefing?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: Two areas have been affected in Poland. One is around Gdansk, Sopot, and Gdynia, where they are partial to complete strikes. The Polish Government is maintaining air and naval patrols along the Baltic coast. The other hot spot is Szczecin, where authorities have closed schools, cancelled afternoon work shifts, and imposed a 6:00 p.m. curfew. There are reports that some disturbances

² See Document 147.

may have occurred in Silesia; at least, we have indications that army units are on the alert there. At Wroclaw and Katowice commercial flights have been cancelled, and local officials are reported on the way to Warsaw. Disturbances were also reported in other cities west of Warsaw, including Poznan and Slupsk.

Dr. Kissinger: What triggered the disturbances?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: Price increases, combined with shortages. The government was attempting to shift purchasing from food to appliances while holding the line on wages. The disorders were apparently spontaneous. There have been strikes, including some in Warsaw, for wage increases; but the regime says it will hold fast. Soviet forces are on a common-sense alert, but we have no firm evidence that troops are on the move, although there was a single report of a troop movement. The Poles have fifteen divisions; as long as these remain loyal, they have plenty of muscle to handle the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the expectation about what the Polish Army will do?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: We think they will remain loyal. There has been no occasion to use troops yet although some tanks have been deployed. There has been some fighting, with about 100 wounded and 12 killed. That is the situation as of three o'clock today.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you giving us daily reports?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: Yes. (to Karamessines) Are these being prepared on a regular basis?

Mr. Karamessines: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Continue to do that for the next few days.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: The reports will probably be prepared more often—I imagine at least twice daily.

Dr. Kissinger: What is our assessment of the effect these riots are likely to have on the Polish regime? In one of these reports you say that Gomulka might withdraw and Gierek might take over.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: This speculation is not based on any evidence. However, a few years ago Gomulka had quite a fight to retain power, and if this happened again, he might withdraw if it looked like the country were going to be torn apart.

Dr. Kissinger: What is Gierek's position?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: I don't know.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Hillenbrand) What do you say?

Mr. Hillenbrand: He is not an entirely orthodox communist. He would probably put the interests of the workers as he sees them ahead of reform. The current problem is related to action by the economic reform group in the Polish Government. It will probably mean a setback

for reform. The Polish effort has been modeled somewhat after the Hungarian reform.

Mr. Baker: But the Poles have not gone nearly as far as the Hungarians.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it the Poles will stick to a more orthodox economic policy.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: How would the Soviets react to Gierek? Would they like him?

Mr. Hillenbrand: He would be acceptable. On the other hand, he may not be able to come to grips with the longer range problems of the Polish economy.

Dr. Kissinger: That is their problem.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes. It is certainly not ours.

Dr. Kissinger: What is our assessment of the possibility that the situation will get out of hand?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: It is difficult to say. If the riots spread—and if a report we have had that something may be occurring in East Germany proves valid, then things could really get going. The key to the situation is to be found in the Polish forces.

Dr. Kissinger: So far they have not been used.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: There has been some fighting.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Poles are basically relying on their security forces rather than on the army.

Mr. Karamessines: They have put troops in certain industrial areas.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume that the riots will either have to subside or spread—that the present situation won't continue. Is that a fair judgment?

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think so.

Dr. Kissinger: What conclusions can we draw about the reaction in East Germany and the Soviet Union? Can we get an assessment? We don't have to have it right now.

Mr. Hillenbrand: We have a tentative assessment. Even if the disturbances do not rise to a higher level than at present, we believe the cause of economic reform in Poland will be set back. The Polish disorders will also give the Hungarians pause in carrying out their far-reaching economic reform program, to which there is considerable domestic opposition. In the USSR the group that takes a passive attitude toward Ostpolitik may be led to reassess their position. One theory about the Polish price hikes is that they were implemented at this time because the Polish Government was feeling more confident as a result

of having settled its border with Germany.³ If the objective of Ostpolitik was greater Soviet permissiveness toward German intercourse with Eastern Europe, then the troubles in Poland may constitute a setback for Ostpolitik.

Dr. Kissinger: If I may be the devil's advocate, couldn't the riots be viewed as being not the fault of Ostpolitik but of the conclusions the East Europeans drew from Ostpolitik? That is, it is all right to go full speed ahead on Ostpolitik, but it is not correct to conclude that it is possible to raise prices just because a major international settlement has been arranged.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Possibly, although my judgment is that in the short run we will find the Soviets and the Poles taking a more conservative approach.

Dr. Kissinger: Then you estimate that if the riots subside, the domestic consequence in Poland will be a more conservative economic policy and that internationally the Poles will adopt a more cautious approach toward increased dealings with the West.

Mr. Irwin: These are possibilities, not predictions.

Mr. Baker: There will probably be a greater impact on the Soviet attitude toward Ostpolitik than on the Polish. Poland will still be looking for the benefits that Ostpolitik could bring. As Marty [Hillenbrand]⁴ has said, if the Soviets see that the situation is volatile in Poland, they may take another look at Ostpolitik.

Dr. Kissinger: The old approach to Ostpolitik, which the Germans tried in 1965, was to deal directly with the East European countries. When that didn't work, they decided that the way was to go through Moscow. Now the Soviets may conclude that even that route is too dangerous. The Germans represent a magnet for the East Europeans. The conclusion the Soviets might draw is that rapport with Bonn is just not the right policy. If one carried this line of speculation one step further, it might be said that the Soviets will decide that it is better to seek détente with the US.

I believe that one of the foreign policy problems the Soviets have had in recent years is choosing between geopolitical and ideological considerations. They want to be sure that they are free to meet the Chinese threat; yet, if they get too close to us, they open the way for the Chinese to contest their leadership in the communist world. Ostpolitik seemed to offer the Soviets a way out by pacifying Europe. Now they may draw the conclusion that these benefits from Ostpolitik are only superficial. Am I speculating too wildly?

³ See Document 140.

⁴ All brackets in the original.

Mr. Karamessines: The Polish disorders could be the greatest thing that ever came down the pike for Ulbricht.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Sonnenfeldt) What do you think?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Russians may be more cautious about German access to Eastern Europe, but they will still have a major problem. They want Western economic and technical assistance, and they know they can only get what they need from Germany. It is not going to be available from us, and the French and British can't offer enough. The only way for the Soviets to avoid economic reforms is to get the margin of support that Germany can provide.

Dr. Kissinger: When Ambassador Pauls was in yesterday crying about Acheson,⁵ he said the Germans were not going to give credits to the Soviets. (to Hillenbrand) Do you believe that?

Mr. Hillenbrand: On the basis of recent talks I have had with various German bankers and industrialists, I would say that the Russians have illusions about the quantity of money that might be available from either private or governmental sources in Germany. Pauls' statement is probably correct. People like Egon Bahr are economic illiterates. The money won't be produced by the Chancellor's office but by the industrialists and bankers, who are much more bearish about the possibilities.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: They also belong to a different party.

Dr. Kissinger: If neither the government nor the private bankers give the money, then the last incentive for Ostpolitik is removed.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets may well draw the conclusion that they cannot derive the dividends from Ostpolitik that they had expected. The Soviets face the problem of deciding what to do to promote economic growth. If credits are unavailable, the pressures for economic reform will possibly be increased. There are three ways they can make the economy move. They can squeeze the people; that constitutes a return to Stalinism. They can try to get subsidies from the West. Or they can make reforms, but this is repugnant to the present leadership.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) What are your views?

Mr. Irwin: I tend to think that anything like what is happening in Poland tends to make the Soviets more cautious. However, if they recognize that the recent events are not the result of Ostpolitik but are due to the internal situation in Poland, they might conclude that Ostpolitik is still helpful to them.

⁵ For information concerning Kissinger's meeting with Pauls, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 146.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's look at the next contingency. What if the riots spread and are bloodily suppressed by the Polish forces? Would we expect the consequences to be merely a magnification of what we have already discussed, or would there be additional elements that might come into play?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The quantitative difference would be such as to constitute almost a qualitative difference. The Ulbricht line will carry the day—that is, that it is dangerous to expose yourself to Western contamination.

Dr. Kissinger: I tend to agree with what John [Irwin] said, but if the Soviets did connect the troubles in Poland with German policy, what would happen?

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think the linkage is more complex. The Soviets might conclude that if the political systems in the Eastern European countries are so volatile that a price rise threatens their stability, how much more dangerous might it be if these countries are exposed to German influence.

Mr. Irwin: That makes considerable sense.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good thesis. Then we can say that if there is a bloody revolt, the Soviets will clamp down. Will it be a general clampdown, or will they try to achieve friendlier relations with us, since we are not a threat in this situation?

Mr. Hillenbrand: SALT would probably be the least affected. There might be more fallout with regard to Berlin and Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there anything that we can do in the event of these first two contingencies? I assume that anything we might say would only make matters more complicated.

Mr. Baker: If the Polish Government sheds a lot of blood, there will be an outcry in this country. Many groups will be demanding to know what our attitude is toward a repressive Polish regime.

Mr. Nutter: I don't think the Polish military will respond if ordered to put down an internal revolt.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Polish Government can always repeal the price hike.

Dr. Kissinger: But such concessions often only make matters worse if they come late in a revolutionary process. (to Irwin) Could you prepare a list of measures we might take if we wanted to show our disapproval in the event of a bloody revolt?

Mr. Irwin: We are already working on it. Here is the list that is in preparation covering actions under certain contingencies.⁶

⁶ Not found.

Dr. Kissinger: What contingency?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Russian intervention.

Dr. Kissinger: Could you polish it up over the weekend, and then we can meet again. Are there any other inputs needed?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: The only input we might have would be Radio Free Europe broadcasts, for which we would want policy guidance.

Dr. Kissinger: (looking at the list provided by Irwin) What is this item about economic retaliation? Do we have the authority to take this action on the basis of administrative discretion? What other economic measures could we take? What about refusing to sell that oil plant?

Mr. Hyland: That has already been disapproved.

Mr. Hillenbrand: There are steps we could take to restrict credits and export licenses.

Mr. Irwin: With regard to the Soviet reaction to events in Poland, what the Soviets do could be affected by our own reaction, for example, whether we do anything in SALT.

Dr. Kissinger: In the contingency we are discussing, the Soviets have not yet done anything. We are talking about bloody repression by Polish forces. You are going to provide us a list of possible measures that we might take if this happens.

Now let's take a third hypothesis. Suppose the disorders spread to East Germany. This is probably the only neighboring country where this might happen.

Mr. Hyland: Possibly the riots might also spread to Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you think that the Czechs are going to have more than one revolution every 400 years?

Mr. Baker: There could be slowdowns in Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Kissinger: Are they slowing down?

Mr. Baker: They have never really speeded up since 1968.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's leave open for now the question of specifying countries to which the disorders might spread. I assume we don't expect any troubles in Hungary and Romania.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If the Soviets clamp down, the Hungarian reform program will be affected.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Hungarians are far out ahead on economic reforms. They will be afraid that the riots in Poland will strengthen the position of the Hungarian conservatives.

Mr. Baker: A sympathetic reaction in Hungary to what is happening in Poland could have an effect on whether the Soviets become involved.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume that the East German forces have the capability to put down an East German uprising.

Mr. Hillenbrand: That is the assumption. However, in 1956 in Hungary the troops went over to the people.

Mr. Nutter: I can't see the Polish forces putting down a widespread revolt.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: To do so they will need more troops than they have in the north.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's leave aside temporarily the case of suppression of an East German revolt by East German troops. It is really just an extension of the case we have been discussing for Poland. I assume there will be no interruption of Berlin traffic if there is an uprising in East Germany.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Ground traffic might be stopped temporarily for internal security reasons. The East Germans might have to move troops across the Autobahn. But any blockage would not be for the purpose of harassing us.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we have contingency plans for supplying Berlin?

Mr. Hillenbrand: We have short-term stockpiles in Berlin.

Dr. Kissinger: How long would it be before a shortage began to be felt?

Mr. Hillenbrand: With the stockpiles and an airlift, we can go for six months. We could live through any short period of interrupted access without real dislocations in the city. The only problem might be that export orders could not be filled.

Dr. Kissinger: What about the case of Soviet intervention? You mentioned forces in East Germany. Do you mean Soviet forces?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We assume Soviet forces would come from East Germany or the Byelo-Russian Military District.

Dr. Kissinger: How long would it take them to get there?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Szczecin and Silesia are right across the border from East Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: But where are they deployed? (to Moorer) Tom?

Adm. Moorer: If they haven't started making preparations now, I think it would take them about ten days to move.

Mr. Irwin: They will have to move more quickly than that.

Adm. Moorer: It all depends on whether they are making preparations now.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we tell whether they are?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: As yet we have no indication they are.

Adm. Moorer: It took all of ten days for them to get ready to move into Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we intensify our watch on Soviet troop movements?

Mr. Karamessines: We have already done so.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume we have better intelligence for Central Europe than for the Soviet Union.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: We will have to analyze the position of each division and its state of readiness.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it that none of this is going to happen this weekend.

Mr. Baker: I don't think things will move that fast.

Dr. Kissinger: We need to put together a Working Group with Marty [Hillenbrand] as chairman and with representatives from all of your agencies. The Working Group should work out the details of each of the hypotheses we have discussed and should consider the political implications. You should consider what the effect will be on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the US. The Group should also take a look at measures the US should take. In the Hungarian and Czech cases there was criticism that had the US made its position clearer, we might have had a greater deterrent effect on what the Soviets did. I am not particularly a partisan of this line of thinking. However, the Working Group should address the question of what the President should do if he wants to take a firm stand right away. The Group should consider not only what he should do, but when he should do it.

(to Hillenbrand) Can you get that put together by Monday [December 21]?

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think we can get a report pretty well assembled by Monday.

Dr. Kissinger: It should be ready at least for an oral presentation.

Mr. Hillenbrand: With regard to the East German situation, there are quadripartite agreed contingency plans dating from 1961 to cover an East German uprising. The plan is entitled "Western Attitude in the Event of an Uprising in East Germany or East Berlin."

Dr. Kissinger: What does the plan involve?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The plan basically calls for doing nothing except to exert every effort to welcome refugees. There is to be no action on East German territory.

Dr. Kissinger: Could the West Germans go along with such a policy?

The contingencies that the Working Group should address are: if the riots at the present level die down, if the riots become more extensive and are suppressed by Polish forces, and if the riots become more extensive and lead to Soviet intervention. Then we should also consider the possibility of troubles in East Germany. This might be broken down into three contingencies parallel to those I have listed for Poland.

There is also a question whether the FRG could stand by if a massive revolt took place in East Germany. What impact would that have on West German domestic politics?

Mr. Hillenbrand: That is a separate question.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right. We don't need a contingency plan for that.

Adm. Moorer: If the Poles don't put down the riots, the Soviets will have to make preparations before they can move. Soviet action won't be necessary unless the Polish army refuses to suppress the riots. If the Polish troops refuse, they might turn and oppose the Soviets.

Dr. Kissinger: It's possible they might do neither.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: The Polish army could just dissolve.

Dr. Kissinger: The Czech army did neither.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: There were no riots in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If Gomulka can't put down the revolt, he will call in the Soviets.

Dr. Kissinger: Can a Polish Government survive if it does that?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It's really a question of whether it can survive one way or the other, unless, of course, it decided on a new leader who could quell the uprising.

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps we ought to restudy our NATO exercise. These events in Poland could make the Soviets more reluctant to move troops outside of East European territory.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If there is Soviet involvement, it will be at Polish request.

Dr. Kissinger: There was no request in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets already have two divisions in Poland. They might act in self-defense.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it for granted that the Soviets will intervene if they see no alternative for preventing the establishment of an unacceptable regime in Poland. I agree with John [Irwin] that they would be reluctant to do so. We can meet again on Monday, [December 21]. We can call your offices to set up a time.

145. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Preliminary Comments on the Events in Poland

The Facts

Gomulka and four of his close associates have become the scapegoats for the major disorders that began last Monday. The new regime has already hinted at an increase in wages and a reexamination of the economic plan—both moves designed to pacify the workers. The new leadership appears to be a balance of various factions, including some, such as Moczar,² who stands on the extreme conservative side, but will be dominated by Edward Gierek who succeeds Gomulka.³

Gierek, 57, is a tough minded and dynamic leader of the party in the heavily industrialized areas of Silesia. He spent much of his early life abroad, in France and Belgium, and returned to Poland only in 1948. He has earned the reputation of an efficient and pragmatic administrator. Politically, he is conservative and has been influenced by the orthodoxy of the French pre-war communist leaders Duclos and Thorez. He is thought to be more nationalistic than Gomulka has been in recent years, and thus may be less inclined to depend heavily on the USSR.

Domestic Implications

The most immediate issue is whether the new regime can pacify the population, or whether the signs of weakness and instability in a crisis will embolden the population to press for more sweeping concessions. Gierek has a fairly good popular image. His initial speech suggests he will make some short-term economic concessions to restore

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I. 1969–1971. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A memorandum attached to the original text reads: "Nancy, The attached was delivered to the President on Sunday evening at 8:00 p.m. Copies provided to HAK-Haig-Howe-Latimer-Hyland-Lord. The memo has not been logged. Kevin D." Kissinger discussed this memorandum and the context in which it was drafted in *White House Years*, pp. 797–798.

² Major General Mieczyslaw Moczar, former Minister of the Interior and leader of the ultra-nationalist "Partisan" faction of Poland's Communist Party. He became a full member of the Polish Politburo on December 20.

³ Gierek succeeded Gomulka as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party.

order and postpone the fundamental reforms—thus aggravating the longer term problem.

The real test will come early this week as the workers return to their jobs after the weekend. Thus far there is no evidence of Soviet military movement in reaction to the disorders this week or to the change in leadership.

Relations with Moscow

To what extent Moscow was consulted on the leadership change is not clear. It appears the changes were made too rapidly for the Soviets to be directly involved. On the face of it, however, the Soviets have no particular reason to oppose the new leaders, some of whom, such as the Minister of Defense, Wojciech Jaruzelski, are quite close to Moscow. At the same time, a sudden shift to relatively unknown leaders as Gierek may cause nervousness in the USSR. In his address to the public Gierek was careful to pledge a continuation in cooperation with Moscow as a “fundamental” requirement for Polish security.⁵

Foreign Policy

The change of leaders may lead to a slow down in the pace [of] normalization between Poland and West Germany. Gomulka had been heavily identified with the rapprochement with Bonn and the recent treaty. If only because of the tense internal situation, the new regime is not likely to make new moves in foreign policy. Gierek in his speech mentioned normalization with Bonn but perfunctorily. Moreover, the East German leadership will probably be able to claim that Gomulka's foreign policy contributed to instability in Poland. Ulbricht immediately congratulated Gierek, suggesting he is satisfied with Gomulka's removal.

Soviet Policy

As for Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet leaders may also be inclined to believe that Ostpolitik has an unsettling effect on Eastern Europe. For example, they may believe that the treaty with Germany led Gomulka to conclude he could press unpopular price increases on the population. Thus, Moscow may also want a pause in its relations with Bonn. One casualty of the Polish events could be the Berlin negotiations, where the Soviets may not wish to press the East Germans for concessions—thus compounding instability in Central Europe.

At the same time, with this détente with Bonn at least temporarily slowed down, the Soviet leaders, if they choose to maintain some

⁵ For relevant portions from Gierek's address, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1971-1972, p. 24391.

prospect of détente, may be inclined to show some improvement in their relations with us.

We have checked with CIA and State who generally concur in this evaluation.⁶

⁶ A CIA analysis of the Polish events, "The Implications of Gomulka's Ouster," December 21, and an assessment by the Embassy contained in telegram 3540 from Warsaw, December 21, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. I.

146. Editorial Note

On January 15, 1971, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff forwarded to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger a memorandum regarding the United States position on the Treaty of Warsaw. He wrote: "We had earlier recommended that you raise with Under Secretary Irwin (or dispatch an instruction to the USC) the question of the US position on the FRG-Polish treaty . . . [T]he Secretariat (on your instructions) informed State that it should come forward with a memo. Secretary Rogers has sent such a memo for the President.

"The Secretary's memo unfortunately does not really consider our policy in the context of a ratified Polish treaty. He posed three options for our position in general:

"—continue in public statements to stand by the November 18 statement which expressed satisfaction at the initialing of the treaty, and pointing out that quadripartite rights and responsibilities are not affected;

"—state that we welcome the treaty, including its boundary provisions (this is essentially what the British said in November), and that our juridical position remains unchanged; or

"—state that we would respect the border and would support it at the time of a peace settlement; this statement could be unilateral, tripartite, or quadripartite.

"The Secretary recommends that our position should be to welcome the treaty, and if the FRG does not object, to consider specific comment welcoming the border provisions. Thus, the Secretary's recommendation falls slightly between his first and second option.

"The first two options are virtually indistinguishable, while the third represents a significant modification of our position. The course recommended by the Secretary seems just fine for use, should the oc-

casion arise, at any time prior to the ratification of the Polish treaty. (It is doubtful whether any occasion would arise in this period for the issuance of any sort of official USG statement, since the general public interest—very high when the treaty was signed in November—is rather low.) As the treaty is ratified, however, there will be occasion for a further enunciation of the American position.”

At the top of the memorandum, Kissinger wrote: “I have accepted Rec. 2.” National Security Council, NSSM Files, NSSM III.

For the full text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–72, Document 163.

147. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

Contingency Study for Poland

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

I. Summary

A. Contingencies

1. Termination or suppression of disorders without major involvement of Polish or Soviet Armed Forces.

2. Development of disorder in Poland into a nationwide wave of disorders constituting a national uprising against the regime or against its leadership.

3. The involvement or employment of Soviet armed forces to help Polish armed forces and security forces in suppressing the disorders. This could involve the two divisions of Soviet forces currently stationed in Poland and/or the use of Soviet forces brought in from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, or Eastern Germany.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Secret. The paper was an attachment to a January 8, 1971, memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, not printed. In the memorandum, Eliot wrote in part: “The two contingency papers requested at the WSAG meeting you held December 18 are now in a final version and have been distributed to members of the Interdepartmental Task Force on Poland. (Copy enclosed.)” A second contingency paper on East Germany is not printed. For the minutes of the WSAG meeting, see Document 144.

B. U.S. Interests

1. In view of close historic ties with the Polish people and the large number (estimates range from 7 to 10 million) of American citizens of Polish origin, repression in Poland, even if carried out exclusively by Polish forces, could not be ignored by the US. Severe repression (Contingency 2) could cause a number of current activities—including Polish export trade, exchanges, present and planned exhibits, programs involving use of PL-480 zlotys and CCC credits—to be put into question. This could have an impact on US programs elsewhere in Eastern Europe, including the USSR.

2. As a major world power, the US in its own self-interest could not ignore the possible use of Soviet troops against the Polish population.

3. If Soviet troops were used against the Polish people, this action would put in serious jeopardy any negotiations we may be conducting or contemplating with the Soviet Union, in particular the SALT talks and the Berlin talks, which could hardly continue to the accompaniment of severe US condemnation of the Soviet action. For this reason, it would be in the US interest to deter, if possible, a Soviet involvement which could only destabilize the situation in Central Europe.

4. The Romanian and Yugoslav Governments would view the use or possible use of Soviet troops in Poland with renewed apprehension. This could produce pressures for some form of assurances regarding opposition to Warsaw Pact military action against either of those states and US support for their continued independence.

5. Use of Soviet troops in Poland would certainly have adverse effects on the development of Chancellor Brandt's Eastern Policy. It could produce internal political changes in Western Germany and an FRG call for a renewed statement of the US military commitment.

6. The US military posture in Europe and the question of increased West European efforts on defense would be affected, the degree depending on the extent of involvement of the Soviet Armed Forces in Poland and the degree of popular reaction in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Eastern Germany.

7. US interests outside Europe (Middle East, Viet-Nam, Caribbean) might benefit from Soviet preoccupation in Central Europe.

*C. Assumptions**Under Contingency 1*

The contingency in which the demonstrations subside or are suppressed without further loss of life has, it would appear, now occurred. The principal proponent of the decision on the extent and timing of the price rises, Jaszczuk, has been held responsible by the Polish Central Committee and removed from the Politburo. Gomulka, who is reported ailing, has, as the top man, also accepted responsibility or been

held responsible along with three close associates, and has been removed. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary, those advocating economic reforms may become temporarily more cautious.

Moscow's most immediate concern in this contingency will be for Warsaw to get matters firmly in hand. If the new regime appears to be moving effectively to meet the situation, Moscow will probably be less inclined to meddle than to accept and support the Polish regime's decisions.

The USSR will be concerned nevertheless by the fact that violent demonstrations have succeeded in producing rapid results on the top leadership level. Increased attention to internal security and further emphasis on ideological orthodoxy may result. Soviet propaganda may play the theme of the role of Western influence, or even mischief making, in the events.

In the foreign policy field, the most direct feedback may be on East-West relations in Europe. The Polish disorders, demonstrating the volatility of Eastern European populations, will already have strengthened the arguments of conservatives as to the potential risks of détente policies. The most likely outcome would be continuation of Moscow's European policy, but with greater caution on those items which create greater direct contacts with the West. There may be a heightened effort, in seeking Western credits and technology, to avoid a concomitant increase in Western presence or influence.

By and large, this contingency does not appear likely to produce major changes in Soviet policy on more distant areas such as the Middle East, Viet-Nam, or SALT (the talks in any case being in recess).

Under Contingency 2

The use of Polish armed forces and security forces on a nationwide scale would generate major attention in world media and raise questions in Poland about the viability of the new Polish leadership. Unless the new leadership contained the situation promptly, military-oriented figures might gain in stature. In the West, opponents of building bridges to Eastern European regimes would very probably gain support for criticisms of current US programs in Poland in particular and perhaps in Eastern Europe in general. In Germany, Chancellor Brandt's efforts to normalize relations with Poland, and his entire Eastern Policy, might come under stronger domestic criticism. East Germany's opposition in Warsaw Pact councils to Brandt's initiatives would be strengthened. If major loss of life, widespread casualties, and/or a significant disruption of supplies occurred, the question of US or international medical or food assistance in the wake of the suppression of the uprising might arise.

As the situation in Poland continued to deteriorate, Moscow would be increasingly troubled and increasingly insistent that the Polish communists put their house in order. The Soviets would be more

disposed to advise and ultimately demand that Wawsaw pursue courses of action to resolve the situation.

The Soviets would be increasingly concerned over the possibility of spillover into other Eastern European countries and into the USSR—particularly if the spreading and duration of the demonstrations showed signs of becoming an organized movement. Heightened internal security measures and repression of dissidents in the Soviet Union and Soviet urging of such measures in Eastern Europe would be likely.

In these circumstances, the anti-Western propaganda which accompanied heightened internal repression would begin to affect foreign policy. As the inconsistency between détente diplomacy and vigilance propaganda became embarrassing, Moscow's policy toward Western Europe and then its policy in other areas would tend to stiffen, especially as Western nations shrank from contacts with the Soviets.

Under Contingency 3

The use of Soviet forces to quell Polish disturbances would revive the atmosphere prevailing in the wake of the Czechoslovak invasion.

Anxieties would rise sharply in Romania and Yugoslavia. The possibility of sympathy demonstrations in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or East Germany, also conceivably leading to the use of Soviet troops, could arise. It would become difficult, in a period in which Soviet weapons were killing Poles, for US and other Western representatives to sit across the negotiating table from Soviet representatives in Berlin—and perhaps even in Vienna in March, when the SALT talks are scheduled to resume. The movement toward détente—now spearheaded by Chancellor Brandt—would probably halt for a period of time. There would, in such an atmosphere, be a heightening of concern about the Western defense posture in Europe. The USSR's preoccupation in Central Europe might however cause it to reduce its military and military-related involvements elsewhere in the world, i.e., the Middle East, Cuba, Viet-Nam.

One of the motives for Soviet intervention would be concern over potential spillover effects of continuing disturbances in Poland on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The trend toward greater internal security precautions would continue, as would scapegoating anti-Western propaganda. To the degree that some Soviet or East European leaders might see the situation as one of the products of détente diplomacy or an added argument against allowing Western influence to grow in Eastern Europe, they would feel the need for greater caution in dealing with the West in the future.

The use of Soviet troops in Poland—especially if they should be engaged in bloody incidents—could not but arouse widespread revulsion in world opinion. Part of the task of the Soviet Foreign Min-

istry would probably be—as it was after the interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968)—to attempt to limit damage to Soviet interests abroad. Indeed, if this contingency were preceded by a period of Soviet anticipation of intervention, Moscow might even try to inhibit adverse reactions by making some quiet but positive diplomatic gestures in advance—perhaps hinting at some greater prospect of progress in the Berlin talks or SALT for the purpose.

Our choice of options under this contingency would have to be adjusted to take account of the nature of Soviet military involvement, i.e. whether it was at the specific request of the Polish Government or essentially on Soviet initiative; whether it involved Soviet troops standing by for effect as Polish forces did the job, or whether it involved direct confrontation and violence between Poles and Soviet forces; whether, in the latter instance, units of the Polish armed forces became active *against* Soviet troops. There would have to be a large number of draft Action Papers if each possible combination of the above factors were to be provided for.

D. Options

The following options are listed in relation to the three contingencies discussed. These options are not *recommended* courses of action but *possible* courses of action and therefore constitute a checklist rather than a set of proposals. A separate section itemizes possible US actions and could be taken in anticipation of a possible Soviet decision to use Soviet troops in Poland. These options should not be viewed as measures which would necessarily inhibit, delay or prevent a Soviet decision to intervene; they are unlikely to have that much effect. They are, however, measures which might, in this contingency, be worth taking in terms of establishing US concern for the consequences to the Polish nation and to the prospects for stability in Europe of a Soviet intervention.

(Under Contingency 1)

a) Make a statement at the next press conference by the Secretary and/or President giving briefly our understanding of the origins of the disturbances and expressing our sorrow at the loss of life, particularly in instances where this occurred as the result of ancillary actions by persons not acting on the basis of substantive economic or political grievances. State that we are prepared to continue efforts toward improved relations.

b) Determine broadcast policy for US and US-controlled media.

(Under Contingency 2)

a) Call in the Polish Ambassador and express concern at the loss of life involved in suppression of the uprising. At the same time, a public statement to this effect could be made by the President or the Secretary.

b) Suspend exchange programs underway with Poland and cancel the opening of Architecture exhibit in Warsaw (scheduled for mid-January 1971).

c) Review other US programs in Poland, involving the expenditure of US-held zlotys. (Those which are of direct benefit to the Polish people, such as the planned construction of a new wing at the American Hospital in Krakow, should be continued. Additionally, the Poles are servicing or repaying financial obligations to the US, arising from now-terminated PL-480 programs. We would not want to impel the Polish Government to stop these payments.)

d) Suspend US travel to Poland.

e) Recall our Ambassador from Warsaw on consultation.

f) Withdraw MFN tariff treatment from Polish exports to the US. (Although we can expect significant Congressional sentiment for withdrawal of MFN, doing so would be in violation of our GATT agreement. In addition, we undertook in 1960 to obtain MFN for Poland as part of a claims-settlement agreement. Removing it now could only result in Polish default on debt payments and a consequent long-term impact on trade and financial relations.)

g) Cancellation of the current \$25-million unused CCC credit. (However, it would be self-defeating to refuse to allow Poland to buy agricultural products if we were at the same time mounting any sort of relief effort.)

h) By administrative decision, place Poland in a more restrictive category for export-licensing purposes. (Doing so, however, would run counter to our general policy of encouraging trade with Eastern Europe and probably not have a particularly significant impact.)

i) Offer spot medical or food assistance at points where local medical or food supplies are not meeting needs in the aftermath of suppression.

(Between Contingency 2 and 3)

a) Call in the Soviet Ambassador and warn him of the seriousness with which we would view any punitive Soviet action against the Polish population. At the same time, a public statement to this effect could be made by the President.

b) Use the Hot Line to convey our concern to the Soviets and couple this with a public statement by the President.

c) Stimulate preventive action in the UN Security Council; call an emergency NAC session.

(Under Contingency 3)

a) Immediately break off any negotiations under way with the Soviets and cancel all exchange programs.

b) Take such steps as (a), (b), or (c) above which have not already been taken.

c) Prohibit Pan-American flights to Moscow and Aeroflot flights to New York and discourage commercial activities.

d) Make a public statement expressing US condemnation and listing the actions taken or proposed.

e) Recall our Ambassador from Moscow for consultation.

f) Attempt to get parallel actions taken by other Western Governments.

g) In the event Soviet forces are used without a Polish request, take the matter to the United Nations Security Council in concert with other countries.

h) Avoid threats of military action but consider what stage of alert might be assumed in NATO.

E. Key Issues

The most important questions which will confront the US are:

Under Contingency 1:

1. Broadcast Policy.
2. US Public Reaction.

Under Contingency 2:

1. How far to cut back our relations with the Polish Government.
2. Whether to participate in or offer any spot medical or food assistance in the wake of the disorders.

Under Contingency 3:

1. How far to cut back our relations with the Soviets.
2. Whether negotiations on such important questions as Berlin or SALT should be broken off or only postponed.
3. The degree to which such action would be effective.
4. The number of US troops and amounts of matériel which might have to be moved to Europe in order to allay possible fears of our Allies.
5. The determination of the desired NATO alert status in concert with our Allies.

[Omitted here is Section II, a list of draft action documents.]

148. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Ambassador Michalowski, Monday, March 22²

He is returning to Warsaw for home leave and consultations, and presumably wants a general discussion with you. As you know he is a slick operator, having survived through the Stalinist, Gomulka, and now the Gierek regimes. However, he and some in his Embassy have shown some signs of nervousness about their future. There was even a report in January that Michalowski was considering defection.³

In this light he may reopen the *question of the catalytic cracking process* (an \$8 million process to be sold by a Illinois firm). Our decision to turn it down last November was a setback for Michalowski,⁴ who had lobbied for it and enlisted the aid of Congressman Zablocki.⁵ The negative decision, however, left open the possibility of reopening it later.

Jan Kaczmarek, Chairman of the Polish Science and Technology Committee, who is coming here in April to visit with Ed David, mentioned continuing interest in obtaining the process, so Michalowski may hope to take a favorable signal home with him.

If he raises it you might say:

—naturally, if a formal request is made by the Chicago firm, and the Polish Government is still interested, we would review the case;

—what reason would the Ambassador cite for a favorable decision now compared to last November? (He will now argue that we should have a positive interest in helping the new government, and promoting stability in Eastern Europe.)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971. Confidential. Urgent; sent for information.

² According to Kissinger's March 22 record of schedule, the meeting with Michalowski did not take place. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976)

³ An attached January 16 Department of State memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger reported this possibility; not printed.

⁴ See Document 139.

⁵ Clement Zablocki (D-Wisconsin).

Note: *If he does not mention it, there is no reason for you to take the initiative.* (Defense is strongly opposed to the whole project.)⁶

Conference on European Security. Even under Gierek, the Poles remain an active agitator for a European Conference; their latest scheme is for several conferences on the grounds that there is so much to discuss. He may ask about the Berlin talks and argue that they should *not* be a strict precondition. He might say that if Berlin is stalemated, a grand conference might improve the atmosphere for a Berlin settlement.

You might say:

—if Berlin cannot be settled, what meaning would a conference have that avoided all the difficult questions;

—even if there were a Berlin settlement, it is difficult to see what would be an acceptable agenda for a conference. MBFR is the only subject of conceivable interest, and a conference of all Europeans is not necessary for this;

—the Poles would do well to use their influence on Ulbricht and the Soviets to settle Berlin, rather than promoting a meaningless conference.

Indochina. I doubt that the Ambassador has anything special to raise, other than pumping you for whatever he can on Laos, etc. He might say something about the danger of Chinese intervention, etc. He remains personally very sensitive to allegations that the Polish role years ago was anything but honorable.

You might say:

that the Polish role in the ICC has been far from helpful, and it is surprising that the Poles would issue a special statement denouncing the South Vietnamese operation, after years of silence about North Vietnam's role in Laos. Even Hanoi scarcely hides that its forces are fighting in the panhandle.

The Polish Internal Scene. You might say that you were surprised that the Poles reversed the price increases after resisting popular pressures. Is this a sign of weakness and instability? Will the new government be forced into increasing concessions now that the population has learned the secret of putting pressures on the central government?

You might ask in what way Gierek's foreign policy will differ from Gomulka's.

⁶ In a June 2 letter Nutter advised Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce Harold B. Scott of Department of Defense opposition to the sale of catalytic crackers to Poland and Czechoslovakia because of their "strategic significance." The letter is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971.

The Poles are complaining on the one hand that we are obstructing the ratification of the *Polish-German treaty*, but on the other hand, they have indicated to Bonn they do not wish it ratified before the Soviet treaty. If Michalowski raises this with you again, *you might wish to comment*:

—We expressed our “satisfaction” with the treaty at the time of its signing, and you have said on many occasions we support a German-Polish reconciliation;

—The West Germans linked the treaties to the Berlin negotiations, not the United States, but we abide by their desires;

—The ratification issue and linkage is a highly charged issue inside West Germany, and we do not wish to inject ourselves in domestic politics;

—Together with the Allies we will consider an appropriate statement on the occasion of the ratification of the German-Polish treaty.

149. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Representative Roman C. Pucinski¹

Washington, March 24, 1971, 10:55 a.m.

K: I am terribly sorry I didn’t get back sooner. The message got lost. It’s as inefficient as any government office.

P: The Polish Govt. is trying to buy oil refining machinery from us. The company is based across the street from me. I understand it’s under review again in view of the fact we sold this kind of equipment to Romania. I understand it’s in your shop.

K: When a bureaucrat doesn’t want to make a decision he says I’m the bastard. While that may be true I am not to blame on this. There was a decision made on foreign policy grounds and nothing to do with the merits of the thing which we can review later this summer.

P: The people here to see me from Chicago say that the Polish Govt. has to be making a decision and will buy from the U.S. or Russia. You can imagine where they want the business. It’s for American dollars and exact same that went to Romania.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971. No classification marking. Pucinski was a Democratic Representative from Illinois.

K: Yes but at the time the request came in the Polish Government had been difficult on other matters.

P: I am behind that decision. I am sure you didn't see a note I wrote to the President in which I said if he kept his fingers crossed like everyone else on Gehrig [*Gierek*] it seems they are trying to move.

K: I will try to look at it again.

P: May I say that you are doing a good job? I am very much impressed with the way you are handling this. And I say that as a good Democrat.

K: Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

150. Note From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, undated.

General Haig,

This² is about the catcracking plant the Poles want and on which the President deferred a decision last August.²

There has been some pressure around town to reopen the matter, including from Ed David who wants to be the bearer of happy tidings when his Polish counterpart visits this country in April. (There is a memo on this in your place, LOG 26246, in which HAK would tell David to cool it; we have not had a comeback on it so I don't know where that memo stands.)³

Defense remains opposed but most others in town think that the matter should be reopened both because it has commercial advantages for us and because, so the reasoning goes, it may help Gierek consolidate his position. While you were away, the Polish Ambassador was to see HAK but the appointment was canceled; the expectation was that he would ask to have the matter reopened. State is ready to send

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971. No classification marking.

² Haig sent Sonnenfeldt a copy of the transcript of Kissinger's telephone conversation with Congressman Pucinski (Document 148) attached to an undated note that reads: "Hal, do you know what this is about?"

³ Not found.

over a memo requesting reopening but is holding up pending a signal that the President's attitude has changed from last August. (I have taken the position that we cannot psychoanalyze the President and that agencies that have strong feelings about something should raise the matter on its merits.) Peterson has just launched an East-West trade study⁴ and my guess is that he and his staff will increasingly weigh in on the side of reducing restrictions and increasing trade.

Henry, I note, indicated to Pucinski that there would be a review "later this summer." I don't know why he picked that time, but if he really means it, I suggest that the USC be geared up "later this spring" to get all the arguments once more on the table so that the matter can be put again to the President whenever the time seems propitious and fits in with other things.

If HAK was just placating Pucinski and *knows* that the President will not change his mind, then this should be made clear to us, so we can turn off the mounting bureaucratic pressures.

Please let Fred Bergsten and me know how this is to be handled since we are getting a steady stream of phone calls on it.

HS

⁴ Peterson launched a study on East–West trade with CIEP Study Memorandum 2, on March 13. For the text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 327.

151. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

Exports of Catalytic Cracking Technology to Poland and Czechoslovakia

The Secretary of Commerce, with the concurrence of State and OST, proposes at Tab A that you agree to his approval of five licenses for the export of petroleum catalytic cracking technology, equipment and cat-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Tabs A–C are not printed.

alysts to Poland and Czechoslovakia. Defense opposes approval. Interior would approve the Polish, but not the Czech case, on grounds that other factors override the security consideration.

In September you decided to defer decision on the Polish case, and you approved a somewhat similar application for shipments to Romania.

Two U.S. companies have made competing applications to furnish U.S. technology for a Polish catalytic cracking plant with a capacity of 33,000 barrels a day. These companies estimate receipts from the transaction and additional follow-on supplies at about \$15 million. Three competing U.S. companies have applied to furnish U.S. technology for a 12,000–22,000 barrel a day plant in Czechoslovakia. U.S. fees would be about \$2 million plus \$600 thousand annually.

The U.S. developed the catalytic cracking process in the early 1940s and has made considerable improvement in it in recent years. The British also have significant technology in this area.

The arguments in favor of approval are:

—The products of the plant would be used for motor gasoline, a civilian product, since the Soviet military tanks and trucks depend largely on diesel fuel, and aviation fuel is largely made by other processes.

—The Soviets have already built catalytic plants of these sizes. They are less efficient than our plants but produce similar products. There is no evidence the Soviets have even tried to obtain the technology of the similar 1965 U.S. sale to Romania.

—Even if the Soviets got the technology for these plants, they would not be able to use it to build larger plants before the process is obsolete in the United States. (Some U.S. plants are four times the size of the Polish project.) Dr. David has written at Tab B that the security significance is minimal since even if the whole Eastern bloc had free use of the U.S. processes, they would cut their operating costs only one percent by 1980.

—The USSR has a sufficient supply of petroleum products.

—Approval would provide a basis for trade relations to help the U.S. balance of payments. Denial would force these countries to depend on USSR for their petroleum plants and block our future trade opportunities in this field.

—The Poles have stressed the importance of this case. Approval would signal some recognition of their recent actions to improve U.S. relations such as their abatement of their support for North Vietnam, their recent high level visits to the United States, their granting of civil air permits to Pan Am, their decrease of hostile propaganda, their stepped-up approval of the U.S. cultural program and their recent stress on the need to shift resources to consumers.

The arguments against approval are:

—The products of the refinery would be useful in a conventional war.

—The U.S. still has effective control on the more advanced types of this refining technology.

—If it wishes, the USSR can get the technological data from the Poles and the Czechs and would be able to make their own refining capacity more efficient.

—The process is still sufficiently advanced over what the Soviets have that approval would make a contribution to their military industrial complex.

The difference between the Polish and Czech applications hinges on:

—The importance of the refinery to Polish plans to develop their civilian petroleum industry.

—The recent moves by Poland to improve relations with the United States.

In the light of the recent decisions to license new exports to the USSR, the minimal security consequences of this transaction and the U.S. commercial interest in being involved in future industrial development in Eastern Europe, I believe that the licenses should be approved for Poland.

However, the sad state of the internal Czech regime and the general state of its relations with us do not seem to me to justify approving the Czech licenses at this time. In fact, because of two late July cases of arrests of U.S. citizens, State is now trying to persuade Commerce to delay until the fall announcing approval of the Czech licenses even if you now approve their issuance.

Pete Peterson, on the other hand, believes that our balance of payments situation, the difficulty of defending differential treatment on security grounds, and lack of business sympathy for lost export opportunities argue for approving the Czech cases (Tab C).

Recommendation

That you authorize Secretary Stans to approve the catalytic cracker licenses for Poland but delay consideration of the licenses for Czechoslovakia.

Approve²

² Nixon initialed this option but also underlined “delaying announcement of the Czech decision until the arrest cases are settled this fall” in the second option. In a subsequent memorandum to Stans, August 23, Kissinger wrote: “The President has decided that you should approve the pending licenses for the export of petroleum catalytic

Disapprove, prefer to allow licenses for Czechoslovakia as well as Poland, though delaying announcement of the Czech decision until the arrest cases are settled this fall.

Disapprove, prefer to continue delaying all the catalytic cracker applications.

cracking technology, equipment, and catalysts to Poland. Announcement of the approvals should be made in the usual routine fashion without special fanfare. No decision has been reached on the applications for licenses for similar equipment for sale to Czechoslovakia." (Ibid.)

152. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

U.S./Polish Relations

Background

State (Tab B)² has sent you a telegram (Tab C)³ from Embassy Warsaw reporting that the Gierek regime is now in a position of recognized and unquestioned leadership in Poland. The new regime's gestures toward the Church, workers, and farmers have been cautiously welcomed, and it is moving to meet consumer demands in a way its predecessor had never done. Also State points out (Tab D)⁴ that Poland has attempted to signal its good intentions to the U.S. by:

—informing us that it has significantly reduced its assistance to North Vietnam;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971. Confidential. Sent for action. Concurred in by Sonnenfeldt and sent through Haig. Tabs A–F are attached but not printed.

² Eliot's letter to Kissinger is dated August 6.

³ Telegram 2210 from Warsaw, July 15.

⁴ Telegram 1546 from Warsaw, May 21.

- allowing Pan Am a unilateral permit to fly into Warsaw;
- avoiding criticism of the U.S.;
- allowing exhibits and films about the U.S. to circulate throughout Poland.

Polish Economic Requests

Poland has requested three major items from the U.S.:

- a short-term postponement of dollar payments on PL 480 debts (Tab E), i.e. the U.S. would not ask for immediate repayment of approximately \$55 million owed to us over a period from 1971 to 1974;
- approval of an export license for catalytic cracking technology (Tab F);
- long-term USG credits to finance the sale of U.S. products to Poland.

State proposes to inform Poland that we see no economic reason to justify the debt rescheduling. *Unless you conclude that political arguments are sufficiently strong that we should meet Poland's request, I intend to clear State's telegram (Tab A) which denies the Poles the debt rescheduling.*

The catalytic cracking unit decision, as you know, has not yet been made⁵ although Sonnenfeldt and I continue to believe that a favorable decision should be taken as soon as possible. Long-term export credits through the Ex-Im Bank are available to Poland now that the Fino Amendment has been removed from the Ex-Im Bank bill (although no specific requests have as yet been received).

As this memo and past memoranda on Poland attest, decisions with regard to Poland are now being handled on an ad hoc basis—without benefit of an overall policy framework. Although this has proved only a minor problem, it will increase in magnitude now that the Fino Amendment has been removed from the Export-Import Bank bill (thereby allowing Ex-Im to finance commercial exports to Eastern European countries including Poland). Doubtless there will soon be requests for Ex-Im financing for a number of exports to Poland. We will then have to decide on a policy for handling these requests. You might, therefore, wish to consider issuing a NSSM on Poland which would examine our political relations and identify issues and options in future economic relations.

⁵ Kissinger wrote in the margin at this point: "It is made." See Document 151.

Recommendations

1. That you authorize me to clear the telegram (Tab A) to Warsaw indicating that we do not feel that economic grounds justify the requested debt rescheduling.⁶

2. That you indicate whether Sonnenfeldt and I should draft a NSSM on future relations with Poland—which would take into account inter alia our future economic relationships.⁷

⁶ Kissinger initialed his approval. In an attached August 26 memorandum to Eliot, Jeanne Davis of the NSC staff wrote: "Dr. Kissinger has approved the text of the draft cable to Warsaw. . . . However, paragraph 6 should be deleted since a decision on the catalytic cracker has already been made and communicated to the Poles."

⁷ Kissinger initialed his approval.

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, November 8, 1971, 1040Z.

3748. Subj: Conversation with Party Chief Gierek.

1. In course Soviet Embassy reception November 6, new Polish Ambassador-designate to US Trampczynski arranged for me to speak with PZPR Chief Gierek. Latter was extremely warm in his comments, toasting the American people, US-Polish ties, and expressing hopes for success of Trampczynski's mission. Gierek dwelt on his desire to expand trade between US and Poland said he was most grateful for President's decision to grant license for catalytic cracker.² He was pleased Secretary Volpe had visited Poland and said Prime Minister Jaroszewicz had told him of his extremely interesting talk with Volpe.³ Gierek commented that US and Poland had great historic traditions in common, but that he hoped "new and even better traditions" could be established in future.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL POL-US. Confidential.

² See Document 151.

³ Volpe visited Poland for talks in November 1971. A memorandum of his November 3 conversation Jaroszewicz is in the Department of State, Polish Desk Files: Lot 74 D 440, Volpe Visit.

2. Observing Gierek and Trampczynski together, it seemed evident that, as we have heard, Trampczynski is well regarded by Gierek and has good personal relationship with him. Gierek stressed in his conversation that Trampczynski would have “direct, personal channel” in reporting to him on matters of special interest.

3. In other conversations during evening, I spoke with Politburo member Tejchma, who reportedly concentrates on foreign affairs field, and with Central Committee foreign affairs expert Ryszard Frelek. Tejchma was forthcoming on US-Polish relations and said he thought prospects were good for improvement in political as well as economic field. Frelek called catalytic cracker decision a “turning point” and forecast important favorable developments in US-Polish relations in next year. He mentioned in particular that visit by US astronauts would be welcome in 1972.⁴

4. *Comment.* Change in atmospherics is especially striking when compared with similar Soviet reception November 1970, when it was impossible to talk with top leaders and all one could get out of Gomułka was a glum handshake and no comment.

Stoessel

⁴ There was no visit by U.S. astronauts to Poland in 1972.

154. Editorial Note

On November 17, 1971, former Polish Ambassador to the United States Jerzy Michalowski told Ambassador Walter Stoessel in Warsaw “that he was sure a visit by the President following his Moscow trip would be welcomed by the Polish Government.” Subsequently, the Polish Embassy in Washington twice asked whether President Nixon might make other stops before or after his Moscow visit. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, November 24; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 698, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. I 1969–1971) In response, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger wrote in a memorandum to Under Secretary of State John Irwin on January 6, 1972: “I received a report through State Secretariat . . . on Polish inquiries about a Presidential visit in connection with the Moscow summit. For now it would be best to discourage any speculation on this subject.” (Ibid.)

On March 1, 1972, Andrzej Wojtowicz, First Secretary of the Polish Embassy in Washington, mentioned during lunch with Robert Livingston of the National Security Council staff that President Richard Nixon had voiced an interest in visiting Warsaw during his initial meeting with the new Polish Ambassador, Witold Trampczynski. (Memorandum for the Record, March 8; *ibid.*) On March 20 Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski summoned Stoessel to the Foreign Ministry "to express official interest in knowing whether there was desire on part of President to stop in Poland on return from Moscow. If so, question would be studied in 'friendly and constructive way.'" Stoessel concluded: "In view lack of reaction to informal, unofficial approach . . . on prospect for Presidential visit . . . , and spurred by announcement of date for Moscow visit, Poles have decided to broach matter officially at high level. Seems clear they do not wish to pressure President, but want it well understood that, if he would like to stop in Warsaw, he will be welcome to do so. I would assume that, if interest is expressed on our side, then official invitation would be forthcoming in short order." (Telegram 1078 from Warsaw, March 20; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL POL-US)

155. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 22, 1972.

SUBJECT

Pros and Cons of Stops in Poland and Turkey²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 481, President's Trip Files, President's Poland Trip 1 Jun 72. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Attached was a routing slip from Bruce Kehrli of the NSC staff to Kissinger, March 28, that reads: "Bob Haldeman covered this verbally with the President and General Haig."

² On March 20 at 6 p.m., Chapin wrote in a memorandum to Haldeman: "Secretary Rogers called and would like to speak to the President regarding a 'telegram from Poland.' Haig says that the Secretary may wish to raise the issue of a Presidential visit to Poland on the return from Moscow. If the Secretary raises this (a proposal was made today by the Polish Foreign Minister to Ambassador Stoessel) the President should definitely be non-committal. Such a visit could seriously hurt the Moscow Summit." (*Ibid.*, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 80, EX TR 38-3 WARSAW, POLAND)

Poland

While there would be certain temporary advantages, due to what would undoubtedly be a warm public reception, there would be little if any lasting gain. The West Europeans would be quite upset if you stopped in Eastern Europe but not in the West.

A stop in Poland, however brief, would be a *public success* all around; the people will be turned out and the reception will be warm. On the Polish side, the Gierek regime would welcome this because, just as with Ceausescu in 1969,³ it would, as it were, be riding the coattails of the American President. Gierek almost certainly cleared the trial balloon with the Soviets who presumably do not object to a public demonstration for you. However, Poles are not as disciplined and subtle as Romanians, and there is always a possibility that demonstrations could become emotional (as in 1959)⁴ to the point of becoming an embarrassment for both the regime and the Soviets. We should not forget that the present leadership has been in office only about 15 months (after removing Gomulka) and there could always be an unexpected blow-up when emotions run high. But, barring this unpredictable element, the *net effect* of a visit, from the public standpoint, would be positive and it would come across well here at home and, with some exceptions, please the Polish-American community.

Also to some extent positive from our standpoint would be

—The reassurance to the Poles and others in Eastern Europe that your Moscow trip does not mean you accept Soviet hegemony in that part of the world.

—At least some boost for Brandt's chances of getting his Eastern treaties ratified since he could use your interest in Poland against his CDU opponents; this almost certainly entered into Soviet and Polish calculation. *On the other hand, however*, many of our friends in the CDU would feel let down in view of your assurances that you regarded the German ratification debate an internal German matter. We have to remember that quite apart from the Eastern policy Brandt's government is currently on weak ground and could be replaced this summer by the CDU.

—The Polish regime would probably draw some measure of increased strength, as noted above, and this in turn would increase its freedom of maneuver. But this is inherently limited by geography and other factors and the plus from our standpoint would only be minor.

The strong argument *against* going, apart from the possibility of public demonstrations, getting out of hand, is

³ Regarding Nixon's 1969 visit to Romania, see Documents 183 and 184.

⁴ Reference is to Nixon's 1959 visit to Poland as Vice President. For documentation on the visit, August 2–5, see *Foreign Relations, 1958–1960*, volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe Region; Poland; Greece; Turkey; Yugoslavia, pp. 190–221.

—That you have declined to go to Western Europe and the NATO meeting in Bonn. In this context, a stop in Poland after you have gone all the way to Tehran would tend to accentuate our problems with the West Europeans. This would also be the case, though to a lesser extent, were you to stop in Warsaw before going to Moscow. Such a scenario would, however, be likely to irritate the Soviets. (The Polish Foreign Minister, no doubt for this reason, was quite specific in talking about a stop after Moscow.)

There is also a *more basic* point to consider. While it is true that there is something natural in special attention to Poland because of our large Polish-American community and your 1959 trip, our relations with Poland are in fact no better than they are with Hungary. In terms of the prospects of these relations over the next several years, there is no reason to single out the Poles for special treatment. Indeed, the constraints operating on them are basic and long-term and the payoffs in foreign policy terms of special attention are never likely to be very great. Thus, while a stop in Warsaw would put the Poles on the level of Romania and Yugoslavia, they would not be able to play the role of those two countries. Their position in the Indochina ICC would probably not be any more helpful to us than before.

Turkey

Here, again, while the public reception would be good (though not without some danger of disruption), and the Government would be strengthened, a stop in Turkey at the very time of the NATO meeting in Bonn would be badly received in Western Europe.

Moreover, the Soviets, whom Henry told that you would make no stop beyond Iran, would see a pattern in stops in both Iran and Turkey. They probably would assume that your purpose is to prevent these two adjacent states from going too far in improving their own relations with the USSR.

156. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Chief of Staff (Haldeman)¹

Washington, March 22, 1972.

Nixon: The memorandum they want is self-explanatory about Poland and Turkey.² Oh—Look, I want you to read over them with Haig, but I don't want to have Henry take either of them.

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: They view it both to the extremes. Let me—Let me come around to it another way—

Haldeman: Haig's where you want it, right? [unclear]

Nixon: Let me come at it another way. Both Haig and Henry will come up with the wrong reasons insofar as our interests are concerned.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Poland.]

Now the sole purpose of our travels is Vietnam. The fact that Turkey is a NATO member is—doesn't bother me one damn bit. We're not going to make any decisions. We're just going to stop by. The way I've read that memorandum is to go to Istanbul for maybe 4 hours. And we'll then go to Warsaw and be received informally. On the [unclear] yesterday [unclear] presentation, we got returned and announced it. Last thing—actually, Henry—maybe we'll see some dire plot evolve during the trip, which they, uh—on the other hand, we must try to examine, which I point out in the memo. We'll look at the dire plot. Let [unclear] look and then look at what it will mean to us to go into Warsaw and with any kind of a break get a hell of a reception, which we're likely to get. I mean we'll get Radio Free Europe or what's left of it. [Horrick?] and I must schedule it, and all that sort of thing. We'll get that. Now the problems, that, so—we'll play it off against the German thing. But the whole approach that—and I've been extremely good

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 324–22. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met with Haldeman between 11:01 a.m. and 12:47 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) The editors transcribed the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. This is part of a larger conversation that covered multiple topics. Haldeman summarized this portion of the meeting in his diary: "He [Nixon] wants to be sure that I go to work on Haig and Henry [Kissinger], through him, to make the point that some of our decisions have got to be made on the basis of the effect they will have on the election. For example, P[resident] feels strongly we should go to Poland after the Russian trip, while Henry is equally strongly opposed to that, so we've got to convince Henry that his position isn't right, which may be hard to do." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

² See Document 155.

about this, Bob, with Henry—the NSC and the State Department people are gonna be disappointed—I’ve always put—well, what does the country require? I spent time with that jackass Smith³ yesterday. I spent 45 minutes, almost an hour, on that arms control bit. The whole thing, you know, he doesn’t hear himself babble along, and, he’ll go on and on and on and on. Now the whole purpose from now on—this is now March the 23d—The whole purpose of everything we do—

Haldeman: It means reelection.

Nixon: Is it going to affect our reelection? We’ve got to hammer that into their goddamned cottonpicker heads. They’ve got to get it. And they can tell [unclear] to take some risks on the other side. And give Henry your phone memorandum,⁴ which—

Haldeman: [unclear] Vietnam.

Nixon: I want to read Haig’s memo,⁵ and I don’t want to see Henry. But I do think it’s a matter that you can discuss with them. Come in [to unknown person].

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Poland.]

Nixon: Well, that should be a very—well, if you’ll get some—put the, put the [unclear] to Haig. I mean, tell Haig, so—Henry is—Haig will know better about this than Henry. You know, I think Henry won’t understand it, but you just tell Haig: “Now look here, be cold-blooded and political about every one of these things.” And, we’re not going to make a judgment on the basis of like, how’s this is going to affect this country 50 years from now, or how’s this going to affect German-Polish relations in the next 6 months or 8 months.⁶

³ Gerard Smith, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

⁴ Apparently a reference to a March 22 memorandum from Nixon to Haldeman. In the memorandum Nixon wrote: “I want you to have a frank talk with Haig with regard to the Polish invitation. Assuming for the moment that the invitation is a trap to get us involved in the German treaty ratification process, I think we should examine it to see if we can avoid the trap and still get the benefit. There is very little question in my mind that a visit to Poland, from the standpoint of its effect in the United States, would be an enormous plus. It would have more effect than all of our other visits put together from a strict political standpoint. This is something that neither Haig nor Henry understand and that they cannot be expected to consider. Take a hard look at it in any event and see what we can work out. On the other hand, I do not want to discuss this matter with Henry. You discuss it with him and then give me a recommendation.” For the full text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 68.

⁵ Document 155.

⁶ On March 30 Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger regarding a potential Presidential trip to Poland: “I don’t know where exactly this stands and whether you plan to take it

Haldeman: Well, it's that simple. The answer is: Which is going to affect Germany more? Our going to Poland for a day, or the President getting—

Nixon: Reelected.

Haldeman: —being defeated in November—

Nixon: That's right. You put it right to 'em that way.

Haldeman: And I—You know, by—

Nixon: That's right, that's right.

Haldeman: —and we've got—

Nixon: Don't—

Haldeman: —and look at this—

Nixon: The main thing is, the main thing is—

Haldeman: —if we can pull this off—

Nixon: The main thing is, I want you to tell Haig—and you can tell Henry: I do not want Henry to raise these things with them, 'cause he'll come in and he just gases interminably about McGovern.⁷ You see he's great when he's in his field, but when he's out of his field, you know, he just goes on and on and on about stuff he knows about and it has no relevance. You see, that's why he probably likes to talk about Pompidou.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Poland.]

Nixon: I mentioned Polish briefly—I asked for Poland briefly last night. [unclear] Right, but who the hell are they? I mean, of course, Rogers has been thinking of these arguments—arguments I'm sure. He

up with Dobrynin. If you do, you can assume that his response will be positive, or that he will refer the question home and then come back with a positive response. Although Gierak undoubtedly has particular objectives of his own in issuing the invitation, the idea was bound to have Soviet approval. It is almost certainly intended to help Brandt in the ratification debate [for the Warsaw Treaty] and, in the longer term, to deflate Romania's special position. Both the Poles and the Soviets presumably are prepared to run the risk of emotional demonstrations in the streets of Warsaw. (For us the question is whether the undoubted short-term spectacular that will occur is worth the fact that there will be few short-term results and that we risk offending the West Europeans who have been told, via [NATO Secretary General Joseph] Luns, that the President cannot stop for schedule reasons.)" For the full text of Sonnenfeldt's memorandum, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 75.

⁷ Senator George McGovern (D–South Dakota), candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for President.

probably understands them more than I do, but—about the Polish Jews' treatment⁸ and all the rest. But—

Haldeman: Well, Henry gets oversensitive. He's like—in that kind of thing he's like a corporate lawyer always—he's always afraid not to do anything. That's the easiest way to avoid trouble. You got to think sometimes [unclear] and games and—

Nixon: How come?

Haldeman: This is one of them. A big reception—

Nixon: [unclear] about Romania.⁹

Haldeman: A big reception in Poland—

Nixon: You expect this result? [unclear] Chicago—

Haldeman: Much more than Romania. Much more than any country we've been in.

Nixon: Bob, a big reception in Romania [*Poland*] affects Pennsylvania, it affects Ohio, it affects Illinois, and it affects Michigan.

Haldeman: How about New York?

Nixon: New York not so much.

Haldeman: [unclear]

Nixon: Well, yeah, Buffalo, you're right. Buffalo, Buffalo, I agree. But there's so many other people in New York. I, I must say I agree—

Haldeman: That's right, that's right.

Nixon: It has some other, but I mean percentage-wise, Pennsylvania is enormous, Ohio is pretty good country. Illinois is pretty good country, and Michigan.

Haldeman: And Wisconsin.

Nixon: Yeah. If you want to go to a second-line state, there is no question.

Haldeman: That's a second-line state [unclear] where we got a problem.

Nixon: That's where we got to—we want to cover.

Haldeman: [unclear] Polish and Illinois is one that—

Nixon: It's always the bomb.

Haldeman: You never know.

Nixon: [unclear] dying today.

⁸ Documentation on the U.S. concern regarding official anti-Semitism in Poland during the government's "anti-Zionist" campaign of 1968 is in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XVII, Eastern Europe, Documents 132, 134, and 135.

⁹ Regarding Nixon's visit to Romania, see Documents 183 and 184.

Haldeman: Especially if there's something if we end up against Muskie,¹⁰ getting the Polish thing, we could blunt some of the [unclear].

[Omitted here is a discussion of Muskie.]

¹⁰ Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Maine), candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for President.

157. Editorial Note

On the morning of March 30, 1972, President Richard Nixon raised his proposed visit to Poland in an Oval Office conversation with his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger. He instructed Kissinger to discuss the matter with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin in his scheduled conversation that afternoon:

"Nixon: First of all, do your best to cut the deal on Poland.

"Kissinger: I think I can handle that.

"Nixon: But the second thing—And then say, and you can point out that, he can have, he need to be not concerned about what I say on Poland. He can be very sure. There's no problem on that. That we'll be totally discreet. But that I think we're going to be in a terrible position if we turn it down." A fuller account of the discussion is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 73.

Kissinger discussed the proposed visit during his luncheon meeting with Dobrynin. Kissinger reported on the meeting as follows: "I opened the conversation by discussing the possibility of a visit to Poland by the President. I told Dobrynin that I had mentioned the fact that the visit to Iran would be the last stop. However, we had now received a formal invitation to Poland; previously it had been only a feeler, but now it would be very difficult in an election year to turn it down. We would not go to Poland in order to embarrass the Soviet Union. When we went to Romania, we knew that it might create some difficulties but we were willing to pay the price, though it was not our intention even there deliberately to produce difficulties. In the case of Poland, our motives are quite different. Dobrynin replied that he was very moved by the fact that I bothered to check with him. He recognized that we did not have to check our movements in eastern Europe

with him, but it was an example of our goodwill. He was certain that Moscow would not object, but it would make a very good impression in Moscow if we could hold up our decision until we got a formal answer." For the full text of Kissinger's memorandum of conversation, see *ibid.*, Document 76.

Kissinger reported to Nixon personally that afternoon:

"Kissinger: Well, I had a long talk with Dobrynin. And I put the Polish proposition to him. And I said, 'You know, the basic departure that we are doing here is that we want to build policy on the recognition of we're two superpowers and that we don't want to interfere in each other's basic concerns.' And I took—I showed him the cable we had from Warsaw and the reply we gave. I said, 'This is the spirit which we would like to deal with you. We don't need to ask you if we want to go there but we want to show you the President is particularly concerned in what your reaction is.' So he was practically in tears. He said, 'This is the most generous thing I've heard. You will, I cannot tell you, Henry, how much this will impress Mr. Brezhnev.'

"Nixon: That we asked because he knew what we did on Rumania.

"Kissinger: Yeah. I said, 'I want you to know, when we went to Rumania, we knew it would annoy you. We're going to Warsaw because, and if it raises any problems for you, we'll look [unclear].' And he was practically in tears. He said, 'Speaking informally and as a member of the Central Committee, I am certain they will say yes. But if you can wait 'til Monday, he said—so that he is formally—'so that you get a formal reply from us, it would mean a great deal to us. But I can tell you now that it will be yes. It will almost certainly be yes.' But he was practically in tears.

"Nixon: You see, they, we have to realize we've got some chips to play too here. . . . And you told him that I would not embarrass them and that I—

"Kissinger: I said that you will say nothing that would embarrass. And I said it [unclear] to our support in domestic considerations.

"Nixon: He understood that." For a more complete text of the taped conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, see *ibid.*, Document 77.

As late as April 3, the Soviets apparently had not responded to Kissinger's feeler on Poland. In a telephone conversation with Nixon that evening, Kissinger said: "I think if we don't hear from them [the Soviets] about Poland tomorrow we should just do it." The conversation continued:

"P: That I am sure about. Why do you think they delayed on it?

"K: They may not have had a chance to have everyone together—or they may just be cute. They may be going to Poland now.

"P: I don't think our going to Poland will change anything. Tell them tomorrow. We can't hold it any longer—it's starting to leak." For a more complete transcript of the telephone conversation, see *ibid.*, Document 80.

On April 5 Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel reported from Warsaw: "I called on Vice Minister Spasowski today and informed him of President's decision to accept Polish Government's invitation; of his appreciation for this invitation and the opportunity to visit Poland; and of his proposal to arrive in Warsaw, after one-day visit to Tehran, in mid-afternoon on May 31 and to depart approximately 24 hours later directly for the US." (Telegram 1316 from Warsaw, April 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL POL-US) On April 17 President Nixon received Polish Ambassador Witold Trampczynski, who delivered separate letters of invitation to the President to visit Poland from Poland's President, Henryk Jablonski, and Polish Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz (see Document 158).

Even before Nixon received the official invitation, the White House staff had initiated plans to exploit the trip for the President's re-election campaign in 1972. On April 15 at 1:15 p.m. Deputy Assistant to the President Dwight Chapin wrote David Parker of the White House staff: "This is just to remind you that you are to get the ethnic information regarding the Poles and where they're located [in the United States] so that we can consider a Presidential trip there shortly after Russia [i.e., the Russian trip]." Immediately thereafter, Chapin followed up in a memorandum to Herbert Klein of the White House staff (1:20 p.m.): "We should put together a plan to start cultivating and feeding stories to the Polish newspapers. It is my understanding that there are some Polish newspapers scattered around the country and at least one in Chicago called the 'Polish Alliance.'" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Dwight L. Chapin, Chronological, Box 16)

On May 9 Nixon accepted the Polish invitation in separate letters to Jablonski and Jaroszewicz. (*Ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence, Poland Pres: Jablonski and PM: Jaroszewicz)

158. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Polish Ambassador (Trampczynski)¹

Washington, April 17, 1972, 10:32–10:47 a.m.

Kissinger: My Soviet experts, incidentally, reading that Soviet note² say it's the mildest thing they could have done. It gives them, it covers them with Hanoi.

Nixon: Can I ask a question about this fall? I don't want this—are we supposed to announce today that we're going to—I don't want them to—I don't want to announce and then have these little assholes³ pull the plug on us and cancel it.

Kissinger: They won't pull the plug independent of Moscow.

Nixon: Okay.

Kissinger: Whatever they do we'll become—

Nixon: One thing that, if I can poll you on this, what you had in mind, I remember what happened when the U-2⁴—you remember too, but I was here. And I know what happened and I know what an embarrassment it was to President Eisenhower. Henry, I'm not—we've got to play Moscow very carefully. If we ever get a feeling that they're going to break off the summit, we're going to break it off first.

Kissinger: No question.

Nixon: We have got to do it, see?

Kissinger: No question.

Nixon: You agree, don't you?

Kissinger: Totally.

Nixon: In other words, so that's—

Kissinger: Joe Kraft⁵ called their spook. He's not at all sure of himself. He says he notices that the Russians are very mild in their response. He said, "Do you guys know what you're doing? I said, "Joe, write anything you want." He said—

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 709–10. No classification marking. The editors transcribed portions of this conversation specifically for this volume.

² Regarding the Soviet protest note of April 16, 1972, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIV, October 1971–May 1972, Document 112.

³ Reference is to the Polish Communists.

⁴ For documentation on the U-2 airplane incident and the cancellation of the Paris summit between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, see *Foreign Relations*, 1958–1960, volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region, Soviet Union, Cyprus, Documents 147–156.

⁵ Syndicated columnist for the *Washington Post*.

Nixon: You can keep talking to [unclear].

Kissinger: He says why are you, he says why [unclear].

[Trampczynski enters and an initial exchange of pleasantries takes place.]

Nixon [to Trampczynski]: We will look forward to coming to, as you know we, as I have said, and as you are aware, we have differences in types of government, differences about certain areas of the world. But the United States seeks good relations with all countries. We particularly have a reason to seek good relations with Poland because there are so many Polish-Americans and they all want—

Trampczynski: One-third of the Polish nation is living in the United States.

Nixon: One-third?

Trampczynski: One-third, right. Yes.

Nixon: And we want to—we will do that, having full regard for your right to have any independent policy and for us to have an independent policy, but there are many areas where our two governments can work together and that's what we try to seek—that's what I was trying to do in China. That's what I will be doing in the Soviet Union. That's what we will be doing in Poland. But with Poland I will go with a little different feeling because I know so many Polish friends in Chicago, in Cleveland, in Pittsburgh, in New York, and in California. And they say, "You've got to go to Warsaw."

Trampczynski: [laughter]

Nixon: Philadelphia, yeah. The Cardinal that I'm meeting in Philadelphia is Polish, did you know that? The Catholic Cardinal in Philadelphia.

Trampczynski: Krol.

[Omitted here are Nixon's discussion of his previous visit to Poland and Kissinger's discussion of his own earlier visit.]

Nixon: I can assure you that we will, as I said, we want the visit to be one that will be, that will show the friendship between our two peoples, recognizing the differences that our governments may have, but trying to find areas of agreement, respecting each other. That's the only basis for an East-West relationship. We understand that very much. And I think we can get that understanding with your government, that we can find parallel areas to work together, particularly the economic field.

Trampczynski: That will be very true of the visit. [Unclear] solve these problems of international [unclear].

Nixon: At least help.

Trampczynski: It will help us out with some of our bilateral relations.

Nixon: No problems can ever be solved. You can only start solving them.

Trampczynski: [Unclear]

Nixon: You know, the economists know that you can never solve economic problems. You just start.

Trampczynski: [Unclear]

Nixon: Well, it's very good to see you. My best to you. We will see you then if not sooner.

[Omitted here is an exchange of pleasantries as Trampczynski leaves.]

Nixon: Let me tell you something, this is just bullshit.

Kissinger: If you were in Hanoi and you saw, you read the papers today 48 hours after the bombing of Haiphong, the Polish Ambassador can send such a warm invitation, can broach such a warm invitation.

Nixon: Of course, this invitation was written before the bombing, you know?

Kissinger: But he delivered it 48 hours after.

Nixon: You think they have that good of communication?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: They probably went [unclear] before sending anything.

Kissinger: It means two things: it means the Russians didn't stop them from sending it, and that they delivered it. No, also as far as our press is concerned, this announcement—what are they going to say, "The Communists are very mad at you"?

159. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 19, 1972.

SUBJECT

The Problem of the President's Meeting with Cardinal Wyszyński²

As you asked, I have discussed this informally with the Polish Ambassador. His immediate reaction, which he said was of course personal, was that such a meeting would be undesirable. He said he recognized the pressures on the President and Cardinal Krol's interest. But in his view there has been remarkable progress in State-Church relations and Polish-Vatican relations. The Soviets have tolerated this uniquely in Poland. Meanwhile, however, relations between Gierek and the Cardinal³ have not improved; it is still the problem that the Cardinal regards himself and in fact is something of a second head of state. A meeting with the President could only reinforce this problem especially when he is in the country for barely 24 hours. It could reverse the positive trend.

There is an additional problem. June 1 is Corpus Christi, one of the major Church holidays in Poland. People normally walk in the street with candles and the Cathedral will be crowded. (It is a day off for everyone.) The whole focus of the President's visit, from the standpoint of the regime (and Moscow) could thus be changed into a religious demonstration with overtones of our recognizing the Cardinal's secular role.

The Ambassadors also said that Gierek has agreed to the Cardinal's accepting an invitation to the US from Cardinal Krol but has reserved a decision as to timing. This was a further sign of improving relations.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for immediate action.

² In an April 10 memorandum to Chapin, Haldeman wrote: "In Poland, the President wants to visit the old Cardinal [Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński]. He talked to Cardinal Krol about this while he was in Philadelphia. Henry may have some problems with this, but it should be worked out if it can be done on a sound foreign policy basis." (Ibid.)

³ Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, Primate of the Polish Catholic Church.

The Ambassador asked whether he should report our talk to Warsaw. I told him not to do this, though of course this can't be controlled. (We obviously don't want an official *démarche* from Gierek and Co.) I stressed I was merely asking his opinion to enable us to form a judgment. I stressed that he should not repeat our conversation within his Embassy (which is leaky as a sieve) or anywhere else. He said he understood, especially since he himself had been talking without instructions and as a "Pole" rather than a diplomat.

My own judgment now is that the President should be dissuaded from having a meeting. The coincidence with Corpus Christi, itself involving the risk of demonstrations, could still be used for some gesture to the Church, for example by reference in the departure statement at the airport.

Recommendation

1. That you urgently discuss this with the President.
2. That thereafter Haldeman send clear instructions to Chapin in Moscow.

Note: This all needs to be done *today*, before next Monday/Tuesday, lest Chapin raises the matter when he gets to Poland.⁵

⁵ An attached April 19 note by Sonnenfeldt reads: "A.H[aig]. 1. HAK says this is 'turned off.' 2. HAK says he will make sure Haldeman knows. 3. You should make sure. HS."

160. Telegram From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Moscow, May 21, 1972, 1820Z.

Hakto 11. Call in the Polish Ambassador and make the following request on behalf of the President:

As he knows, there has been growing domestic pressure on the President to call on Cardinal Wyszynski.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, President's Trip Files, President's Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May-Jun 72, TOHAK. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

The President is aware of the sensitivity of this matter and wishes to suggest that Mrs. Nixon pay a courtesy call.

You should be sure Ambassador understands this supersedes our previous approaches on this in various channels and comes from President personally.

161. Telegram From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 21, 1972.

Tohak 39. Ref: Hakto 11.² After some delay I was able to contact the Polish Ambassador who had spent the afternoon at Dulles Airport. When I informed him that I had a direct message from the President on the sensitive issue of Cardinal Wyszynski, he became quite concerned and agreed that this issue was indeed one of the greatest sensitivity in Poland. I explained that the President was under increasing domestic pressure to meet with the Cardinal during the President's forthcoming trip to Poland. The President had been resisting these pressures due to his understanding of the sensitivity of this problem. I also understood that there had been some exploratory contacts made on the subject of the Cardinal through normal diplomatic channels. For this reason I had asked him to come in to meet with me personally in order to discuss a suggestion that President Nixon wished to make to his Government, recognizing of course that it was in the interest of both governments that the issue of Cardinal Wyszynski be handled with the greatest delicacy. I then stated that President Nixon wished to suggest the alternate solution of having Mrs. Nixon pay a brief, low-profile courtesy call on Cardinal Wyszynski during the forthcoming visit. The Ambassador reacted quite sharply, stating that on his own he could categorically state that this was an unacceptable course of action for his Government, reiterating that it was a matter of the greatest sensitivity. I, of course, avoided pressing and made it clear that this was merely a suggestion which the Ambassador might wish to propose to his Government, but in doing so it should be clearly portrayed as a suggestion. The Ambassador replied

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, President's Trip Files, President's Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May 1–Jun 72, TOHAK. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

² Document 160.

that in his view it would even be an unnecessary irritant to ask his Government to consider the suggestion, but that he was willing to do so if that was the U.S. Government's wish. At this point in the conversation you called and suggested to me that you wished to discuss it further with the President. After talking to you, I told the Ambassador that we were most anxious that the President's visit proceed successfully and that until you had had an opportunity to discuss this with the President, he should not formally make the proposal to his Government. I am sure he will immediately report all that occurred, but he seemed very much relieved and stated that he was leaving here Wednesday night for Warsaw and could be used between now and then in any way we wished and also following his arrival in Poland. He remarked that he was perhaps the most understanding of our problem, and departed very amiably insisting that his Government was most anxious to have the most successful visit and was determined to receive President Nixon with the greatest warmth and hospitality.

I will await further word from you on this subject.³

³ On May 22 at 8:28 a.m. EST the White House Situation Room received Kissinger's reply (Hakto 16) to Haig's message: "Tell Polish Ambassador not to relay request for Mrs. Nixon call." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 480, President's Trip Files, President's Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May-June 1972, HAKTO)

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, May 23, 1972, 1019Z.

2130. Dept pass Moscow for Secretary. Subj: Contact With Cardinal Wyszyński. Ref: (A) State 89407; (B) Warsaw 2128.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. A notation on the telegram reads: "sent Moscow."

² In telegram 89407 to Warsaw, May 19, the Department of State reported that the Polish Embassy had expressed anxiety over Nixon's May 16 meeting with Krol and had stressed its view of the "undesirability" of a meeting between the President and Cardinal Wyszyński, citing its ongoing Church-state problems. (Ibid.) In telegram 2128 from Warsaw, May 22, the Embassy reported that, acting under instructions, it had suggested that the President send a written greeting to the Cardinal during his visit. (Ibid.)

1. Vice Minister Spasowski summoned me to MFA at 7:30 pm May 22 on urgent basis. He said that he wished to advise me at once of strongly negative reaction to our proposal concerning Presidential greeting to Cardinal Wyszynski, which I had made to him earlier in the afternoon (ref B). In view of importance and sensitivity of subject, he wanted me to know of this reaction as soon as possible, and he wished to be very frank and clear in his statement so there could be no misunderstanding.

2. Spasowski stated that any contact—either personal or by message—with Cardinal at time of President's visit was not acceptable to GOP. President's visit was at highest level of state-to-state contacts, and this character should be preserved and no elements which could jeopardize visit should be introduced.

3. Speaking personally, Spasowski said he could understand "internal reasons" in US which would favor Presidential contact with Cardinal. However, GOP has its own reasons for not wishing such contact and he asked us to understand these reasons.

4. I reviewed presentation I had made previously (ref B), stressing that inability of President to have any contact with Cardinal might be subject to misunderstanding, could lead to criticism of GOP by prominent Polish-Americans and therefore would not help promote better US-Polish relations. Spasowski acknowledged there might be such criticism, but said criticism of some kind about something is unavoidable. It was more important to ensure success of President's visit, and to this end GOP feels it is important that there be no speculation about visit by President to Cardinal or special message to him. Spasowski said he had deliberately restricted circulation of information within GOP about our proposal for Presidential message to Cardinal, since he thought such information would risk creating a bad atmosphere not conducive to success of visit. He concluded by saying that any effort to contact Cardinal would be extremely inadvisable.

5. I said I would report Spasowski's remarks, although on personal basis I regretted rigidity of Polish stand and concerned at misunderstandings which might arise therefrom.

6. *Comment:* GOP position clearly is very firm against contacts with Cardinal and it seems evident that continued efforts on our part to counter this stand will be seen as affront and could risk damaging atmosphere President's visit.³

³ In a May 23 memorandum to Haig, Livingston reported that the Polish Embassy was "putting out the story that the White House has given its assurances about a contact with Cardinal Wyszynski." In a handwritten annotation, Haig responded: "State has been told to drop the issue—no Pres. visit w[ith] cardinal."

7. If President tours Old Town on foot evening May 31 we have envisaged that he would make brief stop at entrance to Cathedral of St. John (visit inside Cathedral might not be appropriate since religious services will be in progress at that time). This could be seen as gesture of recognition to Polish Catholic Church. Any reference in oral remarks to Cardinal, however, would obviously not be well viewed by GOP.

Stoessel

163. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Warsaw, May 31, 1972.

SUBJECT

Your Discussions in Poland

Polish Objectives

The Polish leaders will be chiefly interested in showing some tangible results from your visit; the mere fact of your stop has already provided them with the psychological and political benefit of being given special recognition as an important East European nation. Gierek personally undoubtedly sees his meeting with you as adding to his own authority. He has obviously watched closely the style and procedures of the Moscow summit and seems eager to adapt them to his own purposes.

As regards the tangible goals the Poles seek, they are essentially two: (1) further recognition of their Western frontier, the Oder-Neisse line, and (2) access to US credits.

Your Objectives

Your own objective, from a foreign policy standpoint, is to give substance to our intention to treat the East European states as sovereign and independent without at the same time complicating their relations with Moscow or arousing Soviet suspicions excessively. This problem is less difficult for us in Poland, which is welded firmly into

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 481, President's Trip Files, President's Poland Trip, 1 Jun 72. Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

the Soviet camp, than it was in Romania, which clearly resisted Soviet domination.

In Poland, you also confront the delicate Church/State problem. The Church retains a powerful hold on the people and in many ways is a parallel government to the secular regime.

The Polish people—and of course Americans of Polish descent—will feel themselves more directly addressed by you through a gesture to their religion than through the regime.

Your Approach in the Talks

Gierek will almost certainly have been briefed by the Soviets on the essence of your Moscow talks on Europe and Vietnam. It is doubtful that he was told much if anything on the Middle East and SALT. He will also be aware of the degree of progress made on economic issues, especially of the fact that you did not actually extend EX-IM facilities. The Poles will of course have examined in detail the “Basic Principles” and the final communiqué.

1. *In the course of your meeting with Gierek you should be prepared to give him your evaluation of the Moscow summit.*

—Many concrete accomplishments;

—Frank and detailed exchanges, perhaps for the first time since World War II, on all aspects of US-Soviet relations and on the international issues in which both the US and USSR have a stake as great powers;

—A set of ground rules (Basic Principles) for US-Soviet relations which, as they are translated into practice, should not only improve those relations but assist all countries to live in greater security. *You should add the sensitive point that we believe the Principles set down a style of conduct by the superpowers which will permit smaller countries to realize their own aspirations and maintain their own identity;*

—A general program of negotiations on Europe by all the countries concerned.

2. You should *let Gierek raise Vietnam first*. If he does so, he will take the straight DRV/PRG line and may make bitter comments about the mining, which affects Polish vessels. In your comments you should:

—Give a simple and blunt rationale for our policy;

—Assure the Poles that we will not deliberately harm Polish ships in DRV ports but our measures will stay in force on the terms you set on May 8.

Note: The Poles probably want the final communiqué to have a phrase that Vietnam was discussed and that the two sides expressed differing positions. Gierek probably needs this to keep his political purity and you should agree to a general formula of this kind if the Poles insist.

3. On *Europe*, the Poles want our blessing for their *Western frontier*.² We cannot do this formally because it would impair our rights with regard to Germany. *However,*

—Our communiqué draft now picks up language from the Moscow communiqué referring to the principle of “inviolability of frontiers”;

—We can also “welcome” the treaty between the FRG and Poland, “including its frontier provisions.”³

Beyond that you should, if pressed, explain that:

—We do not, as a matter of principle, explicitly endorse international borders unless we are a party to the agreement establishing the border involved. (This will not happen in the case of Poland’s western border until we become a party to a German peace settlement.)

—At the same time, we have no interest in seeing any particular boundary in Europe revised.

4. As regards the European Security Conference, the Poles feel that this is one of their special initiatives. (Although their formal position is identical to the Soviets, the Poles see the conference as an arena for displaying a certain individuality.)

You should:

—Reiterate the Moscow position that we will be ready for preparatory consultations later this year to ensure a carefully prepared agenda and conference procedures satisfactory to all countries involved;

—We think that the actual conference had best wait till 1973;

—We look forward to the Polish contribution, which we know will be constructive because of all European countries, Poland, the victim of brutal aggression in 1939, has a paramount stake in peace, security and cooperation in Europe.

5. On *MBFR*, you should note that:

—There was agreement in Moscow to begin preparatory consultations soon;

—This should be done in a special forum of the countries directly involved (those with forces and territory in Central Europe, i.e., *including Poland*);

² On April 19 Wojtowicz had told Livingston that the Polish Government, in the wake of the Polish-West German treaty, was hoping for a “clear declaration on the Oder-Neisse Line” from President Nixon during his visit to Poland. (Memorandum for the Record, April 21; *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 1330, Unfiled Material, 1972, 2 of 8)

³ On May 22 Haig cabled Kissinger in Moscow: “Our Embassy in Bonn believes that the German government would understand the formulation that we ‘welcome’ the West German-Polish treaty, ‘including its border provisions.’ You may wish to consider, prior to the Warsaw stopover, how the West German government should be informed if the President does decide to make such a public statement in Warsaw, which the Poles will certainly want him to do.” (Tohak 71, May 22; *ibid.*, Box 480, President’s Trip Files, President’s Moscow, Iran, Poland, Austria Trip, May–Jun 72, TOHAK)

—We expect these consultations to run in parallel with those on the security conference.

6. On *bilateral economic relations*, your position is complicated by the fact that you did not grant EX–IM credits to the Soviets. It would arouse the Soviets if you now went ahead with Poland. *You should say that:*

—You are very favorably disposed toward granting Poland early EX–IM facilities;

—For domestic US reasons it is important that the Poles move to a settlement of their unfulfilled obligation to US dollar bondholders;

—When this occurs, you will review the matter promptly and sympathetically.

Note: The Poles have indicated a willingness to proceed on the bond issue by the end of June.

Note: The Poles have MFN; there is no issue here.

To sweeten the pot for the Poles, you can also indicate that you:

—Will sympathetically consider seeking legislation that would make Poland again eligible for PL–480 sales (the legislation involved would make all countries with MFN eligible for PL–480 sales).

On *all other economic issues*—Polish desire to postpone dollar debt repayment on past PL–480 sales, use of US-owned PL–480 Polish currency (zlotys) for development projects in Poland, joint ventures—you should say that:

—You are instructing Secretary Peterson to review them promptly and sympathetically;

—Meanwhile, you note the Poles last year had a 34 million dollar trade surplus with us out of total turnover of 180 million and which certainly can help in financing Poland's debt obligations to us.

7. If the Poles raise *Radio Free Europe* you should:

—Reaffirm your support of it as an instrument for better communication;

—Express your conviction that its output is responsible and constructive.

8. *You should note:*

—Signature in Warsaw of the long-negotiated consular convention;

—Initialing in Washington of a new bilateral air agreement;

—The successful and extensive programs of cultural, educational, scientific and technical cooperation between the US and Poland all of which you support and which will get even more impetus from your visit.

9. You should invite the Polish leaders to the US.

164. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon, having completed the first three legs of his trip with a visit to Salzburg, the Moscow summit, and a visit to Iran, flew from Tehran to Warsaw on May 31, 1972. After the President and his entourage were greeted at the airport by Henryk Jablonski, Chairman of the Polish Council of State, and Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, the President proceeded in a motorcade to the center of Warsaw to lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

Of great concern to the President's White House staff had been the size of his potential reception in Warsaw. On May 4, H.R. Haldeman wrote to Herbert Klein, William Safire, John Scali, and Ronald Ziegler: "The four of you should be aware that it is going to be virtually impossible to insure a reception in Poland which can equal the spontaneous reception the President received in 1959. . . . You should develop a plan for tempering any talk or discussion of big crowds in Poland. If we do end up with sizeable crowds we will be in a position to say that they were larger than we expected. Conversely, if we end up with small crowds, we will be in a position to say, 'We told you so'." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Dwight L. Chapin, Chronological, Box 16) On the day before his entourage's arrival in Poland, May 30, Nixon had instructed Haldeman that "he wanted to be sure we find a way to get to the people when we get to Poland—and to use Brennan out in front, to use the Secret Service, and get the Polish police out of the way." On May 31 Haldeman noted in his diary: "Arrival there [in Poland] was not as big as we thought it might be, but very big crowds [were] on the streets, and they surprisingly allowed them up pretty close. They didn't get quite as emotional as they apparently had in '59, but they were friendly, wanted to wave, and we did an extremely effective job of running the motorcade up through the planned part . . . He [the President] then got out and was completely engulfed by Poles. They started shouting 'Neek-son, Neek-son, Neek-son' . . . It all got quite emotional and was extremely impressive." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

After the wreath-laying, Nixon met with Poland's Communist leader, Edward Gierek, at the Polish Parliament for one-on-one talks. The President spoke with Gierek alone, accompanied only by a Polish interpreter. Haldeman wrote in his diary: "[O]ur interpreter, supplied by State, was apparently no good, as a number of the Poles told me, so we had to change and used a Polish interpreter for the dinner, and we'll use him for the rest of the activities here." (*Ibid.*) On the same day, Secretary of State William Rogers, also in Warsaw, signed a consular convention between the United States and Poland. Later in the

evening, President and Mrs. Nixon attended a state dinner in their honor. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

The following day Nixon met with Gierek at the latter's office at the Polish Sejm at 10:05 a.m. for a second round of talks. This time, the two leaders were accompanied by Jaroszewicz and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger (see Document 165). At 10:45, a second meeting took place between the entire Polish and U.S. delegations at Jaroszewicz's office at the Council of Ministers (see Document 166). After hosting a luncheon for Poland's leaders at Wilanow Palace, the President and Mrs. Nixon, along with their entourage, flew home. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

In a joint U.S.-Polish communiqué, the two sides expressed their support for MBFR and a "carefully prepared" conference on European security. They also "expressed their interest in the conclusion of an inter-governmental agreement on comprehensive cooperation in science, technology, and culture" and announced their expectation that they would "sign in the near future an air transport agreement" and "establish mutual and regular air conventions." (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, pages 914–915) With regard to scientific cooperation, see Document 175. On July 19 Poland and the United States signed a bilateral Air Transport Agreement. For the text of the agreement, see 23 UST 4269.

For the text of the President's public remarks during his visit to Poland, along with the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the talks, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, pages 909–915.

165. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Warsaw, June 1, 1972.

PARTICIPANTS

Edward Gierek, First Secretary, Polish United Workers' Party
Piotr Jaroszewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 487, President's Trip Files, The President's Conversations in Salzburg, Moscow, Tehran and Warsaw, May 1972 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the First Secretary's Office in the Parliament building.

The President

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

First Secretary Gierek welcomed the President to Poland. All the newspapers and media of Poland were giving the most extensive coverage to the President's visit. His talks in Warsaw were considered an extension of his Moscow talks. The whole world attached great significance to these talks. The First Secretary then asked his friend the Prime Minister to present Poland's views on concrete matters.

Chairman Jaroszewicz greeted the President and Dr. Kissinger warmly. It was his profound conviction that the President's visit would be most useful. The rise of living standards of the Polish people was their most important task. Per capita income in Poland was only \$1100; the government wanted to increase the national income. There had been a 3% increase in wages; production had also increased. They would keep the economic balance of the country, especially the balance of payments. Despite great expenditures they had kept the economy stable. Poland was now embarked on a vast program to develop and modernize its economy. As part of this, Poland was now reaching for the most advanced technology, and that was why they attached so much importance to relations with the United States.

The Polish Government had sent us four aides-mémoires last year on these matters. Poland was particularly interested in the consumer goods industries: foodstuffs, agriculture, light industry, chemicals. They would like to purchase several plants containing the most advanced technology, for textiles especially. Some of their plants had machinery dating back to the last century. Food processing plants were highly desired. They needed highly processed products. They also wanted to enter negotiations to bring about a new agreement for the long-term purchase of grain, especially soybeans. They were prepared to make a five to seven-year agreement for a 10-year credit at not-too-high a credit rate.

Poland had a large engineering industry due to Soviet assistance. They regretted the absence of participation by U.S. technology. They had no engineering plant. In order to raise agricultural production and use tractors to replace \$2.7 million in houses they wanted an entire truck factory—to produce 100 thousand tractors a year. They wanted the assistance of the U.S. to develop an electronics industry. They had a program for heavy industry. In this regard Chairman Jaroszewicz particularly wanted to thank the President on behalf of the Polish Government for the catalytic cracking plant² and the transforming of the sheet metal industry. It helped Poland enormously. Both projects were

² See Document 151.

now being implemented. Their conversations with American firms proved our interest in developing their copper and zinc industries. Poland had the metals but needed the technology to develop them further. American firms were expecting the President's decision. Poland also hoped for \$140 million for cinematography and television and wanted to work out a five-to-six-year program of scientific cooperation.

EX-IM credit the Chairman recognized was essential. Poland needed \$3.3 billion over five years. This depended on the President. Poland was one of the most reliable debtors. "We pay back everything." If Poland got a ten-year credit she could pay back \$250 million a year. This would lead to \$500 million in trade—the same level as Poland had with West Germany. This credit would represent only 3 percent of the total trade turnover and ten percent of that with the Communist world.

On P.L. 480, Poland was requesting a postponement of payments for five years. Poland would like to use this money to make purchases in the U.S. markets for machinery. They wanted to use the counterpart funds of zlotys for social programs, for example, hospitals and water reservoirs for farmers. The Prime Minister envisaged a program for a skyway using counterpart funds. Poland also wanted to build a center for Copernicus and to expand East-West tourist visits.

On fishing, there were a number of agreements. Poland would like to settle this issue in a comprehensive agreement. They had marked out a full program. If this was not realized, the U.S. trade share would decline. This program would have a spectacular significance as cooperation between a big country and a medium-sized country which stood for peace, restraint and stability in Europe. U.S. machinery in Krakow was a good advertisement vis-à-vis Soviet machinery.

Finally, Chairman Jaroszewicz said he could recommend a permanent joint organ of some kind to foster economic cooperation between the U.S. and Poland.

The President in reply thanked the Prime Minister for the sweep of his ideas. We were in the position where the President agreed to the goals the Chairman had outlined, but Congress implemented. The President nevertheless could make a few commitments now—for example on the Polish request for postponement of P.L. 480 repayments, which he now agreed to. Once the bond problem was solved, we could move more easily on EX-IM credits. Once that was worked out we could go ahead. First Secretary Gierek remarked that Poland was ready for a settlement. The President then stated that we could agree in principle to a joint economic commission as well as a joint scientific body. He recommended that the commission on our side include also representatives of U.S. private industry.

Dr. Kissinger commented that the Poles always thought in big terms. History gives us no other choice, Chairman Jaroszewicz replied.

The President noted that economic cooperation between us of course also required the participation of private industry. He asked how much of Poland's trade was with socialist countries and how much was with Western Europe and Japan. The Chairman gave the figures: Poland's trade was 63 percent with all the socialist countries, 35 percent with the USSR, 4 percent with Japan, 8 percent with West Germany, 14 percent with East Germany, and 2.5 percent with the United States. Poland wanted to get the latter figure up to 8 percent. Why do you want so much trade with the U.S., the President asked. Mainly for the advanced technology, the Chairman answered. First Secretary Gierek pointed out another problem: Some technology that Poland acquired from Western Europe, e.g., France, was indirectly from us [integrated circuits].³ Why not get it directly?

The Chairman explained his government's program for developing and modernizing the economy. Poland would like to be reliable about repayment of loans. Of course if the U.S. refused credit they would have to get credit elsewhere. The President said he wanted to discuss one problem. With the war in Vietnam going on, there was resistance in the U.S. Congress to extending credit to countries which have given aid to North Vietnam. We would be forthcoming on all these problems. But a settlement in Vietnam would remove a difficult irritant in our relations.

First Secretary Gierek then summed up the conversation. The two sides had discussed all the problems before them. He wanted to repeat one thing following what the President had said. If the U.S. really meant to help Poland, what was needed was actions and not words. The U.S. should not reproach Poland too much and should not say too many nice things about Poland either.

³ Brackets in the original.

166. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Warsaw, June 1, 1972, 10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Polish-American Relations

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side:

President Nixon

Secretary Rogers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Asst. to the President

Ambassador Stoessel

Martin J. Hillenbrand, Asst. Secty., EUR

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Senior Member, NSC Staff

Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secty. to President

Polish Side:

Edward Gierek, 1st. Secty, Polish United Workers' Party

Piotr Jaroszewicz, Chairman Council of Ministers

Mieczyslaw Jagielski, Vice Chairman, Council of State

Jan Kaczmarek, Minister of Science, Higher Education and Technology

Stefan Olszowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Franciszek Szlachcic, Member, Politburo and Secretariat, Polish United Workers' Party

Witold Trampczynski, Ambassador to the U.S.

Tadeusz Olechowski, Minister of Foreign Trade

Henryk Kisiel

Romuald Spasowski, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Włodzimierz Janiurek, Under Secretary of State

Jan Szydłak, Secretary, Polish Workers' Party

Gierek expressed the hope that the visit to Poland of President Nixon would serve to strengthen the traditional friendship of the Polish and American peoples. The program of the Polish Government is based on a realistic assessment of possibilities. Poland was devastated by the war and had to undergo a long process of recovery. Now it was among the ten leading industrial powers in the world. The Polish people had great talents and energy, and the Government wanted to avoid any ambiguities about its ambitions and prospects. For the immediate future, it would have to concentrate its efforts on agriculture and production of foodstuffs, market industries, municipal transport systems, housing, education and health. The Government's ability to achieve its

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL POL–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Hillenbrand. The meeting took place in the office of the Council of Ministers. Another record of this discussion, drafted by Sonnenfeldt, includes only the President's remarks. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files, Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972)

objectives would be of decisive importance for socialism and democratic civil liberties in the country.

Expanding peace in the world would also favor the achievement of Polish goals. Gierek said he was one of those Poles who during World War II had fought in the Belgian Resistance Movement. The Polish divisions in Western Europe had fought under the command of General Eisenhower.² He hoped that the list of great Americans linked with Polish history could be broadened and the tradition of friendship expanded. He was fully aware of the difficulties to be overcome. He noted that the President's route to Warsaw had led through Moscow where there was a socialist power with which Poland had a defensive alliance and which had helped Poland economically. He was glad the President's trip to Moscow had been so fruitful, and he could only congratulate him and Brezhnev. The route to Warsaw had also led through Tehran, Gierek continued. This was a place which also symbolized definite facts, such as the three-power meeting in Tehran during the war which had directed the shape of Polish frontiers and territory. Now, 27 years after the war, these frontiers have been recognized by the Federal Republic of Germany.³ The ratification of the German treaty and the signing of the final Quadripartite Berlin Protocol⁴ proved the soundness of Polish policy in its quest for peace which was convergent with that of the other socialist states. After the President's meeting with the Soviet leaders, the security expectations for Europe were coming closer to realization. With respect to other "hot beds," such as the Middle East, the Polish Government desired that the Arabs and Israelis live in peace. A separate problem is Viet-Nam, which he had discussed previously with the President.⁵ Poland believes in peace and is aware of the dangers of nuclear war which would leave no victors. Therefore the Poles hope for détente and lasting peace in the world.

The President said he could agree with most of what Gierek had said and with all of his goals. One of the benefits of summit meetings, such as he had had in Moscow, Warsaw and Peking, is not only that some agreements are reached but also that a personal "man-to-man relationship" can be developed so that, in the future, when we receive communications we think of them in terms of the specific men involved. This was important to him personally. It did not mean that all

² During the 1943–1945 military campaign in Italy.

³ See Document 140.

⁴ For texts of these agreements, December 7, 1970, and September 3, 1971, respectively, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 1125–1127 and 1135–1144.

⁵ An apparent reference to the conversation between Nixon and Gierek on the evening of May 31, for which no record has been found. The only other person present was a Polish interpreter. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

problems had vanished. While some understanding had been reached on this trip, it was more important that foundations had been built for cooperation in the future.

The President added that he wanted to say frankly that we know there are differences on the question of Viet-Nam. He hoped that this would in due time pass, preferably by the route of negotiations. As Gierek had recited what had happened to Poland, how it had been attacked from all sides and how it had suffered terribly from the war, the President had appreciated, as a realistic man, the position of Poland in a sensitive part of Europe. The Polish leaders had alliances which they expected to keep, and we would keep our alliances. As we develop a new relationship, Polish leaders can be our friends without being anyone else's enemy. Poland has strong neighbors on both sides; it is essential that it maintain good relations with them. We understand this. We seek cooperation with Poland without any effort to embarrass its leaders. In speeches, communiqués and toasts we will talk about the real friendship of our people and how they are for peace. No one knows better than the leaders of Poland that there will never be a perfect world. In the Middle East the hatreds go back hundreds of years, and the most we can hope for there is a cease fire which will protect the integrity of both sides. We know that great powers and small powers will sometimes be rivals. The important new fact is that in the nuclear age such differences cannot be allowed to develop into armed confrontation. Some think that, if only the Soviet Union and the U.S., or the People's Republic of China and the U.S., or the USSR and the People's Republic of China could reach understanding, then there would be no problems. This is not true. While Gierek said that Poland was a medium-sized nation, there are many small and medium-sized countries. If they become involved in conflict, such conflagrations might spread and lead to a confrontation of the super-powers. We welcome an era of cooperation and welcome the opportunity to work with Poland towards a new relationship which will help security in Europe.

The President concluded by saying that he hoped this meeting will contribute towards these objectives. He could declare to our Polish friends that we believe in the importance of having good relations with all nations, large and small. We will make no arrangements at the expense of the small nations. We were a small nation at the time of Kosciusko and we heed the interest of small nations today.

167. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, June 10, 1972.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Polish Diplomat

On June 6, I had lunch with Andrzej Wojtowicz, First Secretary of the Polish Embassy, with whom I have lunched often before. We talked mostly about the President's visit to Warsaw.

Presidential Visit

Wojtowicz disclosed that his Embassy had received a circular telegram from Warsaw several days before describing the visit as a success. He was awaiting the return of Ambassador Trampczynski on June 9 for further details. The circular had stressed that "particularly on Germany" in the communiqué had Poland achieved its goal. Other Polish gains were the formulations on the European Security Conference (CSCE) and MBFR, both of which represented considerable advances.²

Wojtowicz said that the circular had skipped over the economic aspects of the visit, which Poland had originally regarded as key. Perhaps Trampczynski would have more to say when he got back. Wojtowicz himself thought that the communiqué passages on the economic and the scientific-technical commissions were inconsequential. Probably they came out of the meeting between President Nixon and Gierek. They looked to Wojtowicz like attempts to give the appearance of more substance on economic issues and to parallel economic passages in the US-Soviet communiqué. Frankly, agreement on the two commissions had caught the Polish Embassy by surprise.

Wojtowicz asked how the President has most benefitted from the visit. I thought that getting to know Poland's new leaders personally and the publicized contact with Polish citizens had been the main gains

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Poland, Vol. II 1972. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Livingston. The original was sent to Kissinger, who initialed it. A copy was sent to Ash.

² See Document 164. The joint communiqué contained the following language on the Polish-West German treaty: "Both sides welcomed the treaty between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany signed on December 7, 1970, including its border provisions." (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, p. 915)

for the President.³ It had been a pity, however, that the Polish authorities had at first tried so hard to keep the crowds away. Wojtowicz pointed out that contrary to the Feron story in the *New York Times*, Polish media had announced the President's schedule well in advance.⁴

Germany

Wojtowicz strongly hoped that the United States would not reduce its presence in Europe as a result of post-Summit atmospherics. If the Americans left, the Germans would certainly be the strongest force in Central Europe. The danger in that was obvious. How could the US help Poland keep Germany under control? That was a major problem for Warsaw now. Wojtowicz was not sure that we were correct in ascribing to the Soviet Union the objective of diminishing the US presence in Europe. This was in any case no Polish objective.

I pointed out that Four Power Responsibility for Germany continued (Wojtowicz thought that was a good thing), indeed had been reinforced by the Berlin Protocol just signed.⁵ Brandt was correct in his observation in his June 5 speech at Harvard that it is too often forgotten that the Berlin Protocol assures a US presence in Central Europe—and one to which the Soviets have agreed.

CSCE and MBFR

Wojtowicz said that the Soviets had not solicited Polish views before signing onto the US-Soviet communiqué's passages on these topics. He had the impression that neither the Soviets nor their Warsaw Pact allies had done much MBFR work yet, although Warsaw had some old schemes in the files which might be worth dusting off. On CSCE, more work had been done, of course. There had for example been a joint Polish-Hungarian study of the economic aspects of a Conference and also another joint study. Both joint studies had come out of the re-

³ On July 6 at 2:30 p.m., Chapin wrote in a memorandum to Colson: "We have film of the President's trip to Poland which was taken by our documentary crew. It would seem to me that this would make outstanding film to be used by some of the Polish leaders or by people who are visiting the various Polish wards around the country. Perhaps we should even consider making a TV commercial out of it to be run in the Polish areas. The other thing that would be good is to use the soundtrack for radio." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 80, EX TR 38-3 WARSAW, POLAND)

⁴ James Feron had reported on June 1: "President Nixon arrived in Warsaw today and succeeded in reaching the Polish people despite official attempts to avoid a repetition of the emotional welcome he received here in 1959, when he was Vice President. . . . Polish Communist party members had been told to stay home and watch the arrival on television. . . . There had been no publicity on either the President's route into the city or his schedule." Feron, "Nixon in Warsaw, Greets the Public and Meets Gierek," *New York Times*, June 1, 1972, p. 1.

⁵ For the text of the Final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin, signed June 3, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 1204–1206.

cent Budapest meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers. I told him that NATO had been doing a lot of preparatory work on both MBFR and on the CSCE.

US Oil Company in Poland

Saying that this was very secret, Wojtowicz related that six weeks ago the Polish government had asked Standard Oil of Indiana to send geologists to Poland to help their Polish counterparts explore for oil reserves off the Baltic coast. This invitation had come out of the high-level Polish trade/technical delegation's visit to the US in early May. Standard's geologists were now in Poland.

This was sensitive. Not only was the exploration going on near the Polish-GDR frontier, but, if oil were located and American engineers and technicians came in, they would be replacing Russians. The Soviet geologists' exploration methods were outdated. That's why the Poles had sought out an American company.

I asked what was in it for Standard of Indiana. Wojtowicz thought that if exploitable oil reserves should be found, Standard would be paid in crude, which it could profitably ship by sea to nearby refineries in Hamburg or Sweden and then market in Western Europe.

Vietnam

Wojtowicz asked whether the President and the Soviet leaders had come closer on Vietnam. I said that I had no knowledge beyond that in the communiqué. Shaking his head, Wojtowicz observed that the Soviet Union had hardly stood by its North Vietnamese friends. Shrugging his shoulders, he added that that was "politics."

Soviet-US Relations

What had the US gotten out of the Summit, Wojtowicz asked. The major gains, I thought, had been the SALT agreement and the personal acquaintanceship with the Soviet leaders and their views, which the President had gained from his long and detailed talks.

What about the *Pravda's* post-Summit criticism of "left-wingers" opposed to Brezhnev's Western policy, I asked. Wojtowicz thought that this attack had been aimed at Maoist and New Left groupings in the Western European communist parties, rather than at an anti-Brezhnev faction within the CPSU.

Would the three Soviet leaders come to the United States together, I inquired. Not likely, Wojtowicz replied. He expected that Kosygin might like to come next fall, extending a visit to the UN General Assembly into a tour of the US.

Robert Gerald Livingston

168. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Robert Hormats, and Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 22, 1972.

SUBJECT

Next Steps in US-Polish Economic Relations

As a result of the President's discussions with the Polish leaders, we should now take action in three areas of Polish-US economic relations.

The Polish Ambassador has delivered two letters from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Jaroszewicz to the President (a) requesting for the second time postponement of PL-480 dollar debt repayment; and (b) proposing a new agreement on the sale of US agricultural products to Poland.² (The latter question, the sales agreement, will require extensive staffing by the agencies, should be handled separately, and will be treated in a separate memorandum.)

The three areas in which we can and should act on soon are: 1) EX-IM Bank Credit Facilities, 2) Deferral of Polish PL-480 Debt Repayments, and 3) Polish-American Trade Commission.

A joint memorandum for signature by you and Mr. Flanigan to the President (Tab A)³ reviews these issues and requests his approval for implementing instructions to the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Commerce. The memorandum to the President also forwards a letter, coordinated with Ray Price's office, for the President's signature replying to Chairman Jaroszewicz.

Issues

1. EX-IM Bank Credit Facilities

During the Warsaw visit the President told Gierek that while he had the authority to grant EX-IM credits, any action on this score must await a "solution" of the problem of claims of American holders of dollar bonds issued by the pre-war Polish government.⁴ (The claims

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-234, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 173. Confidential. Sent for very urgent action. Handwritten notations in an unknown hand at the top read: "Thru Haig," and "Memo sent to Pres. 7/3/72" (see Document 169).

² Copies are attached to Document 169 but not printed.

³ Not found; apparently a draft of Document 169.

⁴ See Document 165.

amount to about \$42 million.) Once the President's condition has been met by the Poles, the Secretary of State should submit to the President a determination that granting EX-IM is in the national interest.

The language used by the President with Gierek makes the requirement for positive Polish action on the bond debt stricter than that proposed in a memorandum by Secretary Rogers to the President. The Secretary recommended that the Poles be told that we would be willing to extend them the facilities *when we were satisfied that Poland had initiated negotiations which, in our judgment, show promise of a reasonable settlement of the dollar bond debt.*⁵

We must treat the precise wording of the President's commitment with care, particularly in notifying the agencies of it, because the nature of the commitment will affect the negotiating position of the Bondholders Council. If the Council learns that the requirement for Polish action is in fact stricter than that proposed in Secretary Rogers' memorandum, the Council will be encouraged to harden its terms for settlement, which—depending on the degree of hardening—could make a reasonable solution extremely difficult. (The Poles are now planning to send a delegation over in the near future to talk to the bondholders. They claim that the talks will move rapidly.)

We assume you still hold the view that the timing of a Presidential decision should be determined at least as much by the status of a decision on EX-IM for the USSR as on the status of the bond negotiations. For this reason, we presumably can afford to let the bond negotiations drag on a bit.

With these factors in mind, we have prepared a draft NSDM/CIEPDM⁶ which will inform the agencies that a Presidential decision on EX-IM is tied to "solution" of the bondholders' claims without specifying the nature of that tie or of the "solution." (This should preserve flexibility for the President in making a final decision on EX-IM for Poland.)

2. Deferral of Polish PL-480 Debt Repayments

It is our understanding that during the Warsaw visit, the President also indicated to Gierek our willingness to defer repayment of the dollar tranches of the PL-480 debt falling due in the next few years. Jaroszewicz, in his letter to the President, committed Poland to purchase

⁵ On May 18 Rogers made this recommendation in a memorandum to Nixon. The following day, Kissinger replied: "The President has considered your memorandum on this subject [Export-Import Bank facilities for Poland] . . . He wishes to hold this matter in abeyance until his talks in Warsaw. He may at that time decide to take the step you propose." Both memoranda are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972.

⁶ Not found; apparently a draft of Document 170.

in the US during the period 1972–1975 machinery and equipment in amounts equivalent to the total of repayments deferred. *We assume that the President's intention is to defer for the period requested by the Polish government.*

3. *Polish-American Trade Commission*

The US-Polish communiqué⁷ states that: "In the interest of broadening and facilitating trade relations between the two countries and working out concrete steps toward that end the two sides decided to create a joint Polish-American Trade Commission."

This can be dealt with separately from the EX–IM and PL–480 debt questions. And we can move rapidly to establish the Commission, which Secretary Peterson should chair.

Recommendations

1. *That you and Mr. Flanigan sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A requesting his approval for the US-Polish economic steps outlined above and recommending that he sign the letter to Chairman Jaroszewicz.*

2. With the President's approval, that you and Mr. Flanigan sign the NSDM/CIEPDM transmitting the President's decisions on EX–IM facilities and the PL–480 debt.

3. With the President's approval, that you and Mr. Flanigan sign the memorandum to Secretary Peterson instructing him to work with the Poles to establish the Polish-American Trade Commission and to chair it for the US side.⁸

⁷ See Document 164.

⁸ See footnote 5, Document 169.

169. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Chairman of the President's Council for International Economic Policy (Flanigan) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 3, 1972.

SUBJECT

US-Polish Economic Relations

During your visit to Poland you indicated to the Polish leaders that, upon solution of problems relating to pre-war Polish government dollar bond debts to US holders, you would be prepared to exercise your authority to extend *EX-IM Bank credit facilities to Poland*. You also indicated our eventual willingness to postpone *repayment of dollar tranches of Polish PL-480 debt to us*.

On June 14, the Polish Ambassador delivered two messages to you from Chairman of the Council of Ministers Jaroszewicz (Tabs D and E),² one on PL-480 indicating that the Poles want a five year postponement and the other on a proposed new agricultural agreement, which we are staffing separately. The joint US-Polish communiqué which you signed in Warsaw called for the creation of a *joint Polish-American Trade Commission*.

Gierek, when he paid an unusual personal visit to our trade exhibition at the Poznan Fair June 11, stressed that "time is money" and expansion of US-Polish relations need not wait until next year. He alluded to his conversations with you in this regard.

We recommend that the agencies be directed to follow through promptly on your discussions in Warsaw on EX-IM Bank Credits, PL-480 Debt Deferral, and the Joint Trade Commission.

—With regard to EX-IM Bank Credits, the NSDM/CIEPDM at Tab A³ would (a) inform the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Commerce, and heads of the other agencies involved, that your decision to exercise your authority to extend credit facilities is tied to a solution of the US bondholders' claims; (b) instruct the Secretaries to inform the Polish government representatives, if they press the US on when these facilities will become available, that in accordance with what you said in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-234, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 173. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Printed as Document 170.

Warsaw, you will make this decision in light of the status of the negotiations between the Polish government and the bondholders; and (c) instruct the Secretary of State to inform the bondholders' representatives that we continue to favor a reasonable settlement of their claims within a reasonable time.

(You can determine the precise timing of any affirmative action on EX-IM for Poland later, taking into account the status of EX-IM facilities for the Soviets. At this stage the bondholders should not come to believe that we have established too tight a linkage between EX-IM facilities for Poland and settlement of their claims, for in this case they would harden their demands and gain undue influence over the timing of your final decision.)

—With regard to PL-480 Debt Deferral, the NSDM/CIEPDM would also direct the Secretary of State, after coordination with the Department of Commerce and other agencies, to inform the Polish government: (a) that we are prepared to postpone repayments of the annual tranches of the PL-480 dollar debt falling due in years 1973–1974 for five years, i.e., so that these annual tranche repayments would take place in 1978 and 1979; and (b) that toward the end of 1974, we will be prepared to give consideration to a deferral of further tranches. (The repayments average just over \$16 million annually.)

—The Polish government's request, made in an aide-mémoire handed Secretary Stans last year⁴ and repeated in Chairman Jaroszewicz's message to you was for a five year deferral—i.e., until the period 1978–1982—of payments due in 1973–1977. We do not believe that it is economically sound or politically wise to commit ourselves formally to this extended period. The Poles' main problem is with their short-range debt. Giving them a postponement and taking a look at their balance-of-payments position at the end of 1974 will give them the needed immediate relief. In terms of our relations with Poland and other PL-480 debtor countries, an undesirable precedent would be set by meeting precisely the Poles' wish for a deferral of as much as five annual tranches.

—*Polish-American Trade Commission*

Secretary Peterson is ready to chair this Commission and is the right man. The memorandum at Tab B⁵ would designate him as Chairman of the US side and would instruct him to work with Polish officials to get the Commission functioning.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Attached but not printed. Signed by the President on July 7.

—*Reply to Chairman Jaroszewicz*

A proposed reply for your signature to Chairman Jaroszewicz's letters is at Tab C,⁶ and has been coordinated with Ray Price's office. It indicates your favorable attitude toward PL-480 deferral. (It should be noted that the reply does not commit you on the second agricultural proposal made by Chairman Jaroszewicz.)

Recommendations

1. That you approve the NSDM/CIEPDM at Tab A.⁷
2. That you approve the memorandum to Secretary Peterson at Tab B.⁸
3. That you sign the letter to Chairman Jaroszewicz at Tab C.

⁶ The draft letter to Jaroszewicz, signed by Nixon on July 8, reads in part: "Thank you for your letters of June 5. . . . After appropriate consultations between officials of our government, I anticipate that our two countries should soon be able to reach an agreement on a five year deferral of dollar installments due for payments in 1973 and 1974 in accordance with an earlier Public Law 480 agreement between Poland and the United States. I have also requested the responsible Departments of the United States Government to give prompt consideration to your request for conclusion of a new agricultural sales agreement. . . . Permit me to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to thank you once again for the warm welcome and generous hospitality accorded Mrs. Nixon and me during our recent trip to Warsaw. We will long cherish our memory of that visit."

⁷ The President initialed the approval option.

⁸ The President initialed the approval option.

170. National Security Decision Memorandum 173¹

Washington, July 7, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT

Polish-US Economic Relations

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972. Confidential. Copies were also sent to the Secretary of Agriculture, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and the President of the Export-Import Bank. Also issued as CIEPDM 8.

1. Export-Import Bank Credit Facilities

Exercise of the President's authority to extend these facilities is tied to a solution of the claims of US holders of dollar bonds issued by the pre-war Polish government. The Secretary of State should notify the Foreign Bondholders Council that the US Government continues to favor a reasonable settlement of US holders' claims within a reasonable time. If Polish government representatives inquire when Export-Import Bank credit facilities can be made available to Poland, they should be informed that the President, in accordance with his discussions in Warsaw, will make this decision in light of the status of negotiations between the Polish government and the bondholders' representatives.

2. Deferral of PL-480 Dollar Debt

In response to Chairman Jaroszewicz's message on this subject to the President of June 5, 1972,² the Department of State, after appropriate coordination with the Department of Commerce and other agencies, should inform the Polish government that we are willing to defer the dollar tranches under the PL-480 agreements which fall due in the years 1973–1974 for a period of five years, i.e., so that these payments will be made in the years 1977 and 1978. Toward the end of 1974 we would be prepared to consider deferral of further tranches. This is contingent, however, upon appropriate assurances from the Polish government, as proposed in the aide-mémoire of December 2, 1971,³ and Chairman Jaroszewicz's letter of June 5, 1972, to the President, that Polish enterprises will purchase in the United States during the period 1972–1973 machinery and equipment for the amount equivalent to the total of deferred tranches.

Henry A. Kissinger
PMF

² See Document 169 and footnote 2 thereto. An unofficial translation of Jaroszewicz's letter of June 5 is also attached to a June 16 memorandum from David to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972)

³ Not found.

171. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 25, 1972.

SUBJECT

How Polish Officials Regard Your Warsaw Visit.

In the weeks since your Warsaw trip, we received several State Department cables and also intelligence reports on the views of Polish officials about the outcome of the visit. The reports all agree that Poland's leaders regard your visit as a definite success, which reinforces their country's prestige and influence and opens the door to improve US-Polish bilateral relations, particularly economic.

In late June, Polish diplomats sought out their US opposite numbers in several places with specific purpose of telling them about an official assessment of your visit cabled them from Warsaw. According to their assessment, as the diplomats described it, the Polish leaders were greatly impressed by your handling of the Warsaw talks and considered you a forward-looking leader with modern ideas. The assessment also reportedly said that they look forward to pursuing an "independent" policy in European affairs and had noted the strong residual friendship toward the US which exists among the Polish people.

Two separate intelligence reports are confirmatory. One, [*1 line not declassified*] says that these officials considered that:

—your signature of the communiqué with Gierek proves that you fully accept him as Poland's leader.

—your coming to Warsaw via Tehran, rather than directly from Moscow, was good since it demonstrated that you regarded your Warsaw talks as separate from the Moscow Summit.

—you had recognized that the differences between the Moscow and the Warsaw communiqué stem from the independence of Polish policies.

A particularly sensitive intelligence report [*1 line not declassified*] confirmed that the Polish leadership was satisfied with the visit, which had increased Poland's influence within the communist bloc and throughout Europe. The source of this particular report added that your visit had also heartened Polish intellectuals.

We have learned separately that the Polish government plans a special book on the visit. It will contain color photographs and appear in perhaps several hundred thousand copies.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 481, President's Trip Files, President's Poland Trip. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

An additional sign of the Polish government's favorable view of your visit is the unprecedentedly large number of high Polish officials, including the Foreign Minister, who attended Ambassador's Stoessel's Fourth of July reception.

It is noteworthy that not only the Polish government but also the intellectuals in Poland, who are not necessarily Gierek supporters, and the Polish-American community all consider the trip a success. It was to be expected that Gierek would use your visit to strengthen his domestic position, but non-government elements in Poland have also evidently benefited from it.

172. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 7, 1972.

SUBJECT

Conversations in Poland

I talked on August 2 for about a total of three and a half hours alone with Szlachcic² and Frelek, the senior Polish Party Secretary in charge of international affairs who had accompanied Gierek to the Communist summit in the Crimea.³

The first talk was with Szlachcic who received me with enormous friendliness. He said he had just hung up talking to Gierek who was still in the Crimea and who wanted Szlachcic to convey his warmest regards to you. Gierek and the entire Polish leadership were still under the deep impression of the President's visit but beyond that were totally convinced that the evolution in US-Soviet relations and in international affairs generally that was now underway was extremely favorable. The processes that had been set in train were, in the Polish view, wholly constructive because they promised the further democratization of Communist societies, including in a crucial way Soviet society. This could only occur under conditions of détente and the Poles

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Kissinger's handwritten note on the first page reads: "Good job—HK."

² Franciszek Szlachcic, Minister of the Interior and a member of the Polish Politburo.

³ Held on August 2.

were therefore delighted over the way the situation was developing. Szlachcic said that he was convinced that Soviet policy in this regard was firmly established and that Brezhnev was in a position to override opposition to it to the extent that it still existed. Szlachcic said that unlike some others the Poles were not concerned about US-Soviet dealings; these were essential to the whole process and the Poles could see no way in which Polish interests might be damaged by superpower agreements. On the contrary, these were required for things to keep moving forward as the Poles want.

I asked Szlachcic whether he really felt that the process of détente and democratization, as he had described it, could go forward without arousing Soviet misgivings about the implications for intra-Communist discipline and, in particular, whether the point might not come where once again the Soviets and some others, like the East Germans, felt the brakes had to be applied lest democratization proceeded too far and too fast. I said that in the past there seemed to be a dialectic pattern that operated: the more détente the greater the effort to control its effects with détente the victim.

Szlachcic said that if the process was carefully managed he thought this time the experiences of the past would not be repeated, even though there will still be some, like the East Germans and Castro who preferred tension. (He said in regard to Castro that he wanted you to know that the Poles and Soviets had agreed before Castro's recent visit to Moscow⁴ and Warsaw that they would not sign any anti-American statement with him. The Soviets ended up signing what Szlachcic regarded a rather harmless joint statement but the Poles refused to issue a statement altogether because Castro had tried to inject anti-US themes. Szlachcic said the Poles wanted to make clear to Castro that he would be isolated if he continued to push anti-Americanism and Szlachcic thought that the lesson Castro learned in Moscow and Warsaw might produce some effects in his orientation that would permit the US to conduct a more flexible policy toward Cuba over time.) Szlachcic stressed that it was important that we operate through the Communist parties in Eastern Europe; any effort to achieve change by working outside the parties would immediately arouse intense Soviet reaction. This was why the Poles appreciated the President's decision not to see the Cardinal [Wyszynski] in Warsaw, and, as he had told you, why they were so pleased at the way we played the December 1970 events in Poland. I said we felt that Soviet decisions in 1971 had in part been influenced by the Polish December events. Szlachcic said he agreed. He said the

⁴ Fidel Castro was in Moscow for the COMECON economic summit June 10–12. A summary statement on the activities of the meeting is in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, July 5, 1972, p. 23.

Soviets move slowly and reluctantly but they are now moving, in part by conscious decision. The Poles had decided to give the Soviets full and loyal support because this was the best way to produce the fundamental changes in their system that we all wanted. To illustrate, he cited the automobile and Polish regulations on travel abroad. He said the Poles had opened their frontiers to the USSR and the GDR for the first time because they want their people to move around and stimulate the Soviets to do the same for theirs. Cars were going to help the process.

This took us onto a brief discussion of the impact of the automobile. I said I thought there were three sets of implications in the coming of larger number of cars: (1) they require an economic infrastructure that will require some change in economic priorities, (2) they will facilitate contacts among people over larger distances and across frontiers, and (3) they will reinforce the impulse toward privacy and toward individual decisions which Communist regimes have traditionally tried to smother. Szlachcic said the first two sets of implications were already clear and the Poles, at least, were taking the requisite economic decisions. He thought the Soviets would, too. The second was of course a prime motive for the Poles in promoting the automobile age. The third would be an interesting phenomenon to watch; the Poles were all in favor of greater individualism and were not afraid of it since it was a key ingredient in the process of democratization and humanization.

I asked Frelek, whom I have known for many years in his earlier capacity as head of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, how he accounted for the fact that a man of Brezhnev's background had apparently become the driving force behind a rather dramatic shift in the Soviet approach to relations with us and the West generally. Without answering directly, Frelek said that the thing to remember about Brezhnev was that he knew the Party and the Party knew and trusted him. (Patolichev in quite a different context had made the same point to us in Moscow.) The cadres trusted him as they did not trust Khrushchev who had constantly shaken them up with purges and reorganizations and the use of groups and devices that circumvented the apparatus. Moreover, despite the high average age of the Politburo and Brezhnev's own seniority, Brezhnev had succeeded in catching the imagination and enlisting the loyalty of that large proportion of Central Committee members who were only in their forties and below and who were truly the first post-revolutionary generation. Both Szlachcic and Frelek tended for these reasons to discount the likelihood that Brezhnev was in serious political trouble on any foreign policy issue. Frelek said that if there were disputes about any of the trade matters we had been in Moscow to discuss it would be about technical aspects rather than political ones. But he added that in the USSR as elsewhere the political fortunes of leaders rise and fall basically with domestic issues, especially economic ones. This was also true in Poland, even though the international

environment was crucial to Poland's existence; Gierek's strong position was in large degree due to his successful coping with economic problems, just as Gomulka's downfall had been heavily influenced by economic failure. (Both Frelek and Szlachcic however stressed that Gierek's personal qualities and his ability to work with and influence the Soviets had a great deal to do with his political strength.)

Frelek commented that since moving in as Party Secretary with Gierek he had come to know his Soviet counterparts Katushev and Rusakov—now Brezhnev's personal assistants for intra-Bloc affairs—quite well. For the first time this year, he had been invited to their homes and had met their families. He had spent ten days with Katushev in Sochi. We were wrong to see these people as party hacks. They were bright, well informed and energetic. He said that the same was true of others in the Soviet higher apparatus although the party does not always get the best people to work for it in career jobs. But in his own department of the Polish Central Committee he now had several of his former students and in a small way he thought it compared well with the NSC staff. He was still teaching part-time at the University and would be coming to the US again in December.

Szlachcic repeatedly reverted to his theme that American-Soviet and East-West détente was the most favorable feature of the current international situation. He said you were a hero in Poland because you were regarded as the architect of what was happening. The Poles were convinced that the reelection of the President was vital for the continuation of the process and they would do all they could to help although they were virtually certain that the President would be chosen again in any case. Szlachcic said the entire European bloc had reached the same conclusion and that it was confirmed at the Crimean summit. The Poles were working with Polish-American groups and would be sending a delegation to Chicago to "brief," in a very matter of fact manner, the Polish-American organizations there about the President's visit. Szlachcic said we could be sure that they would not overdo their support, recognizing that it could backfire if handled clumsily.

Szlachcic stressed Polish eagerness for good US-Polish relations within the overall process of détente. He said they were not aware of any Soviet fears in this regard, provided, of course, that it occurred within regular channels. Szlachcic said the Soviets had been instrumental in triggering the Polish initiative of inviting the President in part because they wanted the curse taken off their own reception of the President in the aftermath of the Vietnam mining operation.⁵ The

⁵ On May 8 President Nixon announced the imposition of a blockade on North Vietnam. For text of his statement, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 583–587. On May 10 the United States bombed Hanoi.

Poles had kept the Soviets fully informed of their talks with the President, Szlachcic said, and the Soviets had reciprocated. (I did not probe.) It was in this context that Szlachcic said the Poles were happy to hear of your forthcoming visit to Moscow.⁶ (Frelek, on the other hand, said that the Soviets had been very reticent in talking to the Poles or others about SALT II.)

Szlachcic also said that the Poles had been deeply appreciative of our support of Brandt's eastern policy. I said we had always made clear that we supported the normalization of the FRG's relations with the East but we had had to be careful not to get caught up in German domestic politics. Moreover, many of us felt that the kinds of decisions involved in the FRG's search for reconciliation and a *modus vivendi* with the East were so fundamental that they should be truly national decisions of the Germans. One should not have a situation where some years from now someone in Germany would claim that the eastern settlements had been externally imposed and a new stab-in-the-back legend would be manufactured. Szlachcic said he understood this but we should not be overly modest regarding our role; the Poles knew that given our influence in Bonn the Germans must have acted with our encouragement. Szlachcic went on to say that the Crimean summit had decided that Brandt's re-election was a must and that everything should be done to help it along. Consequently, the Poles would move to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn in late September, although the complex citizenship issue still had to be settled by the lawyers somehow. (Bahr's friend Sahm, the new German Ambassador in Moscow, had told me just two days earlier that the Soviets had put a total freeze on bloc relations with the FRG until the German election, in part, because they did not want to risk the defeat of any aspect of eastern policy that might have to go through the stalemated Bundestag. This applied particularly to the German application for UN membership.) I would judge the Crimean decision is related to Schroeder's trip to China.

Frelek in confirming the Crimean decision said that for his part he was well aware that we had had our doubts about some of Brandt's eastern policies. But, where Szlachcic had observed that even with a CDU government the basic lines of Brandt's policy would continue because of objective factors, Frelek noted that we might find ourselves confronted with far more serious problems with a CDU-conducted eastern policy than with Brandt's. The Poles, he said, would have distinct reservations about the kind of courtship of the Soviets which someone like Strauss would soon become engaged in were he in a position of power.

⁶ September 10–12.

Szlachcic got to talking about the European security conference and the Polish view that it was an important aspect of the *détente* process. I said we understood the Polish interest and respected it; our reservations had not related to that aspect but to our concern that any such venture deal with substance rather than atmosphere. I said that in my view countries like Poland were chiefly interested in the process of the conference whereas we were bound to be concerned with its results. This was why we had stressed the need for careful preparation. I then said that we of course also expected MBFR explorations to proceed in parallel with the conference preparations. I said we were doing serious homework on MBFR. Szlachcic said the Poles welcome MBFR negotiations but they were very concerned that any reductions encompass national forces—he pointed westward, implying that the Poles would not be comfortable with reduced US and Soviet forces while the East Germans and the West Germans remained at full strength. He said the Poles really did not worry so much about the reduction of US and Soviet forces. The presence of Soviet forces, including in Poland but also, for example, in Hungary, had permitted the process of reform and democratization to go forward in Eastern Europe without arousing Soviet security worries. (I commented that Kadar seemed to have achieved all of what the 1956 revolutionaries had aimed at as regards economic changes. Szlachcic said he has managed to go beyond what [Imre] Nagy had wanted but without allowing extra-Party forces to take over the process.) Szlachcic said the Poles want the US to remain strong in Europe and in the world as a whole; without such strength *détente* was doomed and with it the whole Polish policy concept. Consequently, the Poles oppose unilateral US reductions. I said that our effort to negotiate reciprocal reductions was importantly influenced by our need to keep our unilateral reducers from achieving their purposes. Szlachcic said he understood this and did not want our bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the Soviets undermined by unilateral cuts. But he stressed again that any agreement should include national forces. I said that because of our Congressional problem⁷ we would emphasize stationed forces initially but we certainly saw the weight of the arguments for also including national forces. Szlachcic reverted several times to the point that a strong US was prerequisite for peace and for democratization in Eastern Europe and the USSR. That was why the Poles want the President re-elected.

I said I could assure Szlachcic that maintenance of a strong US was also the President's purpose, since it was equally clear to him that the

⁷ Reference is to efforts by Congress to save money and achieve greater Western European involvement in its own defense by unilaterally reducing the size of U.S. forces stationed in Europe. The most recent effort to impose a troop cut, in May 1971, had been defeated on the floor of the Senate.

world's peace depended on it. To that end we would continue to make our domestic system work successfully, we would maintain our military strength whatever the critics might say, and we would end the Vietnam war in a way that did not shatter the internal cohesion of our society nor raise questions about our will and capacity to play an active and responsible role in international affairs. Szlachcic said he assumed I was speaking on the assumption that the President would be re-elected. I said that was the premise we had started with in our conversation. Szlachcic said that while the Poles obviously have to say things about the US that are critical—as he had told you, the ideological struggle would go on—they view us and the policies of the President and you are pursuing with the greatest admiration.

Szlachcic asked me how I felt about the prospects for a Vietnam settlement. I said that there were many factors which led to the conclusion that Hanoi, acting rationally, should now grasp the opportunity to end the war. I said that if Hanoi was stalling because it hoped a new Administration would give it better terms it should recognize that a re-elected President Nixon could be much tougher to deal with than he was now. I said I was not informed about developments in the Paris talks and that perhaps Szlachcic could judge better than I whether Hanoi had begun to draw the logical conclusions from developments since May or whether it was still operating on the basis of its irrational suspicions, fears and hopes. Szlachcic said that Hanoi tells the Poles nothing and that if he had half the influence in Hanoi that we have with Thieu he could assure me peace would be imminent. But he could also assure me that the Soviets and the Poles have told Hanoi that the time to settle was now and that indeed they had conducted their policy in such a way that Hanoi would be led to that conclusion. Szlachcic said he himself was more hopeful than ever before that the war could be ended. In any case, that was what the Poles ardently wanted and they could see that the President wanted it too. They had told Hanoi so.

Szlachcic asked me whether I had any advice for the Poles. I said that was a large question that I wouldn't want to answer on the spur of the moment. But I was impressed with the Polish view of the world and with the impact of Polish attitudes on others. I said I did have one specific suggestion: it related to the European conference and seemed to fall in with what Szlachcic had earlier said about opening frontiers, the role of the automobile, etc. In the West, one of the tests of what the conference would accomplish would be whether it contributed to the intensification and broadening of contacts across the dividing lines in Europe. In fact, when we had signed our Statement of Principles with the Soviets, we had been criticized by some in Western Europe for not including a principle on freedom of movement, though this was unwarranted since the whole document dealt with greater cooperation

and contact. But the criticism showed the feelings on the matter. I thought it would give the conference a more concrete character if it could develop ways to increase contacts, facilitate movement between peoples and stimulate the flow of ideas and information. I said I would hope that if it were feasible the Poles might use their influence with their allies to have an item of this kind on the conference agenda. Szlachcic said he would consider the point.

Some other points: Frelek said the Crimean summit was fairly routine; these meetings have become regular summertime events. The Soviets never raised the Middle East but both Frelek and Szlachcic volunteered that they thought that what had happened there might make a settlement more possible or at any rate remove the problem as a US-Soviet issue. I did not comment.

I told both Szlachcic and Frelek that I thought our economic relations would proceed well once the essentially technical issues of the bonds had been resolved. I told them Peterson was speaking with the President's full authority in stressing our desire for close economic relations.⁸

Frelek said that the Soviets had been very positive about the Peterson mission and that Brezhnev had been very pleased about his conversation with us at Oreanda. The Soviets apparently gave no hint of the difficulties which in fact are still in the way of a comprehensive trade settlement.

Frelek said the Poles have no information about what was going on in Romania but that Soviet-Romanian relations were fairly stable at present.

Both Szlachcic and Frelek stressed Polish concern with EEC trade policies. The point was also made in the official talks with Peterson. As Patolichev had done earlier in Moscow, they said that the US and the East Europeans had a common interest in fighting the trade practices of the Community. I said we had supported the formation of the EEC and its enlargement; clearly there were now some serious economic problems between it and us, but we hoped to be able to persuade the Community to join us in finding ways of reducing or managing them.

⁸ Peterson visited Poland in July, as the head of a U.S. commercial delegation.

173. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 6, 1972.

SUBJECT

Deferral of Polish PL-480 Dollar Debt

The State Department has been conducting negotiations in Washington this week with the Poles on deferring the 1973 and 1974 dollar repayment tranches of PL-480. The President agreed in his July 8 letter to Prime Minister Jaroszewicz on these postponements.²

The negotiations have revealed a wide difference in views between the Polish and US sides, and State is seeking guidance urgently (memorandum at Tab B)³—*in time for a meeting at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow, Saturday, October 7.*

The issue is whether the Poles should pay interest on the amount to be deferred (i.e. about \$30 million).

Our negotiators take the view:

—that a deferral is equivalent to a \$30 million export credit, on which the Poles should pay a 6 percent interest rate. We are arguing that the law prohibits a concessionary rate, i.e. less than 6 percent. Treasury and Agriculture in particular want to stick by 6 percent, although they would accept a “political decision” to shave the rate.

The Poles argue:

—that since the deferral was agreed upon at the highest political level it cannot be treated as a normal commercial loan. They have, however, agreed to discuss a nominal interest charge and requested new instructions, which should be in by October 7. State believes they might pay 3 or 4 percent ultimately.

Two other factors are involved:

—the current negotiations in New York with the US Bondholders, where the two sides are also apart on the interest rate; State believes that an agreement on PL-480 debt deferral would help bring about a settlement with the Bondholders;

—the US-Polish Science and Technology Agreement, which will likely be ready for signature in a few days; a schedule proposal for a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972. Confidential. Sent for urgent action.

² See footnote 6, Document 169.

³ Attached but not printed.

high-visibility signature ceremony has already gone forward to the President (Log # 6886, Tab C).⁴

State points out that the Poles are not likely to agree to 6 percent and that if we insist on it, they are likely to break off the negotiations this weekend. This might in turn jeopardize a Bondholders settlement and a S & T agreement signing ceremony in October, which Dr. David believes the President wants.

In seeking guidance, State has presented two options for the October 7 negotiating round:

1. Stick at 6 percent but make concessions on other aspects of an agreement, such as deferring five rather than two annual tranches, extending the grace period of deferral from five years to perhaps seven or eight. If no agreement can be reached on this basis, we would tell the Poles that we should resume the discussions at a later date.

2. Shave the interest rate.

Pros and Cons

If we select option 1, we risk a breakoff of negotiations. The Poles may interpret our insistence on 6% as a negation of the President's generous offer during his Warsaw visit to postpone PL-480 debt repayment.

If we select option 2, there may be Congressional criticism that a concessionary rate of interest is in effect an exaggerated subsidization of Polish imports from the United States. Selection of this option will also make us more vulnerable to criticism on what will be seen as concessions on different rates in our current trade negotiations with the Soviet Union.

State recommends option 1.

However, Peter Flanigan is adamantly opposed to any efforts of flexibility on deferring more than two repayment tranches or increasing the grace period to more than five years.

On balance, it seems feasible at present only to accept that part of State's option 1 which retains the 6% position, recommends that the Poles be told again that they should settle with the Bondholders (a hint that they might get EXIM Bank credit facilities in that case), and informed that we will reconsider the debt deferral later if they cannot meet the 6% interest rate.

This will be unpalatable to the Poles but on the other hand they may be taking a rigid position now because they think the President wants an agreement in this field before the election. In fact, we have several things going with the Poles as far as the President's interests

⁴ Not printed. Regarding the U.S.-Polish science and technology agreement, see Document 175.

are concerned, including the Science and Technology Agreement and Cardinal Krol's forthcoming trip to Poland. So there should be no undue harm in telling the Poles, if no agreement based on our present position is feasible, that it will be better for both sides to review their positions and resume these talks later.

Recommendation

That you authorize General Haig to sign the memorandum to Eliot at Tab A,⁵ which accepts option 1 but *without* the offers of concessions on tranches and grace period extension which State recommends.

⁵ On the evening of October 6, Haig signed the memorandum to Eliot regarding deferral of the Polish P.L.-480 debt. It reads as follows: "The recommendation in your memorandum of October 6, 1972, . . . that the US side retain the requirement for a 6% interest rate is approved. However, our negotiators should give no indication to the Poles that we are prepared either (a) to depart from our position that only two annual tranches will be deferred; or (b) to increase the grace period already offered."

174. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, October 10, 1972, 11:55 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between the President and Polish Ambassador Witold Trampczynski,
Monday, October 10, 1972, 11:55 a.m., The Oval Office²

The meeting began in the Oval Office at 11:55 a.m., with the President greeting the Ambassador and inviting him to stand in front of the flags for photographs. The President said the timing of the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972. Confidential. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt.

² On October 4 Bull proposed in a memorandum to Haldeman that the President meet with Ambassador Trampczynski on October 10 to present him with a copy of a 15-minute documentary film shot during Nixon's visit to Poland. The purpose of such a meeting, Bull wrote, was "to show Presidential recognition of Polish-Americans by reminding them of his trip to Poland in the Spring." Bull continued: "Wednesday, October 11, is Pulaski Day, but the President will not be engaged in any Polish-type activity. He will probably be at Camp David. In order to show recognition of Pulaski Day, it is being proposed that the President see the Polish Ambassador on Pulaski Day Eve." Haldeman approved Bull's recommendation. (Ibid., White House Special Files, Confidential Files, Box 8, CO-121 Poland)

Ambassador's call was appropriate because Pulaski Day would be celebrated the next day. The Ambassador said it was also a big event in Poland and had already been observed there during the previous weekend. The President said this highlighted the role of Poles in our Revolution and history. During the picture-taking the President handed the Ambassador a movie of the President's Polish visit, noting that it had been made by American cameramen. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation.

After the press had left the President began the private conversation by recalling the beautiful day he had spent with Mrs. Nixon in Warsaw. He said the palace in which he had stayed as the guest of the Polish Government had been lovely but above all it had been the talks that remained in his memory. They had been very good talks and the President had been most impressed with Mr. Gierek, the Prime Minister, and all the Polish leaders he had met. Mr. Gierek was a very strong man. And Mrs. Nixon had been very impressed with Mrs. Gierek. The President said that he had shaken hands with Gierek on a series of commitments for cooperation and he was pleased to see that these matters were being followed up and moving forward.

Trampczynski said there were three specific areas. The Science and Technology agreement was now completed and all that was needed was a formal signature. The President said Dr. David has kept him informed. Trampczynski then mentioned the bondholders negotiations in which he said the positions were very close. The talks had gone on for a month and he was hopeful they would be completed successfully because this would then open the way for EXIM facilities for Poland. The President said our talks with the Soviets had been going on for two years, so to be successful in one month was quite an accomplishment. The President said he had talked recently with Henry Kearns and we were looking into the EXIM question. The President said he wanted to be sure the Poles understood that we wanted to do as much with them as with the Soviets although what we did with the Soviets was of course very important, including for the Poles.

Trampczynski then said the third issue was the PL-480 debt roll-over on which the Poles had one view and the US had another so that the talks that had been going on had just been adjourned.³ The President said that his commitment given to the Prime Minister stood. He well recalled the list of specific problems he had been shown in Warsaw on the last day and he has made sure that all the items would be followed up on. Of course in business questions there were always

³ The talks were deadlocked over U.S. insistence that Poland pay a 6 percent interest rate. See Document 173.

some technical problems that took time to take care of. But the Ambassador could be sure that we wanted to move ahead on all the items. Even when Dr. Kissinger was not in town, the White House kept a close eye on our relations with Poland. The Ambassador said he knew this since the White House had been very helpful.

The President said perhaps we should get more Polish ham. The Ambassador said the Poles were exporting some \$50 million worth. The President said this was very important because of our domestic meat prices. The Ambassador said there was a problem right now concerning certain health specifications that had to be met; it would take about two months for the Poles to comply.

As the meeting ended at about 12:10 p.m., the President said our relations were in a new era and were very good. The Ambassador said they were the best they had ever been.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

175. Editorial Note

In the fall of 1972, the Governments of the United States and Poland concluded a series of agreements based in part on the discussions between President Richard Nixon and First Secretary Edward Gierek in Warsaw on June 1 and the resulting National Security Decision Memorandum 173 (Document 170).

On October 31 Secretary of State William Rogers and Presidential Science Adviser Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., signed an "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Polish People's Republic on Cooperation in Science and Technology." The agreement was initialed simultaneously in Warsaw by the Polish Minister for Science, Higher Education and Technology, Jan Kaczmarek. See Department of State *Bulletin*, November 27, 1972, page 642. For the text of the agreement, see 24 UST 7565. On June 19 President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, citing "the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the President's visit to Poland," had requested recommendations for such an agreement from the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972) The response of the Under Secretaries Committee,

NSC-U/SM 117A, June 26, is *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-264, U/SM 115-119, U/SM 117A.

From November 4-8 the Joint American-Polish Trade Commission, established pursuant to the Warsaw communiqué of June 1, met in Washington. Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson led the U.S. delegation; Minister of Foreign Trade Tadeusz Olechowski headed the Polish side. During the talks, Olechowski affirmed that Poland had reached an interim agreement with the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., regarding compensation for U.S. dollar bonds issued by the Polish Government before World War II. In response, Nixon signed a Presidential Determination granting Poland access to Export-Import Bank credit facilities on November 8. The Presidential Determination, attached to a memorandum from Rogers to the President, October 19, is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, FN 6-1 POL. At the November meeting, the two sides also agreed in principle that of Poland's existing P.L.-480 debts, only the installments due in 1973 and 1974 would be deferred for a period of 4 years, and interest on the deferred amount would accrue at the rate of 6 percent per annum. During the discussions, the Polish negotiators presented a draft agreement on economic, industrial, and technological cooperation, to which the United States agreed to respond. The unpublished minutes from the talks are in telegram 204074 to Warsaw, November 9. (*Ibid.*, FT 3 POL-US)

The Chargé in Warsaw, Boster, reported on the ensuing mood in Warsaw on November 18 in telegram 5235. "It will scarcely come as a surprise to Department," he wrote, "but perhaps we should report that atmosphere in our contacts with Polish officialdom, increasingly cordial over past several months, seems at a new high following Foreign Trade Minister Olechowski's return last week. . . . Underlying this warmth is evident recognition that we have now been making good on promises, explicit or implicit, in President's visit last summer and belief that our cooperative attitude will continue. Polish officials we have talked to have been unanimous in expressing pleasure at agreements reached or projected in Washington Almost all sections of Embassy have commented this week that Polish doors seem a little wider open for them and, although we have never had particular problem in attracting Polish guests to our homes, we have had unusually good and friendly turnouts . . . at recent receptions." (*Ibid.*, POL POL-US)

On November 15 Polish Ambassador Witold Trampczynski delivered to the Department of State a letter from Gierek to President Nixon. The November 8 letter congratulated Nixon on his reelection. In a December 1 covering memorandum Kissinger told President Nixon: "The letter is unique in several respects. Never before has the head of the Polish Party sent a United States President a congratulatory message

of this sort. The letter also goes beyond the pleasantries usual on such occasions to mention (although in standard terms) several political matters, US-Polish relations, the Conference on European Security, and Vietnam. Moreover the letter is very warm in tone." Kissinger joined the Department of State in recommending that the President respond. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 699, Country Files—Europe, Poland, Vol. II 1972)

On December 4 Nixon signed a letter to Gierek thanking him for his "cordial and thoughtful letter." "It is satisfying to know," he wrote, "that the talks which I had with you and your colleagues have been followed by some very concrete and useful steps in our bilateral relations. . . . We anticipate that Poland will play a helpful role in preparing for the current projects for promoting cooperation in Europe. . . . As you will recall from our talks last spring, there is no cause to which I am more dedicated than ending the war in Vietnam. It now appears we are close to that goal. We look to your cooperation and assistance in the demanding task of keeping the peace in that area once the cease-fire has been established." (Ibid.)